The title page of the March 1518 *Utopia* shows the face of a thorn-crowned Christ at the top and the suicide of the Roman Lucretia at the bottom. Beholding the scene are Lucretia’s father and husband, along with Lucius Junius Brutus. After this event, Brutus would lead Rome to exile the Tarquin tyrants and to found the Roman Republic, becoming one of its first two consuls. For the Lucretia story, see Livy 1.58. For other treatments of Lucretia’s death, see Augustine, *City of God* (book 1, chapters 16–20), and Shakespeare’s *The Rape of Lucrece*. In his “argument” before the poem, Shakespeare explains the significance of what followed Lucretia’s death for Rome: “With one consent they all vowed to root out the whole hated family of the Tarquins; and bearing the dead body to Rome, Brutus acquainted the people with the doer and manner of the vile deed, with a bitter invective against the tyranny of the King: wherewith the people were so moved, that with one consent and a general acclamation the Tarquins were all exiled, and the state government changed from kings to consuls.” On consuls, see More’s Epigram 198, pp. 113–14.
CONCERNING THE BEST
STATE OF A COMMONWEALTH
and the new island of Utopia,
a truly golden handbook,
no less beneficial than entertaining
by the most distinguished and eloquent man
THOMAS MORE,
citizen and sheriff of the famous city of London

EPIGRAMS
of the very famous and very learned man
THOMAS MORE,
in large part translated from the Greek
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The order and illustrations are from the March 1518 edition of Utopia.

* “Paratexts” are the materials that surround the main published text. This is not a term used by More. Parerga (“something accessory to the main work”) is another term used for these supplementary materials. The Paratexts were translated by Dr. Bradley Ritter. The selected epigrams were translated by Drs. Bradley Ritter, Carl Young, and Erik Ellis.
Erasmus of Rotterdam sends greetings to John Froben, his dearest fellow father.

Although everything of my dear More has always delighted me beyond measure, still, I myself doubted my judgment somewhat, because of the very close friendship between us. But, when I see all learned men subscribe to my vote with one accord, and more eagerly look up even to the man's divine talents, not because they love him more, but because they are more discerning, I seriously applaud my opinion, and I will not fear, afterwards, saying openly what it is I think.

What, finally, would that amazing, fortunate nature not have shown had Italy instructed this talent? If it were available in its entirety for the rites of the Muses, if it had matured to a full crop and, as it were, until its autumn? He played at writing epigrams while very much a young man, and most of them as a boy. He has never left his homeland of Britain, except once or twice, carrying out an embassy on behalf of his king near Flanders. Aside from the care of his wife, aside from household concerns, aside from his carrying out his public office, and waves of court cases, he is distracted by so many and such great business matters for the realm that you would be amazed there is any free time for even thinking about books.

And so we have sent you his *Progymnasmata* and the *Utopia*, so that, if you agree, they might be printed by your press and entrusted to the world and posterity, for such is the authority of your shop, that a book delights the educated by the name alone, if it is known that it has come forth from the house of Froben.

Be well, with your excellent father-in-law, your delightful wife, and your sweet, sweet children. See to it that you have Erasmus—the little son shared by me and you, who was born amongst letters—educated by the best of letters. Louvain.

August 25, 1517.
William Budé to Englishman Thomas Lupset, greetings.

You are very much in favor with me, Lupset, most learned young man, who handed me the *Utopia* of Thomas More and brought to my attention a reading most pleasant and, at the same time, one which will be of use. For though you had pleaded with me for a long time, for what I would very much have longed for of my own accord, to read the six books *On Preserving Health* of Thomas Linacre, the doctor who very much excels in each of the two languages, to which, from among the great works of Galen, he recently gave Latinity, or, which he himself, rather, gave to Latinity, in such a way that if all the works of that author (which I think are tantamount to all of medicine) were to become Latin, at last, it would seem that then the school of doctors will not very much need a knowledge of Greek.

I ran through that book from among the writings of Linacre with such a haphazard reading—and I consider the use of these writings being granted to me by you for so long a time to be the pinnacle of favors—that I believe I made very much progress from that reading, but I would guarantee even greater progress for myself from the publication of that book which you are busily taking care of in the shops of this city. When I believed I was sufficiently obliged to you for this reason, look here, you have given me, as an addition or surplus to the prior favor, that *Utopia* of More, a man especially sharp, with a lovely talent, and very experienced in the appreciation of human affairs.

When I had that book in my hands, out in the country, constantly on the run, busy working, ordering the servants (for you know, in part, and partly you have heard, that I have spent a great deal of labor now for a second year on tasks at the farm), I was so very moved by reading it, once I learned of and thought over the character and institutions of the Utopians, that I almost interrupted and even cast aside my care for my private property, since I saw that the whole trade and work behind household management, and wholly all worry aimed at increasing one’s riches, was nonsense.

There is no one who doesn’t see and understand that the whole mortal race is harassed by this very thing, as if by some personal gadfly born with them. So I almost said it is necessary to admit that this is the goal of both legal and civic trades and fields, that, with an ingenuity as envious as it is exact, one person might always
take away something from another person, between whom there is a code of civil authority and sometimes kinship, or drag away, nibble away, deny away, squeeze out, beat out, carve out, twist out, shake out, strike out, pilfer, purloin, filch, carry off, and with the laws in part turning a blind eye, and in part themselves responsible, to take away and overturn.

And this happens so much more in those nations amongst whom law codes which are called civil and pontifical are more powerful in each of the two forums. Everyone sees that by their customs and institutions it has become the predominant opinion that men skilled in exceptions or, rather, in captiousness, and shrewd hunters after unaware fellow citizens, and workers of formulae, that is, of traps, most practiced in knotted law, and style consultants of lawsuits, and experts in debatable, perverted, inverted law, are all thought to be the high priests of justice and equity, and the only ones worthy to give a response on what is equitable and good, and even, which is much more important, to decide with the chief authority and power what each person may have, what he may not have, to what extent, and how long. And this according to the deliberation of an altogether commonly held view which is delirious.

Of course this is so, since most of us, blind with the thick sleep of ignorance in our eyes, think that each one has essentially the fairest case to the extent that he most demands his right or as he has relied upon right. Since if we want to demand rights according to the norm of truth and the prescription of gospel simplicity, no one is so stupid as to not understand, no one so mad as not to admit, if you press him, that what is right and sacred law today and for a long time in pontifical ordinances, and what is right and equitable in civil laws and the decisions of kings disagree just as much as the institutions of Christ, the founder of human affairs, and the customs of his disciples disagree with the decrees and decisions of those who think the heaps of goods of Croesus and Midas are the end and pinnacle of happiness. This is so much the case that if you should now wish to define justice as the earliest authors decided to, as what assigns to each one what is his own, you would find it nowhere in the public sphere, or (if I may allow myself to say this) we must admit it is some kitchen steward, whether you were to look at the character of those ruling now, or the mutual feelings of citizens and countrymen,—that is, if they did not really contend that it was a consequence of the justice which is authentic and as old as the universe (which they call natural law) that the right originated that the more power each person has, the more he has, and the more he has, the more eminent he should be among his fellow citizens.

And so it happens: we see it has already been accepted by the law of nations that those who can help their fellow citizens and countrymen neither by a trade nor any notable degree of hard work, if only they hold those knotted obligations and
pinched-like knots by which the inheritances of men are bound (and which the igno-
orant masses, and men devoted to more humane letters and far from the forum, acting for the sake of amusement or to investigate the truth, consider to be partly Gordian knots, partly the domain of quacks, and not very much worth wondering at), these people might be able to have the property of a thousand citizens, and often that of individual states, or even more; and these same people might be called, with great respect, wealthy, honest men, noble conquerors, of course, in those ages, by those institutions, by those customs, in those nations which have established the right that each person has the greatest trust and authority as he has built up his house with the greatest wealth, both he himself and his heirs.

And this all the more as their great-great-grandchildren, and the great-great-grandchildren of these, in turn, have taken the inheritances made by their ancestors and heaped them up in rivalry with splendid additions—that is, the more they have displaced their paternal relatives, their maternal relatives, their relations and blood relatives far and wide.

But Christ, really the founder and governor of possessions, after leaving a Pythagoras-like sharing and love between his followers, ordained it with a splendid example when Ananias was condemned to death for his violation of the law of sharing. By which institution, it seems to me Christ has annulled amongst his own, at least, all that belonging to that civil law and the argumentative volumes of the very much more recent pontifical law. This very law we see today holding on to the citadel of prudence and governing our fates.

But the island of Utopia, which I hear is also called Udепотia, by absolutely amazing circumstances, if we believe it, is said to have truly imbibed both publicly and privately Christian practices and an authentic wisdom itself, and to have preserved it unimpaired until this very day, as one might expect since it holds on, locked in combat, as they say, to three divine institutions: that is, equality of goods and evils between citizens, or, if you prefer, civility perfect in every detail; the consistent and determined love of peace and calm; and disregard for gold and silver—the three “overthrowings” (if I may say so) of all forms of deceit, fraudulent claims, cheats, cunning, and deceptive wickedness.

Were the gods by their own power to make it so that these three chief points of the Utopian constitution were fixed in the minds of all mortals with massive nails, solidly and fixedly persuasive, right away you would see arrogance, greed, insane competition and almost all the other wound-inflicting weapons of the Stygian foe collapse and grow weak, and that immense body of legal volumes, distracting so many extraordinary and strong talents all the way to the casket, as if ineffectual and unemployed, handed over to termites or assigned for wrapping paper in shops.

O immortal gods, what holiness on the Utopians’ part could earn from the
gods happiness, such that avarice and greed could not have burst in to that island alone, or snuck in over the course of so many centuries, and that their boldness and shamelessness could not hoot out and drive away justice, together with the sense of decency?

Had God, best and greatest, acted so kindly with those provinces which hold onto and embrace their designation given by his most holy name, certainly avarice, perverting and destroying so many minds which would otherwise be outstanding and lofty, would be departing once and for all, and the golden age of Saturn would return. For here, in fact, someone might have asserted that there is a danger that perhaps Aratus and the early poets were deceived in their thinking, since they placed justice in the zodiac, leaving the world behind. For it must be that she remained behind on the island of Utopia, and it has not yet reached heaven, if we trust Hythloday.

But I have investigated and discovered that Utopia is located outside the borders of the known world, of course, a Fortunate Isle, perhaps quite close to the Elysian Fields (for Hythloday has not yet given its location in a certain region, as More himself bears witness), itself divided into many cities, but all coming together or combining harmoniously into one state, namely Hagnopolis, satisfied by all means with its own ways and goods, happy in its innocence, leading a life in a certain sense heavenly, below heaven, but above the flotsam and jetsam of this known world, which is carried away with confusion and agitation into a headlong fall amidst so many mortals’ interests which are as hasty and hurried as they are empty and worthless.

So we owe the knowledge of that island to Thomas More, who has made known the pattern of the happy life and a rule of life in our age, discovered by Hythloday, as he himself reports, to whom he ascribes everything he heard. Inasmuch as he planned the state for the Utopians, and founded the practices for them and their institutions, that is, he borrowed the subject matter of the happy life from them and introduced it, More of course has embellished the island and its sacred institutions through his style and speech, and polished the Hagnopolitans’ very state according to square and ruler, and added all these things which allow for elegance and beauty to be added to the magnificent work—even if in the process of doing that work he has claimed for himself the part of a mere arranger.

Apparently, he was conscientious to not take the greater role in that work, so that Hythloday might not be able to rightly complain that the glory had been plucked by More before he could, and had its flowers removed, if at any time he himself decided to entrust his own productions to print, since he was certainly being careful that Hythloday, who is now fond of living on the island of Udepotia, might
himself appear at some point and be annoyed and distressed at More’s unkindness in leaving him the deflowered glory for his discovery. For to be persuaded in this way is so typical of men both good and wise.

And the testimony of Peter Giles of Antwerp causes me to have complete trust in More, a man important on his own account, and relying on great authority, a man never known to me in person, whom I love (I pass over, for now, the excellence of his learning and character) for this reason, because he is a most trustworthy friend of Erasmus, who is a most notable man and most deserving in every kind of writing when it comes to both sacred and profane literature, with which very man I even entered into a friendship long ago with sealed letters on both sides.

Farewell, my most beloved Lupset, greet Linacre on my behalf, that pillar of the British name, as far as pertains to good letters, no longer any more your possession than ours, either in person or with a letter as a messenger, and this at the earliest possible moment. For he is one of the few whose approval I would have gladly won, if I could, since he himself also, while active here personally won my and my friend John Ruelle’s approval (a colleague in studies), and I look up to his excellent learning and his precise attentiveness in particular, and I strive to equal it.

I would even like for you to send More my greetings, as I said, or give him my greetings, or both on my orders once and a second time, a man who was in my opinion and in my conversation registered in the rather sacred album of Minerva, and as concerns Utopia, the island in the new world, I love him and regard him in the utmost. For our age, and later ages, will consider the account of it as a sort of seed-bed of choice and useful institutions, whence they might bring in customary habits and adapt them, each into his own city. Goodbye! From Paris, on the day before the Kalends of August. [July 31, 1517]

ON UTOPIA

A poem on the island of Utopia by ANEMOLIUS,
poet laureate and son of Hythloday’s sister

Called Utopia [“No Place”] by the ancients for my under-population,
Now, I am a rival to Plato’s city, perhaps its victor:
What that city depicted with words, I alone have produced
With men and resources and the best laws.
I should be called, deservedly, by the name Eutopia [“Good Place”].
This woodcut by Ambrosius Holbein appeared in the March 1518 edition of Utopia.
This page from the 1518 *Utopia* gives at the top the Utopians’ alphabet, followed by “A four-line poem in the Utopian Language.” At the bottom is given in Latin:

**This is the word for word meaning of these verses.**

Utopus ha Boccas peula chama Polta chamaan
Bargol he maglomi baccan Soma gynosphaon
Agrama gymnosophon labarem Bacha bodamilomin
Volualu barchin heman la lauloulu drama pagloni.

Utopus, the general, made me an island out of a non-island.
I alone of all lands without philosophy
have shown a philosophical city to mortals.
I am glad to share what is my own; I am not
displeased to receive what is better.
To the most celebrated Jerome Busleyden, mayor of Aire, councilor to the Catholic King Charles, Peter Giles of Antwerp sends greetings.

In the past few days, most distinguished Busleyden, Thomas More, the outstanding glory of this era of ours, and you are a witness, as he is quite well-known to you, sent me the Island of Utopia, still known to few mortal men, but especially worthy for all to want to learn of it, as more than Platonic, first and foremost, expressed by a man most eloquent in such a way, described in such a way, set before the eyes in such a way that however many times I read it, I think I see a little more than when I heard Raphael Hythloday himself uttering his own words (for I was present for that conversation just as much as More himself was).

Even if that man, endowed with an eloquence which is hardly common, explained the matter in such a way that it was quite apparent he was not reporting things which he had learned from others telling him, but which he had, as it were, drunk in at close quarters with his own eyes, and in which he had not been engaged for a short amount of time, the man, in my opinion, is superior even to Ulysses himself in his experience of regions, men and affairs, and is like one, I would guess, who has never been born in the last 800 years, compared to whom Vespucci seems to have seen nothing. Now, besides the fact that we tell more effectively things we’ve seen than things we’ve heard, there was a kind of facility specific to him in explaining things.

But still, whenever I contemplate these same things painted with More’s brush, I am so moved that I think, sometimes, I am located in Utopia itself. And, goodness, I would have believed Raphael himself saw less in that island through the whole five-year period he spent there than one may see in More’s description. So many miracles are encountered from all angles that I hesitate regarding what I should be amazed at first or most of all, the trustworthiness of his very rich memory, which could render almost word for word so many things which were only heard; or his prudence, since he thus noticed the sources, commonly totally unknown, whence either all evils arise for a commonwealth, or goods could arise. Or his strength and skill in speech, with which he, with so great a purity of Latin language, such great powers of speech, embraced so many matters, especially one distracted by so many public affairs and, at the same time, household affairs. But you are less amazed at
all of these things, most learned Busleyden, since, with a relationship which is even familiar, you have come to know deeply the talent of the man, greater than a man and nearly divine.

So, in other respects, there is nothing I can add to his writings. I just had the four-line poem written in the native language of the Utopians added, which Hythloday by chance showed me after More’s departure, after putting the alphabet of the same people in front, then with some small notes added to the margins of the pages.

As for his distress over the location of the island, Raphael was not totally silent even on that point, although saying quite little about it, and he just touched on it, as it were, in passing, as if he were saving it for some other occasion. And, admittedly some kind of misfortune or other begrudged each of us in this. Since, when Raphael was saying these things, someone from his servants had come up to More, who was whispering something or other to him, and while I was listening so much more attentively, one of my companions, coughing rather loudly, from a cold fever caught on the sea journey, prevented my hearing some words of his as he spoke. But I will not rest until I have found this aspect, as well, in full, so that I will give you, in precise detail, not only the island’s location, but even the elevation of the pole, if only our friend Hythloday is safe and sound.

For a conflicting rumor is being reported about the man. Some assert that he was lost on a journey; again others that he returned to his native land, but partly not able to endure the customs of his people, partly troubled and missing Utopia, he moved back there.

For as to the fact that the name of this island has not been found anywhere amongst cosmographers, Hythloday himself did a fine job dismissing this, seeing that it could have happened, he says, that the name which the ancients used was afterwards changed; or this island escaped even their attention, since even today very many lands crop up, never once touched on by those ancient geographers. Although what is the point of supplying credibility with proofs here, since it is that More who is the author?

But, because he hesitates concerning publication, I praise and acknowledge the man’s modesty. But to me the work seemed in every way unworthy of being long repressed, and worthy, along with the best, of getting out into men’s hands, and that after being recommended to the world by your name, most of all, either because More’s gifts have been especially well-observed by you, or because no one is more capable of helping the commonwealth with the right counsels, which you have already been engaged in for very many years with the highest praise, first of your prudence, next for your integrity. Farewell, Maecenas of scholarship and glory of this age. At Antwerp. November 1, 1516.
Thomas More to Peter Giles, greetings.

It shames me almost, dearest Peter Giles, to send you this little book about the Utopian Commonwealth after almost a year, when I have no doubt you expected it within a month and a half. Of course, you knew that I was spared any labor of invention in the work, and no thought needed to be taken for its disposition, since I only had to recite what I, right along with you, heard Raphael recount. Hence there was nothing to work out in the style nor could the man’s conversation be polished, because, for one thing, it was improvised on the spur of the moment, and for another, the speaker, as you know, was not as learned in Latin as in Greek, so that the closer my language approached his careless simplicity, the closer it would come to the truth, and in this circumstance, truth alone is what I should care about, and in fact do care about.

I confess, my dear Peter, so much labor was taken out of my hands since these things were furnished, that practically nothing was left for me to do. Otherwise, either the devising or the internal arrangement of this matter could have demanded no little time and study from someone of no mean talent and of no little learning. But if it were required that the matter be written elegantly as well, and not just truthfully: that, to be sure, could not have been provided by me regardless of how much time or study I put into it. But since these concerns were removed which would have cost me so much sweat and toil, and since all that was left was simply to write down what I heard, it was really no trouble.

But nevertheless, my other business left almost less than no time for the completion of this non-business. While I constantly plead legal cases, hear others, close some as arbiter, settle others as judge, while I visit one person out of duty, another on business, while I share nearly the whole day out with others and the rest with my household, I leave for myself—that is, for letters—no time at all.

Of course when I return home, I must converse with my wife, chat with my children, talk with my servants. I count all these things as part of my business, since it is necessary that they be done (necessary indeed, unless you want to be a stranger in your own home) and you have to put some work into making yourself as pleasing...
as possible to those whom nature has provided or chance has made or you yourself have chosen to be the companions of your life, provided you do not corrupt them by companionship or turn your servants into masters by your indulgence.

In the midst of such things, a day, a month, a year slips by. When, then, do I write? So far I haven’t mentioned anything about sleeping or eating, which uses up no less time, for many, than sleep, and sleep takes up nearly half of life as it is. But for myself the only time I get is what I steal from sleeping and eating, which since it is little, the work has gone slowly, but because it is at least something, I have finished at last; and I send the Utopia to you, my dear Peter, that you may read it, and remind me if we have missed anything.

For even though I do not completely distrust myself in that respect (I only wish I could amount to something in inborn talent and learning, as I am not totally abandoned by my memory), I do not trust myself so much as to believe nothing could have escaped me. For my young John Clement—who was there with us, as you know: a person I never allow to be absent from a conversation in which there might be some fruit, since I hope for an excellent harvest some day from this fresh shoot of Latin and Greek letters—has put me into considerable doubt about something.

Because, by what I remember, while Hythloday related that the bridge at Am-aurotum, by which the river Anydrus is spanned, was five hundred paces long, John says that two hundred paces must be subtracted since the width of the river was not over three hundred paces. I ask you: can you recall the matter to your memory? For if you think as John does, I will also agree, and assume I have made a mistake; if you do not remember, I will write as I have done, that is, what I seem to remember, for, just as I am taking as much care as possible that there be nothing false in the book, so, if anything is in doubt, I would rather say what is false than speak falsely, preferring to be good rather than prudent.

And yet it would be easy to remedy this problem if you ask Raphael himself, either in person or by letter—and it is, in fact, necessary that you do this, on account of yet another misgiving which has occurred to me—whether more through my own fault or yours or even Raphael’s, I do not know. For it never came to mind for me to ask, nor for him to say, in what part of that new world Utopia is located. I would pay no small amount of money now, not to have missed this; on the one hand, it embarrasses me somewhat not to know in what sea that island is located about which I have so much to say, and on the other, because there are one or another among us—one man especially: a devout man, and theologian by profession—who burns with a marvelous desire to go to Utopia, not out of a vain and curious passion to see novelties, but in order to foster and increase our religion,
so happily begun there already. In order to do this correctly, he decided beforehand to take care that he could be sent by the Pope, and what is more, that he be made bishop for the Utopians—he was not deterred by any scruple about having to ask for the office, since, of course, he considers ambition to be holy when it comes by reason of piety, and not through considerations of honor or monetary profit.

For this reason I beg you, my dear Peter, that either in person, if it is convenient, or by letter, if you are away, to call on Hythloday and make sure that this work of mine does not contain anything false or lack anything true. It might be better just to show him the book itself. For there is no one else equally capable of making a correction, if any mistake has been made, nor can he do this without reading through all that I have written. In addition, by doing this, you will know whether he gladly accepts it or takes it hard that I have written it. For if he has decided to commit his own labors to writing himself, he might not want me to; and I certainly would not want, by publishing the Utopian commonwealth, to steal from him the flower and delightful novelty of his account.

And yet, to tell the truth, I still have not really decided whether I will publish it at all. The tastes of mortals are so various, the dispositions of some so peevish, their spirits so ungrateful, their judgments so absurd, that it seems to go better, by no small degree, for those who pleasingly and cheerfully indulge their own bent than for those who consume themselves with worry in order to publish something useful or pleasant for others who will only feel disdain for it or be ungrateful.

Very many people do not know letters; many despise them. The barbarian rejects as harsh whatever is plainly not barbaric; know-it-alls scorn as trivial whatever is not filled with obsolete words. Some people are pleased only with what is old; still more are only pleased by what they write themselves. One person is so severe that he does not allow jokes; another so tasteless, he cannot bear wit. Some people are so snub-nosed that they avoid all satire just as a man bitten by a rabid dog avoids water. Others are so fickle that they approve one thing when they are sitting and another when they are standing.

They sit in taverns, and over their drinks they judge the talents of writers; they condemn every author out of his own writings with great authority, and however it pleases them, pulling them by the hair, all the while themselves staying safe, and, as is commonly said, “out of range.” Indeed they are so smooth and completely shaven that they do not have even an honest man’s hair by which they can be apprehended.

There are also others who are so ungrateful that although they are hugely delighted by a work, they have not a whit more love for the author. They are not unlike those inhumane guests who, although courteously received with sumptuous feasting, at last depart for home, full, without giving any thanks to the one who
invited them. Go now and furnish a feast at your own expense for people—with their delicate palates, varied appetites, and such grateful and retentive minds!

But nevertheless, my dear Peter, you must do what I have said regarding Hythloday. Afterwards, it will be in my power to deliberate on the matter once more. However, if he does consent, and now that I’ve finished the labor of writing, I would be “wise too late” [if he didn’t]. In the future, I will follow my friends’ advice on publishing, and yours in particular. Farewell to you, dearest Peter Giles, and to your most excellent wife: love me as you always have, since I love you even more than I have ever done.
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When recently, the most invincible King of England, Henry—the eighth of that name, and adorned to the utmost with all the arts of an outstanding ruler—had certain business of no small importance to take care of in a dispute with the most serene Charles, Prince of Castile, in order to discuss and settle the matter, he sent me to Flanders as his orator and as the companion and colleague of that incomparable man, Cuthbert Tunstall, whom the King had recently made Master of the Rolls, to everyone’s immense satisfaction, and to whose praises, of course, I shall add nothing, not because I fear lest the testimony of a friend should be given little trust, but because his virtue and learning are greater than can be told by me, and are everywhere too well-known and illustrious to need to be told anyway, unless I should want to seem, as they say, to show off the sun with a lamp.

They met us at Bruges, by prior arrangement: all outstanding men, to whom their prince had entrusted the business. Their leader and head was the mayor of Bruges, a magnificent man, but their voice and heart was Georges de Themsecke,
Provost of Cassel, eloquent by nature as well as by schooling; in addition, he is most learned in the law, and consummately skilled in his craft, thanks both to his natural genius for doing business and to his long experience in negotiations. When we had met once or twice and could not satisfactorily agree on certain points, they said good-bye to us for a few days and set out for Brussels to consult the oracular response of their prince [Charles]. Meanwhile, (since my business required it) I went to Antwerp.

While I stayed there, no visitor was more gratifying to me than Peter Giles, a native of Antwerp, highly trusted by his fellow citizens, holding a good position and deserving someday of the highest position; it is hard to say whether this young man is greater in learning or in character. For he is an excellent man and very well-educated, and also, while quite frank with everyone, toward his friends especially he has a sympathetic heart, is loving, trustworthy, and so sincerely affectionate, that you could hardly ever find one or two others to compare with him in all the aspects of friendship. He has a rare modesty; no one is farther from guile than he; in no one is there a more prudent simplicity. Moreover, he was so charming in his conversation, and so blamelessly witty, that my longing for my country, home, wife, and children whom I anxiously desired to see again (by that time I had already been away more than four months) was in large part alleviated by his most delightful companionship and sweet conversation.

One day I went to the divine service at the temple of holy Mary—a structure most beautiful in workmanship and most frequented by the people—and when the sacred ritual was over, and I was preparing to return to my lodging, I happened to see Peter speaking with a certain stranger bent with age, his face sunburned, his beard long, a traveling-cloak negligently hanging on his shoulder; by his face and clothing he appeared to be a ship’s captain.

But when Peter caught sight of me, he came over to greet me, and drawing me aside a little as I was trying to return the greeting, says:

“Do you see this man?”—at the same time, he pointed at the man with whom I had seen him talking—“I was just about to bring him right over to you.”

“He would have been most welcome,” I said, “considering it was you who brought him.”

“No, if you knew him, you would think him welcome on his own merits,” said Peter. “For there is no mortal man alive today who can offer so great an account of unknown people and lands, the kinds of things I know you are most keen to hear about.”

“Well then,” I said, “my guess was not too bad. As soon as I saw him, I immediately took him for a ship’s captain.”
“And yet,” he said, “you are really far off target: he did not sail as a Palinurus, but as a Ulysses, or rather, as a Plato. Indeed, Raphael here (for that’s his name), surnamed Hythloday, is not unlearned in Latin, but is very learned in Greek—to which he was more devoted than he was to the Roman tongue, because he had committed himself completely to philosophy, in which subject he recognized nothing of any importance extant in Latin except certain works of Seneca and Cicero. He left the inheritance he had at home to his brothers (for he is Portuguese), and with a desire to behold the whole world, joined Amerigo Vespucci and was his constant companion on the last three of those four voyages which are now read about far and wide, except that he did not return on the last one. For he went to much trouble to have Amerigo let him be among those twenty-four who were left behind in the garrison at the farthest point of their voyage. And so he was left behind as he wished, a man more concerned with travel than with being laid to rest, who is always saying things like: “He who has no grave is buried under the sky,” and “the road to the heavens is the same from all places.” And if God had not been favorable to him, this mindset would have cost him all too dearly. And so, after Vespucci departed, he traveled through many regions with five of his comrades from the garrison. At last, by some wonderful fortune, he was carried to Taprobane; from there he arrived in Calicut where he conveniently found some ships of the Portuguese, and finally sailed back to his homeland, contrary to all hope.”

When Peter related this, and after I had thanked him for being so obliging to me as to consider it so very important that I myself enjoy a discussion with a man whose conversation he anticipated I would like, I turned to Raphael, and when we had greeted each other and had spoken those commonplace things which are usually said when strangers first meet, we left that place and went to my house, where, sitting together in the garden on a bench covered with grassy turf, we conversed.

He then related to me how, after Vespucci had departed, he and his associates who had remained behind in the garrison, began, through arranged meetings and flattery, gradually to insinuate themselves among the peoples of that land, and to interact with them not only safely but familiarly, until they became the favorites of a certain ruler (whose country and name escape me). He related how, by this man’s generosity, supplies and travel-provisions were abundantly provided for him and his five companions, and how, for the journey—over sea on rafts or over land by wagon—he provided a very trustworthy guide, who would take them to other rulers, whom they sought out and to whom they had been diligently recommended beforehand. For, after traveling many days, he said they found towns and cities and not very badly established commonwealths, with large populations.

To be sure, at the equator, and on both sides to the north and south of it, about
as widely as the orbit of the sun embraces, vast deserts lie before one, scorched in a perpetual heat. Squalor and gloom are everywhere to be seen, and everything rough and without cultivation, inhabited by wild animals and snakes and finally, by humans no less wild than the beasts, and no less harmful. Yet when you have sailed farther, gradually everything becomes tamer. The climate is less harsh, the ground is more pleasing with its verdure, the innate dispositions of animals gentler; finally, peoples, cities, and towns appear, and amongst them there is constant commercial exchange by sea and land, not only locally and with neighboring lands, but also with far distant nations.

From then on, they acquired the means to visit many lands near and far, since there was not a ship equipped for any voyage that did not gladly take him and his companions aboard. He recounted that the ships which they observed in the first regions were flat-bottomed, with billowing sails made of papyrus and wovencanvas sails — and everything was similar, in short, to our own.

The sailors were not unskilled with sea and sky. But, he recounted, he won marvelous favor when he taught them the use of the compass, of which they had been utterly ignorant. That was why they had been accustomed to entrust themselves to the sea only fearfully, and not easily at any time besides the summer. Now, however, with their new confidence in the magnetic compass, they scorn winter and are now more carefree than careful — so there is a danger that, through imprudence, what was thought would be a great benefit to them, might become the source of great evils.

To set out fully what he said he saw in each place would take too much time, nor is it the design of this work; perhaps it will be told on another occasion, whatever would be particularly useful to know — and in the first place, whatever right and prudent measures he noticed anywhere among people who were living together as citizens. For we too inquired most avidly about these things, and he discussed them most gladly; meanwhile, we left aside asking about monsters, since nothing is less novel. For you cannot go anywhere without finding Scyllas and greedy Celaenos and people-devouring Laistrygonians and immense fictions of that sort, but sensibly and wisely educated citizens you will hardly discover anywhere.

And yet, just as he noted many mistaken ideas among those unfamiliar peoples, he also recounted quite a few things that can be taken as examples fit for correcting the errors of our cities, nations, peoples, and kingdoms; which, as I said, I must recall on another occasion. For now, my only intention is to report what he related to us about the customs and institutions of the Utopians; adding, by way of preface, the conversation by which, through a sort of natural current, he came to mention that commonwealth.
For, once Raphael had very prudently recounted errors—some made in our part of the world, others made over there (and very many made in both places)—as well as more wisely planned things, both among us and among them, seeming to have grasped the customs and institutions of each and every people he had visited as if he had lived his whole life among them, Peter in astonishment at him said,

“My dear Raphael, I really wonder why you do not attach yourself to some king—I am fairly sure that there is not one who would not be extremely pleased with you, since you would be in a position not only to entertain him with this learning and experience about places and people but also to instruct with examples and assist with your counsel; at the same time, this is a way you could see to your own business excellently and be able to be of service to the interests of all your friends and relations.”

“As for my own people,” he said, “I am not very moved in their regard since I think I have pretty well fulfilled the obligations I have toward them. For the possessions that others do not let go of until they are old and ill, and even then only let them go with an ill humor because they can’t keep them anymore anyway, I have distributed to my relatives and friends while I was still healthy and strong, and young, too. I think that they ought to be content with that kindness of mine, and not demand or expect that I put myself into the servitude of kings for their sake.”

“What a thing to say!” Peter said. “I meant, not that you would be ‘in servitude’ to kings but ‘in service’ to them.”

“Servitude,” he said, “has only one syllable more than service.”

“But I think,” answered Peter, “that no matter what name you use, it is nevertheless a way you can be of help to others, both publicly and privately, while rendering your own condition happier.”

“Would I make my condition any happier,” Raphael said, “by a way of life my mind abhors? As it is, I live as I wish, which I certainly suspect is the case with very few royal courtiers. In fact, there are plenty of people who are ambitious for the friendship of the powerful, so you should not think it a great loss for them to do without me and one or two others like me.”

Then I said, “It is very clear to me, Raphael, that you are desirous of neither riches nor power, and indeed, I have no less reverence and admiration for a man of your mind than for any of those in the highest positions of authority. But you will certainly appear to do something worthy of that so very noble and so truly philosophical mind of yours if you would prepare yourself—even with some inconvenience to your private life—to adapt your talents and industry to public affairs: something you could never do more effectively than by becoming an advisor to some great ruler, and by persuading him, as I am certain you would, to do right and
honest things. Indeed, it is from the ruler—as if from some everlasting spring—that there flows a torrent of all goods and evils for the whole nation. But as for you, your learning is so complete, even aside from your practical experience, and your practical experience so great, even without the learning, that you would present yourself as an excellent councilor to any king."

“You are twice mistaken, my dear More,” he said, “first about me, and second, about the business itself. For I do not have that ability you attribute to me, and even if I had it to the highest level, nevertheless, if I made my leisure activity into a business, I would not advance the public interest one bit. For, first of all, almost all rulers more gladly busy themselves with military endeavors (something about which I neither have expertise nor want to acquire any), rather than with the good arts of peace, and they have far greater eagerness to learn the ways by which they can gain new realms for themselves, by fair means or foul, rather than to learn how to administer well what they have already.

“Besides, when it comes to those who counsel kings, they are all either so wise in fact that they don’t need counsel, or else think that they are wise, so as not to enjoy having to accept someone else’s counsel, except when they all agree with, and freeloading on the most absurd statements of the people who are most in favor with the ruler and whom they try to win over by agreeing with them. Certainly, it has been devised by nature that each one favors his own productions, just as the crow and monkey delight in their own offspring.

“But if anyone in that assembly of those who envy others’ opinions and prefer their own, brings in something new either that he read was done in other times or that he saw being done in other places, the listeners act as if their entire reputation for wisdom were being put at risk, and as if they would afterwards be taken as utter fools unless they managed to find some fault in the discoveries of others. If all else fails, they take refuge in saying: ‘These arrangements were pleasing to our ancestors, and would that we were their equals in prudence!’ And, having said that, they sit down and act as if the position had been fully and superbly argued, as if it would be very dangerous for someone to be considered wiser than his ancestors in any matter. However, anything that has been well arranged by those ancestors, we ignore with the utmost indifference, but if there is something they could have planned more wisely, we seize eagerly on that like a kind of lever, and never let it go. I have encountered such proud, absurd, and peevish judgments often, both elsewhere and once even in England.”

“What,” I said, “have you been in our country?”

“Yes,” he said, “and I spent several months there, not long after that disaster in which the civil rebellion of western Englishmen against the king was suppressed
with pitiful slaughter. Meanwhile, I was very obliged to the most revered Father, John Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal, and then also the Chancellor of England: a man, my dear Peter (and More knows what I am going to say), respected for his authority but no less for his prudence and virtue. He was a man of medium height, not yet giving in to his advanced age; a face you would revere, but not be frightened of; easy to talk to, yet earnest and serious. He enjoyed testing those who came to ask him for things by addressing them sometimes rather roughly, but harmlessly, to see what they were made of and what presence of mind they could show. He was delighted when he found it and welcomed it as a virtue akin to his own—provided it was free of impudence—and as suited for administering public affairs. His conversation was polished and effective; he had great expertise in law and an incomparable genius, a memory so excellent it was astonishing. And he had developed these outstanding natural gifts through study and practice. It seemed, while I was there, that this man’s counsel was greatly trusted by the king and much depended upon by the commonwealth. And this was because at just about the beginning of his youth he was taken straight from school to the court, where he became involved all his life long with important business and was constantly tossed about by the changing tides of fortune until, by many and great dangers, he learned prudence in affairs—which, once acquired like this, does not easily slip away.

“By utter chance, when I was a guest at his table one day, a certain layman was there, who was an expert in the laws of your people. Having found some occasion or other, he began to praise in detail the strict justice that was being enforced at the time on thieves in England, who, he related, were being executed all over the place, sometimes twenty hanging on a single gallows, and he said that he wondered all the more at what evil fate made it happen that, when so few escaped the penalty, so many were still everywhere on the increase. Then I (making bold to speak freely in the Cardinal’s presence) said: ‘You should not wonder at all. For this punishment of thieves is both beyond what is just, and not for the public benefit. For it is too brutal for punishing theft, yet not sufficient for deterring it. Simple theft, in fact, is not so great a crime that it deserves capital punishment, nor is there any penalty so great that it can restrain those from robbery who have no other trade for seeking their livelihood. So in this matter not only you, but a good part of the world as well, appear to imitate bad teachers, who would more gladly beat their students than teach them. For severe and fearful punishments are decreed for thieving, when in fact, what should much rather be provided, is some means for making a living, so there would be no dire necessity first, to steal, and second, to die for it.’

“We have provided for this well enough’, the man said. ‘There are practical arts; there is farming—by which they could earn a livelihood, if they did not of their own accord prefer to be evil.’
“‘But you will not get off the hook so easily,’ I said. ‘First, let’s leave aside those who often return home maimed, either from foreign or civil wars, as recently from the war with the Cornishmen, and, not so long ago, from the war with the French. They sacrifice their limbs to the commonwealth or for the king, and their disability prevents them from practicing their first trades, while age does not allow them to learn a new one. Let us leave these men aside,’ I said, ‘since wars come and go. Let’s consider things which never fail to happen.’

“‘There is, then, so great a number of noblemen, who pass their time idly like drones on the labors of others (such, you can imagine, as the tenant-farmers on their estates, whom they shave to the quick by raising their rents, and that’s the only frugality they know, being otherwise wasteful to the point of having to beg for money themselves); not only that, but they also take around with them an immense crowd of idle followers, who never learned the art of making a living. These, as soon as their master dies, or they themselves fall sick, are thrown out on the spot. For their lords more gladly support them idle than sick, and often the heir of the dying man is not immediately able to support his father’s entire household.’

“‘Meanwhile they actively starve unless they actively steal. And what else are they to do? After wandering around a bit and wearing down both their health and their clothes, now squalid with sickness and covered in tatters, the nobly-born do not deem them worthy of acceptance, and the country folk do not dare to, for they are not unaware that the sort of person who has been brought up softly in idleness and luxury, who has become accustomed to wearing a sword and buckler, and to looking down threateningly on everybody in the neighborhood, and to condemning everyone in comparison with himself—such a man would scarcely be fit to serve a poor man faithfully with mattock and hoe, for stingy pay and a moderate livelihood.’

“‘But this,’ the lawyer replied, ‘is the sort of men we should foster above all. For on them depend the strength and vigor of the army if a war has to be fought, since they have loftier spirits and are more nobly-born than craftsmen and farmers.’

“‘Actually,’ I said, ‘you could likewise say that thieves must be fostered for the sake of war, since no doubt you will never lack thieves, as long as you have these men. In fact, robbers make fairly energetic soldiers, and soldiers are not the most cowardly robbers, so nicely do these two arts agree with each other. But although this fault is widespread among you, it is not peculiar to England, for it is common to almost all nations.’

“‘For there is yet another more pestilent pest infesting France: the whole country is filled with and besieged by mercenaries, even in peacetime (if you can call it peace), who have been brought in on account of the same conviction which has led you to think these idle attendants here should be supported. Indeed, this is because
it has been decided by some ‘wise fools’ that public safety lies in always having ready-to-hand a strong and stable garrison, especially of veterans. For they do not entrust anything to unpracticed men, so they must even seek out war to avoid having inexperienced soldiers, and throats must be gratuitously cut, lest, as Sallust put it so wittily, “the hand or spirit begin to grow dull through idleness.” But how disastrous it is to keep such beasts, France has learned to its own detriment, and the examples of the Romans, Carthaginians, Syrians, and many other nations have also shown the same. In all of these countries, standing armies have at some opportunity or another, overthrown not only their government but also the countryside and the cities themselves.

“But how very unnecessary it is to keep such armies becomes clear from this: that not even the French soldiers, highly trained in arms from infancy, when compared to your [English] draftees, can boast very often that they have left the field as superiors (not to go into it in more detail, lest I appear to be flattering the present company). But neither your urban craftsmen nor your rude and rustic farmers (except for those with a body unfit for acts of strength and boldness or whose confidence has been broken by their own poverty) are believed to fear greatly the idle attendants of the nobly-born; so much the less is there any danger that these [idle attendants], whose strong and hearty bodies (the only ones the nobly-born deem worthy of corruption) now grow feeble with leisure and soft with almost ladylike activities, might become effeminate if they were instructed in the good arts of making a livelihood and exercised by manly labors.

“However this matter stands, I for my part certainly do not think that it benefits the commonwealth to prepare for the chance of war (which you never have if you do not want it) by supporting an unnumbered crowd of the sort that disturbs peace, when peace should be thought about so much more than war. And yet it is not this alone that necessitates thievery. There is another far greater reason, I believe, peculiar to you.’

“What is that?’ asked the Cardinal.

“Your sheep,” I said, ‘that are usually so mild and so meagerly fed (as they say) become so ravenous and untamed that they devour the people themselves, and lay waste and ravage their fields, homes, and towns. For in whatever parts of the realm finer and therefore more expensive wool is produced, there also are nobles and nobly-born—and even some holy abbots—who are not content with the returns and annual profits which our ancestors used to reap from their estates, and do not consider it enough to live leisurely and lavishly and be in no way beneficial to the public, unless they harm it as well, leaving no land for plowing, closing off everything for pasture, demolishing homes, destroying towns, but sparing the
churches—if only for the purpose of stabling sheep, and as if woodlands and preserves for wild game took up too little land among you, those fine men turn all dwellings, and anything ever cultivated, into wasteland.

“‘Therefore, in order that one insatiable glutton—a dire pest to his country—may combine his fields and encircle so many thousand acres with one fence, tenant-farmers are thrown out. Some, either entrapped by fraud or overpowered by force, are even stripped of their possessions or, wearied by injuries, are driven to sell. And so, by whatever method, there is an exodus of miserable people—men, women, husbands, wives, orphans, widows, parents with small children; and a household more numerous than wealthy, since farming has need of many hands—off they trudge, I say, from the homes they knew and were used to, without having any place to go, and all their household equipment—scarcely worth much even if it could wait around for someone to come along who wanted to buy it—they sell off for the minimum price at the time when they are forced to leave.

“‘When they have spent what little they have after brief wanderings, what else is left, finally, except to steal and be hanged for it?—so justly, of course!—or to become vagrants and beg? Of course, then also will they be thrown into prison for walking around idly like vagabonds since there is no one to hire them, although they very eagerly offer their labor. For when it comes to farm labor, which is what they are used to, there is nothing to be done once no land is left for sowing. Of course, only a single shepherd or herdsman is needed for the land to feed herds, while many hands were needed to work that same land when it was used to produce crops.

“‘And so it happens that in many places grain is sold at a much higher cost. And in fact the price of wool, too, has increased to such an extent that it certainly cannot be bought by the poor, who usually make cloth from it in your country, and for this reason many of them are banished from work into idleness. For, after the pasture lands were increased, a pestilence consumed a countless number of sheep, as though God were avenging greed by sending the infection on the sheep—which would have been more justly re-routed upon the heads of the landowners. But however greatly the number of sheep increases, the price still does not decrease. And if this cannot be called a monopoly because there is not only one seller, it is certainly an oligopoly. For the sheep have nearly all fallen back into the hands of a few, and these are the rich, who are pressed by no necessity to sell before they please, nor does it please them to sell before they can do so, and for as much as they please!

“‘The same issue affects other kinds of livestock, making them equally expensive, and even more so, because, once farms have been destroyed and the rural economy diminished, nobody is available there to care for the breeding of animals. For
those rich men do not rear the young of cattle as they do the young of the sheep, but buy them lean and cheap from elsewhere, and after they have fattened them on their own pastures, sell them back at a high price. And for this reason, I believe, the whole scope of the damage done by this situation has still not been felt. In fact, the sellers only make [the livestock] more expensive in the places where they sell them. But when they have removed them from there somewhat more quickly than they can be born, and when at last the supply also gradually diminishes where they are sold, it is necessary that in this place too there be suffering due to a noticeable scarcity.

“'And so the very thing that made your island appear especially happy is now being transformed into a disaster by the shameless greed of a few. For the high price of food is the reason everyone sends away as many persons as possible from the household, and to do — What? I ask you — nothing but beg, or something else you could more easily persuade nobly-born spirits to do — like stealing.

“'And then, what about the fact that with this miserable poverty and scarcity is combined an unrestrained luxury? For the servants of noblemen, the artisans, and even some farmers — in short, all classes alike — indulge in much extravagant dress and excessive luxury in food and drink. And now the dive, the brothel, and other places like them, such as taverns (another type of brothel, really), wine shops, ale-houses — and then, finally, so many wicked games: dice, card games, dice boxes, ball games, hunts, quoits — do not such things, once the money is gone, send their devotees straight off to practice robbery somewhere?

“'Cast out these deadly pests; make laws that those who have destroyed the farms and country towns reestablish them, or else let them be given to those who will restore them or who are willing to rebuild. Put limitations on the buying up of lands by the wealthy, and their virtual license to exercise a monopoly. Let fewer be supported in idleness, let agriculture be restored, let wool-making be resumed so there is an honest business whereby that idle crowd can exercise itself usefully: whether those whom poverty has made, thus far, into thieves, or those who now are vagabonds and unemployed servants, both types being, no doubt, the thieves of the future. To be sure: unless you remedy these evils, you will boast in vain about justice being exercised in the punishment of theft; it is a pretense of justice, rather than really just or useful. For when you allow people to be brought up in the worst way and their characters to be corrupted little by little, starting from their tender years — to be punished, of course! when as grown men they finally do those shameful deeds that from their youth they have raised a constant expectation of committing — what else is this, I ask, but you making them thieves and you, the same ones, punishing them?'
“Now as I was saying this, that counselor of law, meanwhile, had been preparing himself to speak, and had decided to use that typical method of disputants who more diligently repeat things than actually respond to a question, since they put so much value on a good memory.

“‘Indeed,’ he said, ‘you have spoken well, although you are of course a foreigner, who has been able to hear about these matters more than understand them precisely. I will make that clear to you in a few words. For first, I shall review in order what you have said. Then I shall show in what matters ignorance of our affairs has misled you. Finally, I shall dissolve and destroy all of your arguments. Therefore, to begin with the first thing I promised, you seemed to me on four points….’

“‘Quiet, please!’ the Cardinal said. ‘You don’t appear to be responding ‘in a few words’ when you begin in that way. Therefore, let’s discharge you right now from the trouble of responding, and instead reserve the whole task for you until our next meeting, which (unless something hinders you or Raphael here) I would like to be tomorrow.

“‘But in the meantime, I would gladly hear from you, my dear Raphael, why you think that thieves should not be punished with the death penalty, and what other punishment you would set up yourself that would be more in the public interest. For not even you think that theft should be tolerated. But if people are now hurrying into thievery, even with the threat of death hanging over them, once a guarantee of life has been offered, what force or fear could frighten off criminals, who would understand, by a lessening of the punishment as if a sort of reward, that they were invited to crime?’

“‘It simply appears to me, most kind Father,’ I said, ‘to be utterly unjust that a person’s life be taken just because someone’s money was taken. Indeed, I think that with a human life nothing can be equated, not even all the goods of fortune. But if they were to say that injured justice or injured laws are restored through such a penalty, and not just someone’s money — what could such absolute justice deserve to be called but absolute injustice? For we should not approve such Manlian commandments of the law, so that whenever there is less than perfect obedience in the most trivial matters the sword is immediately drawn, nor should we approve the decrees of the Stoics, who consider all sins equal to such a degree that they think it makes no difference whether someone kills a human being or steals a coin from him — between these two actions (if equity has any validity at all) there is absolutely no similarity or affinity.

“‘God has forbidden anyone to be killed, and shall we so easily kill on account of a little stolen money? But if someone interprets that the power to kill is forbidden by God’s commandment except when human law decrees that someone must
be killed, what prevents human beings from deciding in the same way among themselves to what extent rape or adultery or perjury are to be allowed? Since, indeed, God took away the right not only over another’s death, but even over one’s own, if a consensus of men agreed with each other about mutual killing under certain specified conditions, could such an agreement have the force to exempt its followers from that commandment? Could they, without any example set by God, kill anyone a human decree ordered to be killed? And then will not that commandment of God have only as much power as human laws permit it to have? And will it be any wonder that human beings end up establishing, in the same way, and in all circumstances, to just what extent divine laws need to be obeyed?

“Finally, the law of Moses, though merciless and harsh, and of course made for slaves and stubborn ones at that, nevertheless punished theft with fines, not death. Let us not think that God, in the new law of mercy where he commands his children like a father, has allowed us greater license for being savage to each other.

“These, then, are the reasons why I think it is not allowed. How truly absurd, and even destructive to the commonwealth it is for theft and murder to be punished equally, I think there is no one who does not understand. Indeed, once a robber sees no less risk threatening him when convicted merely for theft than if convicted of homicide as well, this thought alone would drive him to murder anyone whom he otherwise would only have robbed. Besides the fact that there is no further danger to him if caught, there is also greater security in murder and greater hope of concealing the crime when the witness has been done away with! And so while we try to terrify thieves too brutally, we incite them to the destruction of good people.

“Now as to what is usually asked: What punishment would be more advantageous? In my judgment, it is hard to find a worse punishment, but (in no small degree) easier to find a better one. For why should we doubt that a useful way for punishing crimes is the one which we know so long pleased the Romans, the greatest experts in administering a commonwealth? They, of course, used to condemn those convicted of great crimes to the stone-quarries and to digging in the mines, guarding them in chains continuously.

“However, in regard to this matter, I approve the institution of no people more than what I found while I was traveling in Persia among a people commonly called Polylerites, a people not small in number nor with imprudently designed institutions, and, except for paying yearly tribute to the king of the Persians, they are otherwise free and permitted to have their own laws. Yet since they are far from the sea, almost surrounded by mountains, and content with the fruits of their own land that is not at all barren, they neither visit others often nor are they visited.
Nevertheless, by an old custom of their nation, they do not strive to increase their territory, and what they have is easily protected from all injury, both by mountains and the tribute they pay to their powerful neighbor. They are completely unburdened by any military, and live not so much splendidly as suitably, and are happy, rather than noble or distinguished; In fact, I think that for this reason they are not known even by name except to their close neighbors.

“'Now, in their country, convicted thieves return what they have stolen to its owner, not to the ruler of the state, as usually happens elsewhere, because they think he has no more right to the stolen item than the thief; but if the goods are destroyed, once their value has been settled and paid for out of the possessions of the thieves, the remainder is left intact for the wives and children of the thieves, while the thieves themselves are sentenced to public employment, and unless they have committed some more serious crime than theft, they are neither shut in a workhouse nor clamped in shackles, but are employed, free and unfettered, in public works. Those who avoid working, or work too sluggishly, are not bound in chains but urged on by whips. Those who do their work strenuously are dispensed from reproaches, and only at night, after roll has been taken, are they confined to their sleeping quarters.

“'Besides constant labor, there is nothing inconvenient about their life. For they who serve the public interest are supported, and not austerely, by the public in various ways, in various places. In one place what is spent on them is collected from alms, and although that way of support is uncertain, nevertheless, since the people are merciful, no other way has been found more abundant. Elsewhere certain public revenue is designated for it. In another place the citizens individually contribute a certain tax for these uses. In a few places they do no public work, but when a private person needs hired hands, he hires the labor of one of them for that day, in the forum, at a wage set a little less than he would have paid a freeman. And in any case it is lawful to correct the laziness of a slave with whipping. Thus it happens that they never lack work; and besides their own support, something is daily brought into the public treasury.

“'All of them—and only they—are dressed in one certain color; their hair is not shaved off but trimmed a little above the ears, and from one of the ears a small piece is cut off. It is permitted for friends to give them food, drink, and clothes of their own color; but giving any money is a capital offense, equally to the giver and receiver, and it is no less dangerous even for a free man, regardless of the reason, to take a single coin from a convict, and likewise for slaves (for that is what the convicts are called) to touch weapons. Each region distinguishes its own convicts with its own particular marking, and it is a capital offense to remove the marking, to be seen outside one’s own territory, and to have any conversations with a slave from
another region. Planning escape is no safer than escaping itself: indeed, to be comp-
licit in such a plan is death for the slave and slavery for the free man; on the other
hand, rewards are decreed for an informer: for a free man, money; for a slave, free-
dom; and for either, pardon and impunity for their complicity so that it could never
be safer to follow through with a bad plan than to repent of it.

“In these matters, this is their law and this is their procedure, as I have said. How humane and beneficial it is, you can readily see, since public outrage acts in
such a way as to remove vices while preserving human beings, who are treated in
such a way that they have to be good. And however much harm they have done,
they repair it with the remainder of their lives.

“Furthermore, there is no fear they would slip back into their old habits, to
such an extent that even travelers who have to make a journey do not suppose
themselves safer on the road with other guides than with these slaves, continually
changed at the border of each region. Of course they never have an opportunity to
commit robbery: they are unarmed; having any money at all would be an indication
of crime; punishment is ready for anyone who is apprehended; and there is abso-
lutely no hope of escaping anywhere. For how could a man conceal or cloak his es-
cape, whose clothes are completely different from the rest of the population, unless
he escaped naked! — and even in that case his ear would give him away.

“But of course, is there not a danger, finally, of them at least forming a plan to
conspire against the commonwealth? As if any local group could entertain such
hopes without first sounding out and winning over the slaves of many other re-
gions (who are not even permitted to greet or talk to each other, let alone have the
chance to conspire); meanwhile, can you believe they would fearlessly entrust a plan
to their co-conspirators which they know is dangerous to those who keep it silent,
and of the greatest benefit to those who betray it? On the contrary, since no one of
them gives up hope that by obeying and being patient and raising the expectation
of living a more correct life in the future, he could by those means regain his free-
dom at some point. In fact, every year some are restored to freedom through recog-
nition of their patience.’

“When I had said these words, and added that I saw no reason this way could
not be used even in England with much greater benefit than the “justice” that that
expert in law had praised so highly, the lawyer, as you would expect, replied, “That
could never be established in England without leading the commonwealth into the
greatest crisis.” And as he said that he shook his head, twisted his lips, and, in this
way, fell silent. And everyone there went over to his side.

“Then the Cardinal said, ‘It is not easy to foresee whether the matter would
turn out advantageously or otherwise, when no trial at all has been made of it. But
Once a death sentence has been announced, the ruler could order the execution deferred, and try this custom out, after withholding the privileges of sanctuaries; then if the practice proved useful, it could rightfully be established. If not, to punish those who were convicted before would neither hurt the commonwealth or be any more unjust than if the same thing were done now, nor does it seem that any danger would arise from the experiment. But it appears to me, certainly, that vagabonds would also not be too badly handled by this method, for although so many laws have been passed against them, we have still not made any progress.'

“When the Cardinal said this, there was no one there who did not rush to praise better than the next man the very points they had disparaged when I recounted them, and especially the bit about vagabonds, since the Cardinal added that himself.

“What happened next, I don’t know whether it would be better to be silent about, since it was rather ridiculous, but I will tell it nevertheless. For it was nothing bad, and did somewhat pertain to the matter.

“By chance, a certain hanger-on was present, who wanted to give the impression of playing a fool, but pretended so well that he was nearly the real thing—looking for laughs with such weak jokes that he himself was more often laughed at than his jokes. Nevertheless certain things fell from the man’s lips from time to time that were so far from being absurd that they proved the validity of the adage: ‘if the dice are thrown often enough, at some point they will come up Venus.’”

One of the guests was saying that now that my speech had made good provision for thieves and that the Cardinal’s had taken care of the vagabonds, there still needed to be a public policy for those whom sickness or old age had driven into poverty, and rendered unable to work at the jobs they could earn a living from.

“And then the wit said, ‘Let me do this. For I will see to it that this too is done rightly. I desperately desire to remove this kind of people somewhere out of my sight; they have so often badly annoyed me, demanding money with those plaintive cries, but they can’t sing well enough to squeeze a coin from me! One of two things always happens: either I don’t feel like giving, or I can’t, since there is nothing for me to give. But they have started to wise up: so as not to waste their effort when they see me coming along, they silently let me pass. And that’s why they hope for nothing more from me than if, by Hercules, I were . . . a priest! But I say we make a law, that all those beggars be distributed and dispersed into Benedictine monasteries and be made what are called lay monks, and the women, I say, should be made nuns.’

“The Cardinal smiled and approved it as a joke; the rest approved it seriously. But a certain theologian, a friar, was so delighted by what was said against priests and monks that now he too began to join in the fun, a man otherwise grave almost to the point of fierceness.
“‘But not even thus,’ he said, ‘would you be rid of beggars, unless you make some arrangements for us friars, too!’

“‘And yet’ said the hanger-on, ‘this has already been taken care of, since the Cardinal provided exceedingly well for you friars when he proposed that vagabonds should be corralled and set to work. You are the biggest vagabonds!’

“Everyone’s eyes were on the Cardinal when this was said, and when they saw that he didn’t reject it, they all began to embrace it rather gladly, except the friar, who had now been so drenched with vinegar that (it was no surprise) he became indignant and ablaze with anger, and could not even restrain himself from insults: he called the man a scoundrel, a detractor, a gossip, and a ‘son of perdition,’ all the while citing terrible threats from Sacred Scripture. And then the other one, the clown, really began to play his part: he was clearly in his own element.

“‘Do not be angry, good friar,’ said he, ‘for it is written, In patience you will possess your souls!’ In reply, the friar said (and I repeat his very words), ‘I am not angry, you villain, at least not so much as to sin. For the Psalmist says, Be ye angry and sin not.’

“Then, when the friar was gently admonished by the Cardinal to check his emotions, he said, ‘No, my Lord, I am only speaking out of good zeal, just as I ought. For holy men had good zeal, as it is said, Zeal for your house has consumed me; and it is sung in churches, Those who scoffed at Elisha while he ascended the house of God, felt the zeal of the bald man, as perhaps this scoffing, scorning, ribald person here may feel it.’

“Perhaps you are acting with a good intention,’ replied the Cardinal, ‘but you would seem to be acting in a holier way, or certainly a wiser way, if you would not put yourself into a ridiculous contest with a foolish and ridiculous man.’

“‘No, my Lord,’ he answered. ‘I would not be acting more wisely. For Solomon himself, the wisest of men, said, Answer the fool according to his folly, as I am now doing, and I am showing him the pit into which he will fall, unless he is very careful. For if the many scoffers of Elisha, who was only one bald man, felt the zeal of the bald man, how much more will this one scoffer feel the zeal of many friars, among whom there are many bald men! We even have a Papal bull, by which all who make fun of us have been excommunicated.’

“When he saw there would be no end to it, the Cardinal sent away the hanger-on with a nod, and tactfully changing the conversation to a different topic, a little later stood up from the table and, deciding to devote himself to hearing his clients’ affairs, dismissed us.

“My dear More, with what a long talk have I burdened you! I would be ashamed to have made it so long if you had not demanded it so eagerly, and did not seem to be listening as if you did not want any part of that conversation to be omitted. And
although it ought to have been told somewhat more briefly, still it had to be recounted to show the judgment of those who had scorned those things I was saying, the very same things that they themselves approved as soon as they saw the Cardinal not disapproving, flattering him even to the point of fawning upon and almost seriously admitting that hanger-on’s inventions, which his lordship was, by way of a joke, not rejecting. So from this you can tell how much courtiers would value me and my counsels.”

“Really, my dear Raphael,” I said, “you have given me great pleasure by all that you have said so prudently and, at the same time, with such charm. It seemed, while you spoke, not only that I was living in my native country again, but also, somehow, to have regained my lost youth through the pleasant memory of that Cardinal, in whose court I was brought up as a boy. And because you so fondly promote his memory, you would not believe, my dear Raphael, how much dearer to me you have become on this account, although you were already very dear to me beforehand. But I still cannot change my opinion in any way, as not to suppose that you could contribute a great deal of good to the public with your counsels, if you could only convince yourself to overcome your aversion to the courts of rulers. And that is why no duty is more incumbent upon a good man, such as you. Seeing that your friend Plato teaches that commonwealths will finally be fortunate only when philosophers rule them, or when their kings are philosophic, how far off will good fortune be, if philosophers do not at least deign to impart their counsel to kings?”

“They are not so ungrateful,” he said, “that they would not do it gladly—in fact many have already done so by publishing books—if those in control of affairs were prepared to heed their good advice. But no doubt Plato foresaw this well: that, unless kings themselves philosophize, it will never happen that those steeped in perverse opinions from childhood and deeply tainted within will ever approve the counsels of philosophers; he had this experience himself at the court of Dionysius. Or do you not think, if I were to propose sound decrees at the court of some king and tried to eradicate the ruinous seeds of evil for him, that I would be immediately either thrown out or held in derision?

“Come now, imagine me at the court of the French king, and seated in his council while, in a very secret place and the king himself presiding in a circle of the most prudent men, it is being discussed with great zeal by what arts and machinations the king might keep Milan and recover fugitive Naples; and then afterwards how he could overthrow the Venetians, and subject the whole of Italy to himself. Then how he could make Flanders, Brabant, and finally all Burgundy part of his dominion—and other nations besides, whose kingdoms he has already some time ago invaded in his mind.
“At this point, while someone persuades him that a treaty should be struck with the Venetians, which would last only so long as convenient for the French themselves, and that the plan should be shared with the Venetians and some part of the spoils be deposited with them, which the King could reclaim once the business had been accomplished to his satisfaction; while someone else advises him that Germans mercenaries should be hired, and another that the Swiss should be mollified with money; another disagrees, saying that the divine power of the Imperial Majesty should be propitiated with gold as if with a votive offering; while it seems to yet another that affairs should be settled with the King of Aragon and that the kingdom of Navarre (which belongs to someone else) should be ceded to him as a guarantee of peace; and in the meanwhile someone else proposes that the Prince of Castile should be ensnared through some hope of a marriage alliance and that with a fixed payment several of the noble courtiers there should be drawn into the French king’s interest—until the most tangled knot of all appears: namely, what to do about England in the meantime?—of course, peace ought to be negotiated anyway and the alliance, always weak, must be secured with the tightest of bonds (they should call them friends, but suspect them as enemies); and then the Scots ought to be held at the ready as if on guard duty, on the lookout for any occasion to be sent against the English immediately if the English make any move; and in addition some exiled noble must be secretly groomed (treaties, after all, keep this from being done openly) to contend that the throne is rightfully his, and in this way the French king would have a lever to control that untrustworthy prince—now suppose at this point, amid such a great effort to move things, with so many outstanding men vying with each other in their counsels of war—suppose that I, a mere nobody, should get up and call for the sails to be shifted to a new tack: let’s say I propose that Italy should be left alone, that the French should stay home, considering that the one kingdom of France is really too great for one man to manage suitably, so that the king should not think about adding other kingdoms to it; then, what if I were to propose to them what was decided by the Achorian people, a country opposite the island of the Utopians to the south-east: once upon a time these Achorians waged war to obtain another kingdom for their king, which he claimed was owed to him as an inheritance on the grounds of an ancient marriage connection; once they finally had obtained it, when they saw that they were enduring no less suffering to retain it than they had in acquiring it, but that seeds were constantly germinating either of rebellion on the inside or of foreign invasion from the outside of their newly-conquered people, so that they were always having to fight either against them or for them; that they never had the opportunity to dismiss their armies; that they meanwhile were being pillaged; that money was being exported; that their own
blood was being spilled for the petty glory of others; that their “peace” was no more secure than before; that moral character at home had been corrupted by the war; that a lust for robbery had been imbibed and recklessness encouraged by the slaughters of warfare; that the laws were held in contempt—and all because the king, distracted by having to care for two kingdoms, could not fix his mind on either—when they saw that otherwise there would be no end to such great evils, at last they called a council and very humanely gave their king a choice: to decide which of the two kingdoms he wanted to keep, since he could not have both; they were too numerous a people to be governed by half a king (since nobody is happy even about having to share a mule driver with somebody else); and in this way, that good ruler was forced to be content with his ancient kingdom and left the new one to one of his friends (who was driven out soon afterwards anyway); moreover, if I were to show the French King that all these war endeavors (throwing so many nations into confusion for his sake), once they had drained his treasuries and destroyed his people, would, by some misfortune end up coming to nothing anyway; that therefore he should care for his ancestral kingdom, should equip it as much as he could, and make it flourish to the utmost; simply love his people and be loved by them, just live with them, rule them pleasantly, and say “farewell” to other kingdoms, since what has now fallen to his lot is more than enough for him already—with what kind of hearing, my dear More, do you think this speech should be received?

“Certainly not a very favorable one,” I said.

“Well then, let us continue,” he said. “If counselors were conducting business with some king and devising what schemes they could use to be able to heap up the treasuries, while one advises that the value of the currency should be inflated when the king himself has to pay out, and devalued below the just price when he must collect, so as to pay off with a little and get paid with a lot; while another persuade him to feign a war and on that pretext raise money, and, when it seems like the right time, make peace, celebrating holy ceremonies to amaze the common people (sparing human bloodshed of course, as a pious ruler should); while another counselor puts into his mind certain ancient and moth-eaten laws, antiquated by long disuse, and which, because no one remembers that they were ever passed, everybody has broken, and then suggests that the king order fines to be exacted since no other income is more plentiful or brings greater honor since it displays the character of justice; by another he is advised to prohibit many things under threat of heavy fines, especially the sorts of things which promote the public good by not happening, and afterwards, in return for a payment, to dispense from the same laws those whose interests would be hindered by them, and in this way both the favor of the people be gained and a double profit be made, when the first group is fined
(whom greed for gain enticed into the snares), and when he sells privileges to the other group, and the more dearly he sells these privileges, of course, the better the ruler he will be, since he only reluctantly grants a private person something contrary to the people’s welfare, and for that very reason only at a high price; another counselor persuades him that judges should be put under obligations to himself so that they decide every case in favor of royal right, and should then be summoned to the palace and invited to argue about the king’s affairs in the king’s presence, and in this way there would be no case of his, no matter how unjust, in which some one of the judges (either in his zeal for contradiction, or shame at saying the same thing someone else already said, or desire to find favor) would discover in his presence some loophole by which some false charge could be applied; thus, when the judges have a difference of opinions, a case perfectly clear in itself is disputed and the truth comes into question, so that a lever is conveniently given to the king for interpreting the law to his own advantage, while the others assent either from shame or from fear — and then the judgement is afterwards boldly announced from the bench, because, for someone who makes a pronouncement on behalf of the ruler, no pretext can be lacking: it is enough for him that that equity be on his side, or the letter of the law, or the contorted sense of the text, or — what in the end outweighs all laws in the presence of scrupulous judges — the indisputable prerogative of the ruler; while, then, all the counselors concur and agree with that saying of Crassus, ‘no amount of gold is enough for a ruler who must support an army’; that besides, a king can do nothing unjustly even if he very much wants to, since everything belongs to him, even the people themselves, and what belongs to anyone is only what the kindness of the king has not taken away, and making sure that is as little as possible is very much the king’s business, since the king’s safety depends on not letting the people run riot with wealth and liberty, because these are things that do not put up patiently with harsh and unjust commands, whereas poverty and scarcity, in contrast, blunts people’s spirits, makes them patient, and takes away the haughty spirit of rebellion from them when they are oppressed — at this point, let’s say I stand up and contend that all these counsels are both dishonest and destructive for the king, whose honor and whose security both reside more in the wealth of the people than in his own; if I were to show that the people choose a king for their own sake and not for the king’s so that, in fact, through his labor and zeal they may live well themselves and be safe from injustices, and for this reason it is more the business of the ruler that his people be well off than that he be well off, no differently than it is the duty of the shepherd to pasture his sheep more than himself, insofar as he is a shepherd; as for the assumption that the poverty of the people is a safeguard of peace, the reality shows that this is very far from the truth:
where do you find more quarrels than among beggars? who more eagerly strives for revolution than one who is dissatisfied with his current condition of life? whose attempt, finally, to throw everything into confusion would be bolder, with hope of making some kind of profit, than someone with nothing to lose? but if some king were to be so despised or envied by his own people that he would be otherwise unable to keep them at their duties unless he went after them with false charges, plunder, and confiscation of goods, and reduced them to begging, it would be better for him just to abdicate his kingship, rather than to keep it with these methods by which, although he may keep the name of “commander,” he certainly loses its majesty; for it does not befit the dignity of a king to exercise command over beggars, but rather over a prosperous and happy people; this is certainly something Fabricius knew, a man of upright and lofty mind, when he replied that he would prefer to exercise authority over rich people than to be rich himself; and certainly for someone to be swimming in pleasures and delight, while everyone around him is groaning and lamenting, is to be the overseer not of a kingdom, but of a prison; finally, since he is the most inexperienced of doctors who does not know how to cure sickness except by another sickness, just so, he who does not know how to correct the life of his citizens in any way other than by taking away the benefits of life, ought to admit that he does not know how to govern free people; rather, he should correct his sloth or his pride, for through these vices it usually happens that the people hold him in contempt or hate him; let him live harmlessly on what already belongs to him; let him match his expenses with his revenue; let him rein in crime and by right education of his people prevent crimes from happening, rather than allow them to increase and then punish them afterwards; let him not rashly bring back into force laws that have been annulled by custom, especially the ones that have been long neglected and never missed; and never let him seize as compensation for some crime a sum such as a judge would not allow to a private citizen who was trying to swindle somebody; at this point, what if I were to propose to them the law of the Macarians, who are also not very distant from Utopia, whose king, on the first day he assumes command, is bound by an oath he takes, accompanied by major sacrifices, that he will never at any time keep more than one thousand pounds of gold in his treasuries, or an amount of silver to equal that price; this law, they say, was established by an excellent king who cared more for the welfare of his country than for his own wealth, a measure that would serve to prevent the heaping up of so much money as to cause scarcity of it among his people, while he saw that the treasury would still be enough, either for the king to fight against rebels, or for the kingdom to fight against enemy incursions, while being too little to encourage anyone to invade; this was the most powerful reason for establishing the
law, the next strongest reason being, that the king thought it provided enough money to be in circulation for the daily exchange of the citizens, and when it was necessary for the king to disburse any surplus over the legal limit of the treasury, he considered that he would not be looking for occasions to commit injustice; a king such as this will be dreaded by the bad and loved by the good—well then, if I were to keep repeating these ideas and others like them to men strongly inclined to the opposite point-of-view, how deaf would they be, do you think, to the story I have to tell?"

“Very deaf listeners, no doubt,” I said, “and, by Hercules, it doesn’t surprise me, nor, to tell the truth, do I think you should ever keep repeating this kind of talk or give the kind of advice which you can be certain will never be accepted. For how could it help? Or how could such extravagant words steal into their hearts when an opposite opinion already holds their minds captive, and has established itself deep within them? Among close friends, in private conversation, this academic philosophy is rather pleasant. But in the councils of rulers, where great matters are deliberated with great authority, ideas like this have no place.”

“That is what I was saying:” he replied, “there is no place for philosophy among rulers.”

“Well, yes,” I said, “that’s true: no place for this academic philosophy, which thinks all things suitable for all places. But there is another, more citizen-like philosophy, which knows the stage it plays on, and adapting itself to the play in hand, maintains its own part aptly and with decorum. This is the philosophy you should employ. Otherwise, let’s say some comedy of Plautus is being performed and while the household slaves are joking around, you enter the stage dressed as a philosopher, and reciting the lines in the *Octavia* where Seneca is disputing with Nero—wouldn’t it be better to play a silent part, than to recite something strange and turn the play into a tragicomedy? For you will corrupt and distort the present play by mixing in things that don’t belong to it, even if what you add is better. Whatever play you are in, act in that one as best you can. Do not throw the whole play into confusion just because another more charming one comes to mind.

“So it is in the commonwealth, and in the deliberations of rulers. If you cannot tear out distorted opinions by the roots, if you cannot cure long-standing vices according to your liking, that is still no reason to desert the commonwealth: the ship should not be abandoned in a storm just because you cannot control the winds.

“But neither should you inculcate strange and extravagant arguments that you know will not carry weight with people of opposing views. Instead, you should try an indirect approach, and you must strive to manage everything beneficially to the best of your ability. And if you cannot make something good, at least make it the
least bad you can. For it is impossible for everything to turn out well, unless all hu-
man beings are good, and I don’t expect that to happen for some years to come.”

“By that method,” he said, “nothing would happen except that, while trying
to cure the madness of others, I would become insane along with them. For if I
want to speak truthfully, I simply have to say such things. To say what is false may
be a philosopher’s duty, for all I know, but it is certainly not mine. Although my
discourse may perhaps be disagreeable and annoying to them, I do not see why it
should seem so unusual as to be tactless. But if I were to talk about the things Plato
pretends in his Republic or what the Utopians actually do in theirs — although these
latter would be, and in fact are, better, nevertheless they would appear strange, be-
cause here, individuals have private property, while over there, all things are held in
common.

“But apart from the fact that nobody who calls for retreat and warns of com-
ing danger is ever pleasing to people who are determined to rush headlong in the
opposite direction, what did my speech have in it that would not be fitting or even
necessary to say anywhere? In fact, if we have to leave out, on the grounds of being
“unusual” or “absurd,” everything that has only been made to seem strange by peo-
ple’s perverse habits, it would be necessary for us to dissemble, in the presence of
Christians, almost everything Christ taught, and what he so very much prohibited
his followers from dissembling that he even commanded them to proclaim openly
from the rooftops what he whispered in their ears! The greatest part of his teach-
ings are much stranger to their customs than my speech was — apart from the fact
that preachers (those cunning men) have, I think, followed your own advice and by
making it very hard for people to conform their behavior to what Christ expects of
them, have instead accommodated his teaching to their behavior, like a ruler made
of lead so there could be at least some sort of agreement, I suppose!

“For this reason, I do not see what they have accomplished except to allow evil-
doers to live less anxiously, and that is just what I will accomplish in the councils of
rulers. For either I would express different opinions, which would be just the same as
if I had expressed no opinion at all, or I would express the same opinions they have,
and be, as the character Micio says in the play of Terence, “a helper of their own in-
sanity.” For I do not see what that ‘indirect guidance’ of yours means, by which you
are of the opinion that, if everything can’t turn out good, one must strive for things
to be handled advantageously, and turn out the least bad they can. But there is re-
ally no place for pretending or looking the other way: you have to approve the worst
plans openly, and underwrite the most pestilent decrees. Anyone who gives inade-
quate praise to evil deliberations will be treated like a spy, almost a traitor.

“Furthermore, there is no opportunity for you to do good because you have
been cast ashore amongst colleagues who would corrupt even the best of men more easily than be corrected themselves, and their perverse habits will either corrupt you, or, while being pure and innocent yourself, you will only be a screen for others’ wickedness and stupidity, so far from being able to make anything better with that ‘indirect guidance.’

“For that reason, Plato declares with a most beautiful analogy why the wise rightly refrain from engaging in public affairs. For when they see the people rushing into the streets to be drenched with constant rain, they cannot persuade them to come out of the rain and come inside. And since they know that the only thing they would accomplish by going out to help, would be to have everybody get wet together, they stay indoors, considering it good enough, when you cannot cure someone else of foolishness, at least to stay out of the rain yourself.

“But actually, my dear More, to really speak my mind to you, it seems to me that, wherever there is private property, wherever everybody measures everything with money, there it can hardly ever happen that a commonwealth will be governed justly or prosperously — unless you think that there is just government when all the best things go to the worst people, or that there is prosperous government when everything is divided up only among the very fewest number, when not even these could be considered happy in every respect, with the rest plainly miserable.

“For this reason, when I contemplate the most prudent and holy institutions of the Utopians, among whom public affairs are administered so conveniently by so few laws that virtue is rewarded, and yet, because possessions are equalized, there is an abundance of all things for everyone; and then when I compare their customs with so many other nations that are always making regulations and are never well-regulated, all those nations where a person acquires what he calls his own private property, in which so many laws, passed every day, are never enough for someone to secure, protect, or even distinguish sufficiently what each person calls his own private property from what somebody else has — this is what those countless disagreements (constantly arising and never ending) clearly indicate. And so, the more I think about these things, the more I come to agree with Plato, and the less surprised I am that he disdained to make any laws for those who were opposed to legislation by which all persons shared all benefits equally.

“That most prudent man easily foresaw that there could be only one way to public well-being: by decreeing the equality of possessions — which I do not think could ever be observed when individuals have private ownership. For when each person, by a definite right and title, sweeps up as much as he can to himself, the entire supply of goods, no matter how large, is divided up among only a few persons, leaving scarcity for everyone else; it generally happens, then, that each group really
deserves the destiny of the other group, since the few are rapacious, shameless, and useless, while the many, by contrast, are modest and simple and by their daily industry more kindly disposed to the public interest than they are to themselves. And this is why I am fully persuaded that goods cannot be distributed in an equitable or just way, or that anything can turn out well in human affairs unless ownership is completely abolished; on the other hand, as long as it remains, so also will remain an anxiety-producing and inescapable load of hardships and poverty for the largest part—and the best part, by far—of the human race.

“Although I admit that this burden can be made a little lighter, I nevertheless contend that it cannot be removed entirely. If, for instance, it be decreed that no one may possess more than a fixed measure of land and that there be a lawful wealth level for each person; if it were required by certain laws that a ruler may not be excessively powerful nor the people excessively insolent; that public offices not be solicited, nor offered for sale, nor require great expenses to be incurred by their holders (otherwise occasion is given for fraud and robbery in order to recoup the money, and it becomes necessary to appoint rich people to offices which should really be administered by prudent people)—through such laws, I say, these evils too might be lessened and mitigated, the way terminally ill bodies are sustained by the repeated application of warm lotions. But that they be really healed and restored to good condition, there is no hope at all, as long as people possess their own property. Rather, in your eagerness to care for one part, you will worsen the injuries of the other parts; one part’s sickness arises from another part’s healing when nothing can be added without the same thing being subtracted from another.”

“But, on the contrary,” I said, “it seems to me that life can never be lived with any convenience where all things are owned in common. For how could there be a good supply of things with everybody trying to get out of work, not being urged by the profit motive, and becoming lazy by relying on the work of others? But even if they are spurred to work by the scarcity, when nobody is able lawfully to protect as his own what he has acquired, is it not inevitable that everyone will suffer from perpetual murder and sedition? Especially when the authority and reverence of magistrates is gone—for how there could be any place for that when the people cannot be distinguished among themselves in any way, I cannot even imagine.”

“I do not wonder,” he said, “that you think that way, since either a false image or no image at all comes to your mind. But if you had been in Utopia with me and you had seen their customs and institutions at first hand, as I did—I lived there for more than five years, and never would have left except to make that new world known—then you would openly admit that you have never seen a people rightly governed anywhere else but there.”
“And yet,” said Peter Giles, “you would hardly persuade me that a people can be found in that new world any better governed than here in this world we know, because, I believe, our talents are not inferior and our commonwealths older than those over there, and long experience has discovered very many conveniences of life, even if I leave aside certain things we have acquired by luck, which not even a brilliant mind would have been able to think up.”

“As for the antiquity of those commonwealths,” he said, “you could speak more correctly if you had read through the histories of that part of the world, and if they ought to be trusted, cities were there before people were here. All the same, whatever intelligence has found out or chance has discovered until now, could have occurred in either place. But I certainly think that although we may be superior to them in natural intelligence, nevertheless we are far behind in eagerness and industry.

“For (as their annals maintain), before we had ever landed there, concerning our affairs (they call us Ultra-equatorial) they had heard nothing, except that once, over twelve hundred years ago, a certain ship which a storm had carried there suffered shipwreck and was lost near the island of Utopia. A few Romans and Egyptians were cast onto the beach and never afterwards departed. But consider how much good their industriousness made of this one occasion! There was not a single useful art practiced in the Roman Empire that they did not either learn from the shipwrecked strangers or discover themselves through the starting points they received from them: so profitable was it for them that a few people from here had once been brought there.

“But if any like fortune has ever driven someone from there to here, it has been thoroughly forgotten — just as thoroughly as the fact that I was once there will probably also be forgotten by our own descendants. And even though they immediately made their own from that one meeting whatever was advantageously invented by us, I think it will be a long time before we accept anything that was established better by them than by us. And this, I think, is the biggest single reason that, although we are not inferior to them in talent or wealth, their state is more prudently administered than ours and flourishes more happily.”

“Well then, my dear Raphael,” I said, “I ask and implore you to describe the island to us. Do not be brief, but explain to us in order the lands, rivers, cities, inhabitants, customs, institutions, laws, and, well — just everything you think we would want to know, and that means, please, think we want to know whatever we don’t know yet.”

“There is nothing,” he said, “I would rather do, and I’m ready to do just that. But it does require some leisure time.”
“Well, let’s go in, then,” I said, “and have lunch. Then right after we can spend as much time as we please.”

“So be it!” he said.

So we went inside and had lunch, and after that, we returned to the same place, sat down on the same bench, and ordered the servants not to let anyone interrupt us. Peter Giles and I exhorted Raphael to fulfill his promise, and therefore he, seeing us attentive and eager to listen, sat for a little while in thoughtful silence, then began in this way.…

END OF BOOK ONE
THE SECOND FOLLOWS
BOOK 2 OF UTOPIA

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The island of the Utopians is two hundred miles across in the middle where it is the widest, and throughout the greater part of the island is not much narrower, while it gradually thins towards the ends on both sides. These ends, as if drawn around by a compass with a circumference of five hundred miles, shape the island as a whole into the likeness of a crescent moon. A strait, flowing between the horns of the island, divides them about eleven miles apart, and, pouring into a huge empty space where the winds are blocked by the surrounding land, forms a kind of vast lake with calm rather than raging waters, turning nearly the entire hollow of the land into a harbor, which, to the great benefit of the people, allows the transport of ships across it in all directions.

The mouth of this harbor is rather terrifying by having shallows on one side, and rocks on the other. In almost the exact center one crag stands up from the water, harmless for that reason, on which they have built a tower for defense; the other rocks are hidden and treacherous. The Utopians alone know where the channels are, and it is not by chance that no foreign craft comes into this bay without a Utopian pilot, seeing how it is hardly safe even for Utopians to enter the bay without a set of signals from the shore to guide their way. If these signals were moved to different places, they could easily lead to destruction an enemy with no matter how large a fleet.

On the other side of the island there are not a few harbors, but access to the coast is everywhere so well guarded by nature or human artifice that large numbers of invading troops can be held off by a few defenders.

But as it is reported, and as the appearance of the island itself shows, the land was once not surrounded by the sea. But Utopus—the island bears the name of its conqueror, for before then it had been called Abraxa—who elevated an uncivilized and rustic mob to a level of manners and humane conduct that now surpasses nearly all other mortals, gained a victory right on his first landing. He undertook to excavate fifteen miles on the side where the land was attached to the continent and brought the sea all the way around the land. And since he forced not only the
inhabitants to perform that labor but all his own soldiers as well (so that they not consider the labor a kind of insult), the task, divided among so great a multitude, was completed with unbelievable speed, so that their neighbors (who had mocked the vanity of the project at first) were struck with admiration—and with terror—at their success.

The island has fifty-four cities, all spacious and magnificent, with language, customs, institutions, and laws entirely identical, and all having the same basic design and the same appearance, as far as each location allows. Twenty-four miles separate those that are the closest to each other, while on the other hand, no city is so isolated from the rest as to keep anyone from reaching another city on foot in more than one day’s journey. From each city, three elder citizens skilled in the affairs of state meet each year in Amaurotum to discuss the common business of the island. For this city, situated as it is in the very center of the country, where ambassadors from all directions can reach it as conveniently as possible, is considered the first and leading city.

The lands are so appropriately assigned to the cities that each of them has in every direction no less than twelve miles of territory. In some directions it can be much more, that is to say, in the areas where the cities are spread further apart. No city has a desire to enlarge its territory, since they consider themselves the cultivators, rather than the owners, of the lands they have.

In the countryside they have homes conveniently located throughout all the fields, and fully equipped with farming tools. These homes are inhabited by the citizens who move there in turns. No farming household has fewer than forty, counting both men and women in addition to the two slaves assigned to each household; over each of these a grave and experienced father and mother are appointed, and over every thirty households presides one phylarch.

From each household, every year, twenty persons return to the city, i.e., those who have completed two years in the country. In their place the same number of new people are substituted from the city, in order to be instructed by those who have been there a year, and are therefore more experienced in farming matters; these new arrivals will instruct others the following year, to prevent any loss in the yearly harvest due to inexperience, if all of them there were equally new and untrained in agriculture. Although this practice of renewing farmers has become the norm so that no one may be forced unwillingly to continue a rather hard life for too long a time, nevertheless, many, who by natural inclination enjoy farming, request and obtain additional years of doing farm work.

The farmers cultivate the earth, raise animals, cut wood, and carry it to the city in the most convenient way, whether by land or sea. They rear an infinite multitude of chicks using a marvelous device. For the hens do not lie on the eggs, but instead
the farmers keep a great number of them alive in a kind of steady heat and tend them; as soon as they hatch from their shells, the chicks recognize and follow humans instead of their own mothers.

They raise as few horses as possible, and only if they are spirited, and for no purpose other than training the youth in equestrian matters. Oxen accomplish all the work of cultivation and conveyance, and though they acknowledge oxen as inferior to horses in power, they think them surpassing horses in endurance, and not as prone to diseases; in addition, they are easier to take care and cheaper to feed, and finally, once they have dutifully accomplished their service, are usable for food.

They sow grain only for bread, since they drink either wine made from grapes or cider made from apples or pears, or finally, water: sometimes straight, but often steeped with honey or licorice root, which they have in great abundance.

Although they know (and know most exactly) how much grain each city and its adjoining territory consumes, they still grow much more grain and raise many more cattle than they need for their own uses, and distribute the rest to their neighbors. If they need anything which is not available in the countryside, they ask for everything from the city, and they get it all from the city magistrates without any exchange of goods without haggling, since they assemble there once every month, mostly on the festival day.

When harvest day approaches, the phylarchs of the farmers inform the urban magistrates of the number of citizens needed to be sent to them, and this crowd of harvesters, since they are all there on the right day, accomplish the whole task in practically one day of good weather.

Anyone who knows one of the cities knows them all; they are so entirely similar to each other (as long as the nature of the place does not prevent it). Therefore I might describe any one of them (for it makes no difference at all which), but what better one than Amaurotum? None is more worthy, since the rest defer to it for the sake of the Senate; nor is any other city better known to myself, having lived there continuously for five years.

Amaurotum is located on the gentle descent of a mountain and is almost square in shape. On one side, beginning slightly below the crest of the hill, it measures two miles to reach the river Annydrus, but the side along the bank is somewhat longer.

The Annydrus rises eighty miles above Amaurotum from a modest spring, but, increased by the arrival of other tributaries, two of rather good size, it stretches out
to almost half a mile in width in front of the city itself; soon becoming still wider, it flows on further for another sixty miles until it is received by the ocean. Over this entire distance between the city and the sea, and even above the city for a few miles, the tide alternates, flowing in for six whole hours and flowing out again with a swift current. When the sea comes in, it fills the whole bed of the Anydrus with its waters for thirty miles, forces the river backward, even a little beyond that point tainting the river with its salt; but starting from here, the stream gradually becomes sweeter, and, gliding untainted past the city, fresh and unsullied, chases the retreating tide in reverse, almost to its very mouth.

The city is joined to the opposite bank of the river by a bridge made not of wooden columns and piles, but of stone work built into an extraordinary arch, and located where the city is farthest from the sea, so that ships can travel along the entire breadth of the city without obstructions.

In addition they have another river: not very big, but quite peaceful and pleasant, for, bubbling out of the same mountain on which the city is located, it flows downhill through the middle of the city and mixes with the Anydrus. The spring and source of this stream, which emerges a little way outside the town, the Amaurotans have surrounded with fortifications and connected to the town, in order to keep the water from being interrupted or diverted or poisoned by any attacking enemy force. From there, the water is drawn off in various directions through brick-work channels to the lower parts of the city, and where the lay of the land prevents this, rainwater collected in spacious cisterns performs the same service.

A high and wide wall surrounds the town, with towers and battlements throughout; a moat that is dry but still deep and wide and made impassable by hedges of thorns, surrounds the walls on three sides. On the fourth side the river itself serves as the moat.

The streets are nicely laid out both for transportation and for blocking the winds, and the houses, by no means shabby in appearance, form a long, uninterrupted row along an entire block, in view of another row of houses opposite; a road twenty feet wide separates these fronts of the blocks. To the rear of the dwellings lies a wide garden extending the length of the block and enclosed on all sides by the backs of the neighboring houses. No house is without a front door to the street and a back door to the garden. And furthermore, these doors are the double-paneled type that easily open with a light pull of the hand and then automatically close again, and let anyone in — thus nothing is private anywhere: they even change their houses by lottery every ten years.

They set a high value on these gardens: in them they keep vines, fruits, herbs, and flowers, and they look so bright and are kept with such care that I have never
seen anything more fruitful or more beautiful anywhere. And it is not only pleasure
that ignites their enthusiasm for gardening but also competition with the gardens
of the other blocks of houses. To be sure, you could not easily find anything else in
the whole city more suitably arranged for the needs or the pleasure of the citizens.
And this is why there was nothing on which their founder appears to have taken
greater pains, than for the care of these gardens.

The plan of the whole city, they say, was designed from the very beginning by
Utopus himself, but since he saw that its development and complete furnishing
would take more than one man’s lifetime—that he left to posterity. And so they
have it written down in their annals (a history they have diligently and religiously
preserved, embracing the one thousand, seven hundred and sixty years since the
very conquest of the island), that in the beginning the houses were low to the
ground, like huts and cottages, and made from whatever wood was lying to hand,
with mud-plastered walls and peaked roofs covered in straw.

But now the form of every house to be seen there is of three stories, with inside
and outside wall surfaces constructed of stone, cement, or fired brick, with rubble
packed into the spaces between. The roofs are flat and they cover them with some
coarse material of no cost but forms a fire-resistant compound that is better than
lead for preventing storm-damage. They keep wind from blowing through the win-
dows by means of glass (the use of which is very frequent there). Sometimes they
also use fine linen in the windows, smeared with clear oil or amber, for a twofold ad-
vantage, really: when treated this way, the linen allows more light—and less wind—to pass through.

MAGISTRATES

Every thirty families chooses a magistrate for themselves each year, called in the
older form of their language a syphogrant, in the more recent one a phylarch. To ev-
every ten syphogrants, each with their own thirty families, is assigned what used to
be called a tranibor, but now a protophylarch. Finally, all two hundred syphogrants,
after taking an oath to choose the one they think most useful, by secret ballot elect
one city-ruler from among four candidates nominated by the people, since one per-
son chosen from each fourth part of the city is recommended to the Senate.

The office of city-ruler is permanent and for life, unless someone is blocked by
the suspicion of seeking tyranny. They choose tranibors every year, but they do not
lightly change them. All other offices are annual.

Every other day, and sometimes more often should the situation demand, the
tranibors come to a council with the city-ruler, where they take counsel about the
commonwealth. The disputes between private persons (if there are any) are very few, and are resolved in short order. They always admit two syphrogrants into the Senate, a different two every day. Precaution is taken that nothing pertaining to the commonwealth be ratified that has not been discussed in the senate on three days before it is decided upon. To engage in counsels about public affairs outside the Senate or the public assemblies is considered a capital crime. They say that these measures were established so that it might not be easy, through a conspiracy of the ruler and the tranibors, after the suppression of the people by tyranny, to make a change in the state of the commonwealth. And for this reason whatever is considered of great importance is deferred to the assemblies of the syphogrants, who, sharing the matter with the families, afterwards take counsel among themselves and report their advice to the Senate. Sometimes the matter is brought before the council of the whole island.

Furthermore the Senate also keeps the custom that nothing is to be discussed on the same day as it is first proposed, but is put off for the next Senate meeting. This is to prevent anyone who rashly blurs out whatever first comes into his head, from thinking up ways to defend his own proposal rather than how to benefit the commonwealth, thus preferring a loss to the public well-being over a loss to his own reputation: an absurd, inverted kind of embarrassment at seeming to have spoken, at first, with too little foresight rather than have the foresight to speak with care rather than haste to begin with.

**OCCUPATIONS**

The one craft common to all, both men and women, and from which nobody is excused, is agriculture. This is what they are all taught from childhood, partly by lessons taught in school, partly by being taken out on recreational field-trips to the farms nearer the city, where they not only observe actual farm work, but also get some exercise by doing it themselves.

In addition to agriculture (which is, as I said, common to all) each one is taught a particular craft as his very own, and this is generally wool-working, or the making of linen, or masonry, or the crafts of building, with either metal or wood. And no other work there, in fact, occupies any number of persons worth mentioning. As for their clothing—apart from distinguishing male from female and single from married person, only one design is in use throughout the whole island, and has been in continuous use for ages: not unattractive to the eye, it allows free movement of the body, and can be adapted to both cold and hot weather—this clothing, as I was saying, each family makes for itself.
But regarding other crafts, each person learns one of them, and not only the men, but also the women, although the latter, being weaker, practice lighter tasks, for the most part working wool and flax. To the men are entrusted the other, more laborious crafts; for the most part everyone is trained in his father’s crafts, since most are inclined that way by nature. But if someone has a mind to go in another direction, he is transferred by adoption into some household that practices the craft that has caught his fancy, care being taken not only by his father but also by the magistrates that he be assigned to a grave and honorable father-of-the-household. Further, if anyone who has learned one craft especially well desires to learn another also, he is likewise permitted to do that. Once he has acquired both, he practices whichever he wishes, unless the city has need of one sort of work more than the other.

The chief and practically only business of the syphogrants is to see to it that no one is idle, but that each applies himself industriously to his craft, and yet not be wearied by constant labor like cattle from earliest morning until late at night. For that is worse than servile labor, and yet it is the life of tradesmen almost everywhere, except among the Utopians, who, although they divide a day into twenty-four equal hours, with the night counted as part of it, assign only six hours to work: three before midday, after which they go to lunch, and once they have rested for two hours after lunch, they then close out the three hours then given to labor with dinner. Because they count the first hour from midday, they go to sleep by the eighth hour, and sleep lays claim to eight hours.

Whatever interval is left between the hours of working, sleeping and eating is allowed to the individual to use at his own discretion, not to abuse through debauchery or sloth, but to apply the time freed from one’s own work to some other pursuit. Many spend these intervals reading good literature. It is traditional for public lectures to be held daily before daylight, which only those who have been specially assigned to study are compelled to attend, while a very large crowd, men and women alike, and drawn from every occupation, come together to attend the lectures, some to one and some to another, according to inclination. Nevertheless, if anyone prefers to spend this time at his craft (as is the case with many whose minds do not rise to the contemplation of a discipline), he is not prevented; in fact, he is even praised as useful to the commonwealth.

After supper they spend one hour at play: in summer in the gardens, in winter in those common halls where they eat. There they either practice music or refresh themselves with conversation. Dicing and similar kinds of silly and pernicious games they do not even know about, but have two games in use, not unlike chess. One is a fight between numbers, in which one number plunders the other.
other is a game in which the vices contend in pitched battle against the virtues. This
game cleverly reveals the discord of the vices among themselves but their harmony
in opposing the virtues. It likewise shows what vices oppose what virtues, with what
strength they attack in the open, with what machinations they attack indirectly,
how the virtues defend themselves and break the power of the vices, with what arts
they elude their attempts, and finally in what way either side can gain victory.

But here, in order that you not misunderstand me, a certain point must be
looked at more closely. Since only six hours are spent working, you might think
that a kind of scarcity of necessities would have to be the result. But that is so far
from happening, that six hours of work not only suffices to supply whatever the ne-
cessity or the convenience of life requires, but in fact exceeds it — something you
will understand when you consider how great a part of the population of other
nations spends its life in idleness. First, almost all the women, half of the entire
population — or, wherever women are busy working, the men usually take their
place at snoring the day away. Add to these, the huge, idle crowd of priests and so-
called religious, throw in all the rich, especially the lords of estates, the ones com-
monly called “the well-born and noble,” and include their household retinue, that
whole morass of good-for-nothing swashbucklers; finally, join to these the strong
and healthy beggars who disguise their sloth with some kind of illness: you will
surely find that the people who produce with their labor all the things that human
beings use are in fact far fewer in number than you had thought.

Judge for yourself now, how few of these who do work are engaged in necessary
tasks. In fact, wherever we measure everything by money, many completely useless
and superfluous arts must be practiced that merely minister to excess and license.
For if this same multitude which now is working were distributed into as few crafts
as the fitting use of nature demands, in the great abundance of goods as is needed
now, the prices would obviously be too low for the craftsmen to maintain a liveli-
hood from that source. But if all those who are distracted by useless crafts — and add
to them the whole crowd that languishes in leisure and sloth, any one of whom con-
sumes as much of the goods supplied by the labor of others as two people who are
the producers of the same things — if all these were placed in jobs that were all use-
ful, you can easily see how small an amount of time would be quite plenty: enough
and more than enough to supply fully everything that either need or convenience
demands — (and including what pleasure requires, provided it is true and natural).

And the reality in Utopia makes this very point clear. For there, in a whole

5
Kinds of idle people

10
The bodyguard of the nobles

15
Very prudently said!

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from work) nevertheless do not exempt themselves, the more effectively to motivate the rest to work by their own example. The same freedom from work is enjoyed by those whom the people (at the recommendation of the priests, and persuaded by secret ballot of the syphogrants) have granted a perpetual exemption in order to master various disciplines. And if any of these disappoints the hope conceived of him, he is thrown back to the workers; on the other hand, it not infrequently occurs that some manual laborer, by industriously spending his extra hours in studying, advances so much by his diligence, that he is taken from his own work and promoted into the class of the learned. Out of this order of the learned are chosen the ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the city-ruler himself, whom they call Barzanes in their ancient language, Ademus in their more modern one.

Since almost all the remaining multitude are neither at leisure nor busy with useless tasks, it can quickly be estimated how few hours are needed to produce so much good work. To what I have already said this convenience should be added besides: they have less need of effort in most of the necessary crafts than other nations, where, first of all, either the building or the repairing of houses requires everywhere such continuous effort on the part of so many, since what the father has built, the insufficiently thrifty heir allows gradually to be ruined, so that, what could have been maintained at minimal cost, his successor must rebuild all over again with greater expense. Furthermore, it often happens, even though one man’s house has been built at great cost to him, that another man with a very particular taste despises it, and once that has been neglected and, for that reason, has soon collapsed, he builds another house elsewhere with no less expense. But among the Utopians, where all things are in order and a commonwealth has been established, it very rarely happens that a new lot is chosen for the building of houses, and not only is a remedy swiftly found for present problems, there is also anticipation for future issues. This is why, for the least amount of work, their buildings last for the longest time, and craftsmen in this field hardly have anything to do sometimes, except to fill an order to cut the lumber of a house and to square and fit the stones, so it can go up more quickly if the need should arise.

Now consider how few labors are needed for their clothing: first, while they are at work, they are clothed indifferently with hide or pelts which last for seven years. When they go out in public, they put on a cloak to cover those rougher clothes; there is one color used throughout the whole island, and that is the natural wool color. And so not only are they in much less need of woolen cloth there than elsewhere, but it also costs much less. But there is less labor involved in linen-making, which is therefore more frequently used; but with linen, only the whiteness matters to them, while with wool, it is only the cleanliness they care about; nor is any
greater value set on a finer weave. And so it happens that everywhere else in the
world, four or five wool coats of different color and as many silk shirts are never
enough for one man to have, while not even ten are enough for those with fussier
tastes; there, everyone is content with one, which generally last for two years. In
fact, there is no reason for trying to acquire more, since if you got them you would
neither be any better defended against the cold, nor look even a bit more elegant
in your dress.

Therefore, since they all practice useful occupations, and since fewer products
are enough for them, it is no wonder that, with an abundant supply of everything,
they sometimes lead a vast multitude out to fix public roads (if any are worn down),
and very often, when there is no need even for such labor as this, they publicly an-
nounce a reduction in working hours. For the magistrates do not exercise the citi-
zens in superfluous work against their will, insofar as the original organization of
that commonwealth was directed to this one goal above all: that in so far as public
necessities allow for it, as much time as possible should be reclaimed from the serv-
vitude of the body and redirected, for all citizens, to the freedom and cultivation of
the mind. For here, they think, is where the happiness of life is to be found.

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

But now it seems I should explain how the citizens deal with one another, what
interactions the people have among themselves, and what method there is for dis-
tributing things. A city, then, consists of households, and the households, for the
most part, are composed of blood relatives. Women (when they become adults) are
placed with their husbands’ families, and move into their houses. But male chil-
dren, and the grandsons after them, remain in the household and obey the oldest
male parent, unless he is not sound enough in mind by reason of old age, and in that
case the next oldest takes his place.

But to keep the city either from becoming too sparsely populated or from grow-
ing larger than it should—each city comprises six thousand households, not includ-
ing the surrounding territory—care is taken that no household has fewer than ten,
or more than sixteen adults, for the number of children cannot, of course, be pre-
established. This limit is easily maintained by transferring into the smaller house-
holds the excess growth of the fuller ones. But if the population of a single city ever
becomes more numerous than it should, they repair the under-population of their
other cities.

But if, by chance, the mass of the population throughout the whole island swells
more than it should, citizens taken from any city are appointed to settle the nearest
part of the mainland wherever the native inhabitants have a lot of extra land and it is without cultivation; the Utopians then plant a colony there under their own laws, admitting as citizens the natives of that land if they wish to live with them. Joining with such who are willing, they easily grow together to form the same way of life and the same habits, and this is good for both peoples. By their institutions they make a land abundant for both peoples together, which had appeared barren and forbidding to them separately. Those who refuse to live by their laws, they drive off the territory they have marked out for themselves; against those who resist this, they clash in war. For they consider it a most just cause of war when a people, not using land but keeping it empty and void, prohibits the use and possession of that same land by others who, as nature prescribes, ought to be supported by it.

If ever some misfortune reduces the population any of their cities to such an extent that the loss cannot be repaired from other parts of the island while preserving the proper size of each city (which is said to have happened only twice in their whole history, through a severe attack of plague), the cities are replenished by the return of citizens from the colony. For they would rather let colonies vanish than let any of the cities on the island be diminished.

But I return to the citizens’ social life. The oldest male (as I have said) has charge of the household. Wives attend to their husbands, children to their parents, and in general the younger in age to the older.

Every city is divided into four equal parts. In the middle of each part is a market for all commodities. Goods produced by each household are brought there to certain warehouses and the different types of goods are distributed into separate storerooms. From these, each master of the household requests whatever he and his household needs, and takes away whatever he has requested without money or the payment of any compensation at all. For why should anything be denied, when there is more than enough of everything, and no fear that anyone would want to demand more than he needs? And why would anyone be suspected of demanding more than enough when he is certain that he will never lack anything? Indeed, what makes creatures greedy and rapacious is either fear of want, present in all animal species, or pride, unique to humans, who think they acquire glory by excelling others with a superfluous show of possessions; but this type of vice can have no place whatsoever within the institutions of the Utopians.

Adjacent to the markets I have mentioned are the food markets. Into these are transported not only vegetables, fruit, and bread, but also fish and whatever birds and four-footed beasts are good for eating, with places located outside the city where gore and filth can be washed away by flowing water. From this place they carry away the cattle that have been slaughtered and cleaned by the hands of slaves.
(for they do not allow their citizens to become accustomed to slaughtering animals, a practice that they think gradually diminishes mercy, the most humane feeling in our nature, nor do they permit anything dirty or unclean to be carried into the city—the air, corrupted by its rotting, could bring sickness).

Further, each street has certain spacious halls, equidistant from one another, each identified by name (in these live the syphogrants) and to each of the houses are assigned thirty families to have food there, fifteen on each side. The food-provisioners for each hall meet at a fixed time in the market, and request food according to the number of persons they are provisioning.

But in this distribution first care is taken of the sick, who are cared for in public hospitals. They have four hospitals on the edges of the city, a short distance outside the walls, each of them large enough in capacity to equal a small town; both so that no matter how great the number of patients, they aren’t crowded and uncomfortable, and so that those who have this sort of disease, infection from which usually creeps from one person to another, can be moved farther away from the mass of other people. These hospitals have been so well furnished and are bursting with all the instruments of medical care, and also so gentle and solicitous the care itself, so constant the attention bestowed by the most experienced doctors, that while no one is sent there against his will, yet in the whole city almost no one who suffers from poor health would not prefer to take a bed there than to stay at home.

After the food-provisioner for the sick has received the food based on the doctors’ orders, then all the best food is evenly distributed among the dining halls, according to the number in each, except that there is special regard for the city-ruler, the priest, and the tranibors; the same goes for the ambassadors and all the foreigners as well (if there are any, they are few and infrequent); but whenever foreigners are present, specially furnished residences are provided for them as well.

At the established times for lunch and dinner, each entire syphograncy, alerted by the sound of a brass trumpet, comes to meet in these halls, except for those who are lying in bed in the hospitals or at home. Nobody, however, is prevented from taking food home from the market as long as enough has already been distributed to the dining halls, since they know that no one does it without good reason; although nobody is forbidden to eat at home, still, no one does so gladly, since it is considered ignoble, and in fact it is foolish to spend effort on making an inferior meal when a sumptuous and splendid one is available at the dining hall, so close-by.

In this hall all the chores which are somewhat dirty or laborious are undertaken by slaves. But the duty of cooking the food and preparing it, and finally of setting out and serving the whole banquet, is something only the women from each household perform, in rotation. They are seated around three or more tables, depending
on the number of people dining. The men are seated along the wall, the women on
the outside of the tables, so that, in case they feel any sudden pain, which normally
happens at times to those who are pregnant, they can get up without disturbing the
seating arrangement and go off to the nursing mothers.

These women sit apart with their infants nursing in a certain room designated
for this, with a steady hearth fire and clean water, with cradles also nearby in the
meanwhile, so they can put the infants down to sleep and, if they want, take off
their swaddling bands and let them have some freedom to move around and play by
the fire. Each nurses her own offspring, unless death or sickness prevents it. When
that happens, the wives of the syphogrants quickly look for another nurse, and it
is not difficult to find one. For those who can furnish this commit themselves to
no duty more gladly, since everyone greets such compassion with praise, and the
child who is reared this way looks upon his nurse as a parent. In the nurses’ cham-
ber, all the children under five sit together. The other minors, among whom they
count those of either sex who are below marrying age, either serve those at table or,
if they are not yet capable because of their age, just stand by in perfect silence. Both
groups eat whatever is handed to them from the ones sitting at table, and have no
other fixed time for eating.

In the middle of the first table, which is in the chief place, and from which the
whole assembly is in view (for this table is placed cross-wise at the upper end of the
room) is where the syphogrant and his wife sit. Next to them are two of the eldest,
for they sit four by four at every table. If there is a religious shrine in the territory
of the syphogrant, the priest and his wife sit with the syphogrant in order to pre-
side. On either side of them are placed younger persons, then elders again, and so
on throughout the whole house, contemporaries being joined with contemporaries
and nevertheless also interspersed between those of different ages; a practice estab-
lished, they say, so that the gravity and reverence of the older (since nothing can be
done or said at table without being noticed by those neighbors on every side) will
restrain the younger from a shameless freedom of word and gesture.

The dishes of food are not served first to the end of the table, working down,
but the best of every kind food is offered to the elders first (who sit in specially des-
ignated places), then the rest are served equally in turn. But any special delicacies
(of which there was not going to be enough be distributed sufficiently throughout
the whole household) the elders share as they see fit with those sitting near them.
In this way, the older ones are respected, while an equal amount of benefit reaches
everyone.

Every lunch and dinner is begun with a reading that is morally formative but
still short enough not to be tedious. After this, the elders start conversations that
are on decent topics and yet not gloomy or humorless. And they do not occupy the entire lunchtime with long speeches; rather, they gladly listen to the younger ones, and for that matter, even draw them out on purpose so much so that they can get experience of each young person’s natural disposition and talent, expressing itself in the freedom of a common meal.

The lunches are a little shorter, the dinners more elaborate, because the former is followed by work, the latter by sleep and a night’s rest, and they think rest more effective for healthy digestion. No dinnertime is spent without music, nor does the second course ever lack sweets. They burn incense and sprinkle perfumes. They leave nothing out that could put the company in good cheer. They are rather inclined in this direction, not to prohibit any kind of pleasure, provided no disadvantage is involved with it.

In this manner, then, they dine together in the city; in the country, however, where they live further apart from each other, everyone eats in their own houses. No household in the country lacks any provisions, since everything that the city-folks eat comes from them to begin with.

**UTOPIAN TRAVEL**

But if the desire takes them to stay with friends in another city, or even just to see a place, they can easily get permission to do this from their syphogrants and tranibors, unless some necessity prevents it. Then a certain number of them are sent out together, with a letter from the ruler witnessing to their permission to travel, and stating a set day for their return. A wagon is provided, with a public slave to drive and take care of the oxen. If there are no women in the group, the wagon is returned, being considered a burden and a hindrance. On the entire journey they carry nothing with them, but do not lack anything, for they are at home everywhere.

If they stay longer than one day in any place, they each practice their own craft there and are treated with the utmost courtesy by their fellow tradesmen. If anyone should wander on his own initiative beyond his territory and be apprehended without an official letter from the ruler, he is held in disgrace, brought back like an escaped slave, and sharply corrected. If he attempts it a second time, his punishment is slavery.

But if anyone is struck with a desire to roam through the countryside of his own city, he is not prohibited, as long as he has his father’s permission and his spouse consents. But at whatever estate he arrives, he is not given any food until he has completed a morning’s work, (or as much work as is customarily done before dinner). Under this law, one is permitted to go anywhere within the territory.
surrounding his own city, for he will be no less useful to a city than if he were actually in it.

Now you see how there is no license in any place for idleness, or excuse for laziness, no wine-shops, no alehouses; nowhere a brothel, no opportunity for corruption, no hideouts, no small meeting places, but the ever-present, watching eyes of everyone else compel them either to do their customary work or pursue leisure activities that are not ignoble. From this national habit it necessarily follows that there is an abundance of everything. And since that abundance reaches everyone equally, it is no wonder that no one can be needy or a beggar.

As soon as it has been ascertained in the Senate at Amautorum (where, as I have said, three persons from every city assemble every year) in which places resources are plentiful, and where, on the other hand, the produce has been more scarce, the abundance of one place immediately compensates the scarcity of another, and they do this without charge, and without receiving anything in barter from those to whom they make the gift. But as the cities give from their own supply to any other city, and take nothing in return for it, just so, they receive what they lack from another city, to which they have paid nothing. Thus the whole island is like a single family.

But after they are sufficiently provided for (a goal they do not think they have reached until they have provided for two years in advance, due to the uncertainty of the year ahead), then they export to the other regions whatever is left over: a great supply of grain, honey, wool, linen, wood, scarlet and purple dyes, fleece, wax, tallow, hides, and, in addition to this, livestock. One-seventh of all this they give as a gift to the poor of the region; the rest they sell for a modest price.

And from this commerce they not only import into their country those goods which they lack at home (and they lack practically nothing but iron) but also a great quantity of silver and gold. Thanks to their long-lasting custom (it has lasted longer than one could believe) of acquiring these metals, they now abound in an unimaginable surplus of them everywhere. And so now they do not care whether they sell for cash or credit, and they have far the most part in promissory notes, and when they make them they look to the public trust of the city, never that of private citizens, by documents drawn up according to custom. When the day for payment comes, the city collects on the loan from the individual debtors, gathers the money into the treasury, and enjoys the interest on it until the Utopians ask for it back. They never ask for the majority of it back. For it is a thing for which they have no use, and they think it unfair to take it away from those who have need of it. But if the situation so demands that they should give some part of it as a loan to another people, then they do at last demand it, or when they must wage war. The one reason
for which they keep at home that whole treasure which they have is for it to serve as a defense in the most extreme or sudden dangers. And they use it especially for hiring foreign soldiers for a generous stipend (whom they would more willingly put in harm’s way than their own citizens), knowing that with a large amount of money their enemies can usually be bribed and set to fighting among themselves through treason, or even in open battle.

For this reason they keep an incalculable treasure, but not as treasure; they think of it in a way that makes me embarrassed to speak about it, for fear that what I say will not be believed, and that is something that worries me all the more, knowing that, if I hadn’t first seen it with my own eyes, I would scarcely have been induced to believe it, if another person had told me! For it is almost necessarily the case that, the farther something is from the customs of those who hear about it, the farther they will be from believing it to be real. Although a prudent examiner of things will perhaps be less amazed (since the rest of their institutions are so very different from ours) that their use of silver and gold is likewise more suited to their style than ours; in fact, they do not even use money themselves, but reserve it for an event that can just as much happen as not happen.

In the meantime, they regard gold and silver (from which money is made) in such a way that they are not valued by anyone higher than the nature of the things themselves deserves—and who cannot see how inferior they are to iron? Human beings can no more live without iron, by heaven, than without fire and water, whereas gold and silver have not been endowed by nature with any advantage we could not easily do without, if only the stupidity of man had not put a premium on their rarity. On the contrary, like a most indulgent parent, nature has placed in the open all the best things, like air, water, and the earth itself, but vain and unbenevolent things she has removed as far away as possible.

So it is with these metals: if the Utopians hoarded them away in some tower, the ruler and the senate would come under suspicion (such is the stupid shrewdness of the mob) of cheating the people by a clever trick, and themselves taking some kind of profit. Moreover, if they used the silver and gold to make goblets and other hand-crafted works, and an occasion ever arose that would require them to be melted down and spent on soldiers’ pay, they see, of course, that in such a case they would hardly tolerate being robbed of what they had begun to take delight in using.

In response to these difficulties, they have devised a certain system that is as consistent with the rest of their institutions as it is extremely abhorrent to our own (for whom gold is so valuable and is stored so carefully), and is therefore unbelievable except to those who have experienced it. For although they eat and drink from earthen and glass vessels (skillfully made, but not expensive), they use gold and silver for...
making chamber-pots and all the lowliest containers everywhere in use, not only in public halls, but in private homes as well. In addition, the chains and thick shackles that bind the slaves are forged out of the same metals. Finally, anyone who has been made infamous by some crime has gold rings hanging from his ears, gold rings on his fingers, a golden necklace around his neck, and finally a gold band on his head. Thus by every means they ensure that among them gold and silver are held in ignominy, and therefore these metals, which other nations allow themselves to be deprived of no less painfully than their own guts, among the Utopians, if some circumstance demands that all gold and silver be taken away, no one thinks he has lost a penny.

They collect pearls on the beaches, and even some diamonds and rubies on some mountain crags; they do not go out in search for them, but if they chance upon them, they pick them up and polish them. They adorn infants with them, who, although in the very beginning of childhood boast and take pride in such ornaments, when they get a little older, notice that it is only children who use trifles like these, they put them away without a word from their parents, through their own sense of shame—no differently than our own children do when they cast aside their marbles, trinkets, and dolls when they grow up.

And so, how their institutions, so different from those of other nations, produce emotional attitudes that are likewise different, was never so clear to me as in the case of the Anemolian ambassadors. They arrived in Amaurotum when I was there, and since they had come to discuss important matters, three citizens from each city had gathered there in anticipation of their arrival. Now all the ambassadors of the neighboring nations, who had landed there before, were thoroughly acquainted with the customs of the Utopians, and knew that they gave no honor to fine clothes, that silk was despicable to them, and even gold a disgrace, and as a consequence these ambassadors were used to arriving in as modest a dress as possible. But the Anemolians, because they lived farther away and seldom had relations with them, upon hearing that the Utopians all dressed in the same, very simple bodily attire, assumed that what the Utopians did not wear, they did not even possess; so the Anemolian ambassadors, more proud than wise, decided to show themselves off as gods with the elegance of their finery, and dazzle the eyes of the sorry Utopians with the splendor of their apparel. So three ambassadors landed with a hundred attendants, each one with colorful clothes, and most in silk, and the ambassadors themselves, who were nobility at home, came in gold clothing, with large necklaces, gold earrings, gold rings on their hands, strings of sparkling pearls and gems hanging from their caps—in short, they came decorated with all the things the Utopians use in the punishment of slaves, to show disgrace for infamy, or to make into toys for children. And so it was well worth the trouble to see how smug the Anemolians
felt to compare their own finery with the dress of the Utopians who had meanwhile filled the streets. But there was no less pleasure in seeing how far their hope and expectation had deceived them, and how far short they fell from the high regard they had been expecting to get. For, to the eyes of all the Utopians, with the exception of a very few who had visited other nations for some reason or other, all that splendor of apparel seemed shameful, and they greeted with reverence all the lowliest among them as if they were the lords, but considered the ambassadors themselves to be slaves because of their gold chains, and let them pass by without any honor at all.

You would have even seen the children who had outgrown their gems and pearls, when observing the same toys fastened to the caps of the ambassadors, poking their mothers in the side and whispering, “Look mother, how the big dummy is still wearing pearls and little gems, just like he was still a little boy!”

But the mother in all seriousness replied, “Be quiet, son—I think he is one of the ambassadors’ fools.”

Others found fault with the gold chains, saying that they were useless, being so thin that a slave could easily break them, and so loose besides, that whenever he wanted he could shake them off, and escape anywhere unbound and free.

But after the ambassadors had spent a day or two there, and saw how little their large amount of gold was valued, and held in no less disgrace there than held in honor in their own country, and, furthermore, that more gold and silver was put into the chains and shackles of one escaped slave than in the get-up of all three of them put together, they were crestfallen, and laid aside in shame all the finery on which they had so arrogantly prided themselves, especially after a few conversations with the Utopians had made them more familiar with their customs and beliefs.

Utopians are amazed that any mortal soul could be delighted by the dubious gleam of a tiny gem or stone, when he could simply look at any star, not to mention the sun; that there was anyone so insane as to appear in his own eyes more noble on account of the fine weave of his spun-wool cloth when this very same wool (no matter how fine a thread it has) had once been worn by a sheep, and the sheep at the time was still nothing other than a sheep.

Likewise they are amazed that gold, by its very nature so useless, is now so valuable everywhere in the world, that the human being himself, through whom, and for whose use, gold has gained so much value, be far less valued than gold, and to such a degree, that any blockhead with no more intelligence than a log, and no less shameless than stupid, could still keep many wise and good men in slavery to himself just because he happened to have a heap of gold coins, and if some change of fortune or some trick of the laws (which no less than Fortune herself confuses the highest with the lowest) transfers it from that master to the most abject fool of his
entire household, it is no wonder that a little later, that erstwhile master would slip into servitude to his own former servant, as some kind of appendage or small addition to his coins. But they are much more amazed and revolted by the madness of those who grant all but divine honors to wealthy persons, to whom they owe nothing, to whom they are not beholden for any reason other than that they are rich, and whom they well know are so despicable and greedy that nothing is more certain to them than that not even a single coin from that great heap of money will ever come their way while those wealthy persons are still alive.

These beliefs and others of the same kind they have partly received from their upbringing, having been brought up in a commonwealth whose institutions are so removed from such foolishness, and partly from their formal instruction and reading. For even if there are not many from each city who are exempted from other work and assigned just to learning (these of course are those in whom they detect from childhood an outstanding talent, a special genius, and a mind inclined toward liberal studies), nevertheless all children are well-trained in letters, and a good part of the population, both men and women, and throughout their lives, allocate to reading and study the free hours we have mentioned.

They acquire their knowledge of the disciplines in their own language. It does not lack vocabulary, nor is it unpleasant to hear, nor is there any more faithful way to convey their thoughts. That same language is spread through almost the whole region of that hemisphere (except that everywhere it is a little corrupted, to different degrees in different places).

Of all the philosophers, whose names are well-known to us in this part of the world, before we came, not even a single name had reached there, and yet in music, dialectic, and in the knowledge of calculating and measuring, they have made almost the same discoveries as our own past great men. Although they have equaled our ancients in almost all things, they are nevertheless far from equal to the discoveries of our recent dialecticians. For they have not discovered even one of those rules about restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions which are so very carefully worked out in the “Small Logical Treatises” which our children here are everywhere made to master. Moreover, they are so far from being capable of researching secondary intentions that not one of them could see what is called man in general, although (as you know) he is plainly colossal and bigger than any giant, and even though we pointed him out clearly with our finger.

But they are very skilled in the motion of the stars, and in the movements of the celestial orbits. What is more, they have also cleverly engineered instruments of various forms, by means of which they have grasped the motions and locations of the sun and the moon, and likewise of the other stars which are visible in their horizon.
But as for the conjunctions and disjunctions of the planets, and in fact, that whole imposture of divination by stars, they do not even dream.

They forecast rain, wind, and other changes in the weather from certain signs observed after long practice. But on the causes of all those things, and the tides and the saltiness of the sea, and in short, on the origin and nature of heaven and earth, they say, in part, the same things as our own ancient philosophers, and in part, just as these disagree among themselves, so the Utopians propose new reasons for things, disagreeing with all of our philosophers, and not completely agreeing among themselves.

In the part of philosophy which deals with ethics they dispute about the same things as we do, inquiring after the goods of the soul, of the body, and of external goods, and whether the word “good” applies to all these goods or only to the gifts of the soul. They discuss virtue and pleasure, but the foremost and chief debate of all, is the following: in what one thing, or in what several things, they think human happiness consists. But in this matter they seem to lean too far to the school that advocates pleasure, because it is by pleasure that they define the whole or at least the most important part of human happiness.

And you should be all the more amazed, nevertheless, that they also seek support for so delicate a judgment from religion (which is serious and strict and almost sad and rigid). For they never debate about happiness without combining certain principles taken from religion with philosophical reasoning, thinking that without such principles, reason by itself is too defective and weak to investigate true happiness. The principles are of this sort: the soul is immortal, and, by the goodness of God, born to be happy; after this life, rewards are waiting for our virtues and good deeds, punishments for our wicked deeds. Although these are matters of religion, they nevertheless think that reason leads to believing and accepting them.

If these principles were to be eliminated, the Utopians assert without the least hesitation that no one would be so stupid as not to conclude that pleasure should be sought by any means, whether good or evil. Only let him make sure, not to let a lesser pleasure get in the way of a greater one, and not to pursue a pleasure which pain would take vengeance upon. Indeed, they say it is the utmost madness to pursue harsh and difficult virtue, and not only drive off the sweetness of life, but also endure pain voluntarily if you expected no benefit from it (for what benefit would there be if you got nothing after death, after spending this life unpleasantly, that is to say, miserably?)

Now they do not believe, in fact, that happiness resides in every pleasure, but in pleasure that is good and honest. They think our nature is drawn by virtue itself to pleasure as to the highest good, while the opposing school attributes happiness to
virtue alone. Now, the Utopians define virtue as living in accordance with nature, which is what we were designed by God to do. And they say that whoever obeys reason in pursuing and avoiding things follows the lead of nature.

Further, reason incites human beings first and foremost to love and revere the divine majesty, to whom we owe both that we exist and that we are able to have happiness; in the second place, reason advises and stirs us to live our lives with the minimum of anxiety and the maximum of joy allowed, and to offer ourselves as helpers to all others in acquiring the same, in accordance with our natural fellowship. For no one has ever been so sad and rigid a devotee of virtue—and hater of pleasure—as to prescribe hard work, sleepless nights, and dirtiness, and not at the same time command you to do all in your power to ease the wants and difficulties of others; thinking it praiseworthy just for the sake of humane conduct, for one man to be a refuge and comfort of another, if indeed it is the most humane conduct of all (no virtue being more fitting for a human being than humanity) to relieve the difficulty of others, and, after taking away sadness, to return them to an agreeable life, that is, to pleasure. Why would nature not drive each person to do the same for himself as well?

For it is one way or the other: either the joyful, i.e., the pleasurable life is evil, and if that is the case, not only should you not help anyone to have it, but, as something harmful and deadly for everyone, you should remove it as much as you are able; or else, if you not only can, but ought to, win others over to it as a good thing, why should you not do the same, especially for yourself? It is only fitting to be just as kind to yourself as to others. Since nature teaches you to be good to others, the same nature does not turn around and command you to be fierce and merciless toward yourself. Therefore, they say, nature herself prescribes the joyful life—pleasure, that is—as the end of all our operations, and they define virtue as living in accordance with nature’s command.

However, since nature invites us mortals to help one another in leading a more cheerful life (and nature is surely right in this, for nobody is so far above the common lot of the human race as to be nature’s sole interest and concern; she equally nurtures all those she embraces in a common species) certainly it is for this reason she commands you over and over again, not to consult your own welfare in such a way that you bring about others’ troubles.

The Utopians therefore hold that not only should agreements entered into by private persons be honored, but also public laws for distributing essential commodities, i.e., the material for pleasure: the laws, that is, which a good ruler has justly promulgated or a people has sanctioned by their common consent without the oppression of a tyrant or the fraud of deception. Obeying such laws as these, it is prudence to look out for your own interest, and piety, to look out for the public
interest. But to seek to snatch away another person’s pleasure while obtaining your own: that, indeed, is an injustice; on the other hand, to deprive yourself of something in order to give it to others: that is a work of humane conduct and kindness; such action never takes away as much good as it gives back. It is compensated by the exchange of benefits, and simply being aware of your good deed, the memory of the gratitude and good will of those whom you benefited, brings more pleasure to your soul than the pleasure of the body which you did without.

Finally (to which conclusion religion easily leads the mind of one who gladly agrees), God repays the loss of a small, brief pleasure with a huge, never-ending joy. And so for this reason they assert (after having discussed and pondered the matter carefully and thoroughly) that all our actions, and including in these our virtues themselves, have ultimately pleasure and happiness for their end.

The Utopians define as “pleasure” every motion and state of the body or soul which is delightful to have, provided nature is guiding us. They are not rash when they add an appetitive power to nature. For, just as anything enjoyable by nature (i.e., what is not striven for through injustice, does not involve the loss of something more pleasant, and is not followed by a struggle) is what not only the senses but also right reason seeks, just so, all those unnatural things that human beings through a most inane conspiracy pretend to be pleasant (as if it were in their power to change things as easily as it is to change the words for things)—all such things, the Utopians maintain, are so greatly non-conducive to happiness that they even hinder it most of all. This is because once they have become entrenched in people, they preoccupy the whole soul with an utterly false notion of pleasure and leave no place for true and natural pleasures. For there are very many things which in their own nature not only contain no sweetness: a good many of them even contain a great deal of bitterness, but through their perverse enticement of desires, are not only held to be the highest pleasures, but are also counted among the chief reasons for living.

In the class of persons who seek counterfeit pleasure the Utopians include those whom I mentioned before, who think they are better, the better the coat they wear. In this one thing, they make two mistakes. For they are no less deceived in thinking their clothes are better, than in thinking that they themselves are better. For, when you consider the purpose of clothes, why should fine-spun wool be better than coarse? But they put on airs, as if they were superior by nature and not by a mistake in their judgment, and they think some worth is gained for themselves thereby. And for this reason, an honor which they would not have dared to hope for when dressed more cheaply, they demand for their more elegant coat, as if by their own legal right, and they are angry if they are passed over rather carelessly. But this very thing—to be impressed by vain and useless honors—is that not equally stupid? For
what natural or true pleasure does someone’s baring his head, or bending his knees bring you? Will this heal the pain in your knees? Or cure the madness in your head? In this picture of false pleasure, it is amazing how they enjoy their own insanity as they plume and pride themselves on a belief in their own nobility, because they happened to be born from a long line of ancestors considered to be rich (for nobility now means nothing else), especially in landed property, and they think themselves not even a tiny bit less noble, if their ancestors left them nothing of that wealth, or if they themselves have squandered away what they did leave them.

To these they add those who are captivated by gems or stones (as I have said), and who seem to themselves to have become gods in some degree, if they ever get an extraordinary one, especially one of the kind that was considered the most valuable at the time and by the people they know; for the same kinds are not valuable at all times, or to all people; they will not have them unless they are taken out of their gold setting and laid bare. But not even then do they buy them, unless the seller guarantees on oath that it is a true gem and a true stone, so anxious are they lest a counterfeit gem deceive their eyes, instead of a true one. But why should a fake gem offer less delight when you go to look at it, when your eye cannot discern it from the true one? Both ought to be of equal value to you no less than to a blind man, by Hercules!

And then there are those who hoard their superfluous wealth, in order to be delighted, not by using their heap of gold, but only by its contemplation; do they know true pleasure, or are they not rather deceived by a false one? Or what about those, who, by a contrary vice, hide their gold which they will never use and perhaps not even see again, and are so anxious about losing it that they lose it. For what else do you do when you keep yourself and perhaps all other human beings from using it, but return it to the earth? But you, nevertheless, are beside yourself with joy over a treasure hidden away as though your mind were now free of care. And if anyone secretly takes it away without your knowledge, and ten years later you die, during that whole ten year period when you lived on without realizing you were missing the money, what difference did it make to you, whether your gold was stolen or safe? Certainly, it was just as much use to you either way.

To these inept kinds of joy they associate gamblers (whose madness they know by hearsay, not experience), hunters, and fowlers. For, say the Utopians, what pleasure is there in throwing dice onto a board, which you have done so often that even if there were some pleasure in it, you would surely have had your fill of doing it by now? Or what sweetness could there be, instead of disgust, in hearing the bark and howl of dogs? Or what better sensation of pleasure is there, when a dog chases a hare, than when a dog chases another dog? Indeed, the same action is done either way, for running is involved, if you like running.
But if what grabs your attention is the hope of slaughter, the expectation of butchery being carried out under your eyes, you ought instead to be moved to mercy to watch a poor little hare be torn to pieces by a dog, the weaker by the stronger, the shy and timid by the ferocious, and, finally, the harmless by the cruel. And so the Utopians have relegated the whole activity of hunting to butchers, as a practice unworthy of free people (and this craft, as we said earlier, is performed by slaves). For they consider hunting the lowest part of the butcher’s craft, while the other parts of it they consider more useful and honest, as contributing much more and killing animals only for the sake of necessity, while a hunter seeks nothing except pleasure from the slaughter and carnage of a poor little animal, and the Utopians consider that this lust for watching the slaughter even of mere beasts, arises from the passion of a cruel mind, or finally turns into cruelty, through the habitual experience of such a savage pleasure.

Therefore although the common run of mortals considers these and other things like them (for they are innumerable) to be pleasures, the Utopians plainly determine that since there is nothing pleasant in them by nature, they have no business with true pleasure. For although the fact that they fill the senses of the common crowd with joy (which would seem to be the work of pleasure), the Utopians do not swerve from their opinion. For it is not the nature of the thing itself, but the perverse habit of those who practice it that is the culprit. And because of this vice they cherish bitter things instead of sweet. It is no different from pregnant women with their defective sense of taste thinking that pitch and tallow taste better than honey. Yet just as the nature of any other thing cannot be changed by a judgment distorted by sickness or habit, so likewise can the nature of pleasure not be changed.

The pleasures the Utopians acknowledge as true pleasures are of various types, since they attribute some to the mind, others to the body. To the mind they give understanding, and the delight produced by the contemplation of the truth. To these pleasures is added the fond memory of a life well-lived, and the confident hope of future good.

Bodily pleasure they divide into two kinds: the first kind is held to be the sensation of being flooded with a clearly perceptible sweetness, a sensation that takes place at various times: whenever there is a renewal of the parts of us that have been used up by our natural energy (these are recovered by food and drink), or whenever things the body has too much of are removed; this comes when we purge our intestines of waste products, or when effort is given to the generation of children, or when an itch of any part is alleviated by rubbing or scratching. Sometimes, however, a pleasure arises neither to give anything back that our body needs nor to
remove something that causes discomfort, but which still, through a certain hidden power, but a clear operation, tickles, affects and attracts our attention, as with music.

They understand a second type of bodily pleasure which consists in a quiet, evenly balanced state of the body, and that is, of course, each person’s own health, when not compromised by any malady. For this, if no pain is attacking it, is delightful in itself, even when not moved through any pleasure being added to it from the outside. For although it does not assert itself and is less obvious to the senses than the swollen pleasure of eating and drinking, nevertheless many maintain that it is the greatest of pleasures, and almost all Utopians say that it is a great one: the basis, so to say, and foundation of all pleasures: which even in itself alone makes life pleasant and desirable, and if it is taken away, there is no place left anywhere for any pleasure. For to be entirely free from pain, without the presence of health, they call stupor, in fact, and not pleasure.

The Utopians long since rejected the verdict of those who decree (since this question too was seriously debated among them) that stable and tranquil health should not be considered a pleasure because they said that it could not be perceived as present unless by means of some external movement. But now, by contrast, there is almost unanimous agreement that health belongs above all to pleasure. For, they say, since there is pain in sickness, and pain is no less the implacable enemy of pleasure than sickness is of health, why should pleasure not be within the tranquil enjoyment of health? For they think it makes no difference to the question whether one says sickness equals pain, or that pain exists within sickness, for the same thing follows in either case. Indeed, whether health is pleasure, or necessarily produces pleasure as fire generates heat, it is no wonder that in either case it of course follows that those to whom stable health is present, are those from whom pleasure cannot be absent.

Furthermore when we eat, they say, what else is happening but that health, which began to be deposed, is in combat with hunger (with food there, fighting as an ally), and during this battle, as health gradually recovers its strength, this very progress back to its wonted vigor brings about the pleasure of our being refreshed. So then, will health that delights in the struggle not likewise rejoice in the attainment of victory? Will health having at last happily regained its former strength (the only thing she had sought through the whole struggle) be suddenly senseless? Will she not recognize her own good and embrace it? For the Utopians think it very far from the truth to say that health cannot be felt. For, they say, who, while awake, does not feel that he is well, except the one who is not? Who is overtaken by so much stupor or lethargy as to deny that health is enjoyable and delightful? And what is delight, except pleasure by another name?
Therefore they especially welcome the pleasures of the mind (for they consider these the first of all the others and the leading ones) and they think that the most significant of them arise from the exercise of the virtues and the awareness of a good life. Of the pleasures that the body supplies, they give the highest award to health. For they determine that the pleasure of eating and drinking, and anything else that brings delight of the same kind, are to be sought after, but only for the sake of health. For such things are not agreeable in and of themselves, but only in so far as they resist ill health, secretly sneaking up on us. And therefore, they say, just as a wise man should pray to be free of sicknesses rather than wish for medicine, and cast off pains rather than adopt comforts, so it is better not to need this kind of pleasure at all than to be soothed by it, and if anyone thinks he is blessed because of this kind of pleasure, he would have to admit that he would only be really happy when he lives a life spent in perpetual hunger, thirst, itching, eating, drinking, scratching, rubbing, and who does not see not only how disgusting, but also how miserable such a life would be? Indeed these are the lowest pleasures, since they are the least self-standing, for they never occur without being connected to opposing pains. Hunger, obviously, is connected to the pleasure of eating, though not in a sufficiently balanced way, for the sharper the pain of hunger, the longer it lasts, and in fact it arises before the pleasure and is not extinguished unless pleasure dies along with it. Therefore they think that pleasures of this sort should not be highly valued except to the extent that necessity demands. But they still rejoice in them, and gratefully acknowledge the indulgence of Mother Nature, who entices her young by the most agreeable allurements to do what they must constantly do anyway. For how tedious would it be to live if these daily sicknesses of hunger and thirst had to be driven away by drugs and medicines like the other discomforts which afflict us only occasionally?

But the Utopians gladly cherish beauty, strength and nimbleness, as the proper and agreeable gifts of nature. Moreover they pursue those other pleasures which come through hearing, sight, and smell, which nature wanted to be particularly proper to the human being (for no other species of animals looks up to the form and beauty of the world, or is moved by any charm of smells, except to distinguish its food, nor does one distinguish harmonious and unharmonious intervals of sounds) and the Utopians pursue these, I tell you, like the agreeable seasonings of life. In all things, however, they keep this rule: a lesser pleasure should not get in the way of a greater one, and pleasure should never produce pain, which they judge necessarily happens whenever the pleasure is dishonorable.

But of course: to refuse the honor due to beauty, to wear down your strength, to turn agility into sloth, to exhaust the body with fasting, to do injury to one’s
health, and to despise all the other favors of nature unless someone neglects his own interests while more eagerly securing the interests of others or of the public, awaiting a greater pleasure from God in return for his labor; otherwise, to afflict oneself for the sake of an empty shadow of virtue, and for no one’s profit or in order to endure adversity with less difficulty—an adversity which may never come—this indeed they think the utmost madness of a mind cruel to itself and ungracious toward nature. As if he disdained to owe it anything, he renounces all its benefits.

This is their opinion of virtue and pleasure; and they believe that, unless a religion were to be sent down from heaven and inspire man with something more holy, no truer opinion can be found out by human reason, and whether they think rightly or not in this matter there is no time for us to examine the question, nor is it necessary anyway. After all, I have undertaken to tell of their institutions, not to defend them as well. But I am certainly convinced of this, that whatever the validity of their judgments, there is no more outstanding people or happier commonwealth.

Physically they are nimble and vigorous, with more strength than you would expect from their stature, and yet they are not too small; and although they do not have fertile soil everywhere, nor a really salubrious climate, they so fortify themselves against the weather by the moderation of their diet, and so amend the ground by their industry, that nowhere on earth is there a richer yield of crops and cattle, or human bodies more vigorous or less subject to disease. And so you would see being diligently done there not only the things that farmers commonly do to improve a naturally barren soil by art and effort; but you would also see forests pulled up from one place and transplanted to another by the hands of the people, the purpose being not quantity of production but transportation, so that the timber is closer to the sea or rivers or cities, since crops are carried overland with less effort, and to a greater distance, than lumber.

They are an easy-going, courteous people, skillful, and fond of leisure, quite patient when it comes to corporeal labor (when called for), but otherwise not exactly seeking it out, tireless as they are in the pursuits of the mind. And when they heard us speak about the literature and learning of the Greeks (for in Latin, apart from histories and the poets, nothing was likely to win their approval very much) it was wonderful how eagerly they strove for the chance to be taught Greek thoroughly by our instruction.

Therefore we began to teach them, at first in order not to seem unwilling to make the effort, more than for any hope of getting results. But when we proceeded a little, their diligence immediately made us anticipate that our diligence would not be spent in vain. For they began copying the shapes of the letters so easily, pronouncing the words so readily, committing them to memory so quickly, and
repeating them so faithfully, that we would have taken it for a miracle, except that the majority of them had taken up the study not only because they were fired up by their own will, but also because they had been ordered by a decree of the Senate. They were from the class of scholars, with the choicest mental talents and maturity of years. And so in less than three years there was nothing in the language which they lacked for reading good authors all the way through without any obstacle, as long as there was no faulty reading in the texts. My guess is that they also learned that literature rather easily because they were somewhat akin; I suspect that the nation originated from the Greeks, because their language, in other respects nearly Persian, preserves some traces of the Greek language in the names of the cities and magistrates.

They Greek authors they have, they have from me (for when I was setting off on the fourth voyage I took on board a medium-size chest of books instead of merchandise, since I had clearly decided never to return, rather than return quickly): most of Plato’s works, and many of Aristotle’s, also Theophrastus’ work on plants, which, I am sorry to say, was mutilated in many places. For, during our voyage, a monkey came upon the book where it had been carelessly laid and wantonly and playfully tore out some of its pages here and there and shredded them. Of those who wrote grammars, they only have Lascaris, for I did not bring Theodorus with me, nor do they have any dictionary except those of Hesychius and Dioscorides; Plutarch’s works they hold very dear, and are captivated by the humor and charm of Lucian. Of poets they have Aristophanes, Homer, and Euripides; and Sophocles, too, in the small type of Aldus. Of historians they have Thucydides and Herodotus; and Herodian as well.

But in the medical field—since my companion Tricius Apinatus had carried with him certain shorter works of Hippocrates, and the Microtechne of Galen—these works are very valuable to them. For, even if, compared with almost all other nations, the Utopians have the least need for the medical art, nevertheless it is nowhere held in greater honor, and just for this reason, that they count a knowledge of medicine among the noblest and most useful parts of philosophy, by the aid of which, when they scrutinize the secrets of nature, they think that they not only obtain a marvelous pleasure for themselves from the activity, but also gain the highest favor of the Author and Craftsman of that nature, who, they suppose, in the manner of other craftsmen, has put the mechanism of this universe on exhibit to be seen and observed by the human being (the only creature he had made capable of such a thing); and they think that for this reason the Creator holds dearer the careful and concerned observer and admirer of His craft than one who, like an animal devoid of mind, stupidly and with no emotion neglects so great and wondrous a sight.
Thus, too, the natural genius of the Utopians, trained in letters, is marvelously capable of discovering techniques that make some progress toward a more convenient way of life by saving labor. But they still owe to us two skills—printing and paper-making—and a good part of that they owe to their own efforts and not only to us. For when we showed them literature printed by Aldus on paper in books, and spoke of the material for paper-making and the ability to print letters, they themselves immediately inferred the matter very astutely somewhat more than we explained (for none of us was an expert in either craft), and although before that time they had written only on animal skins, bark, and papyrus, they immediately tried making paper and printing letters on it; and although at first they did not get very far, by trying out the same things over and over again, they soon acquired both skills, and accomplished so much that, if there had been copies of Greek texts among them, printed books would not be lacking. But as it is, although they now have nothing more than what I have listed, what they do have, they have already reproduced in thousands of copies by printing books.

Whoever has come there to visit the country is eagerly received, especially one who arrives with the recommendation of having some remarkable talent or who, having experience of a lengthy period of travel, is recommended by the knowledge of many lands (the latter was the reason our landing was welcome). For they are glad to hear what is happening everywhere in the world. But people do not land there all that frequently for commerce. What would traders bring besides iron, or else gold and silver—metals anybody would rather take back with themselves anyway! The things that they must export they think it a better idea to ship out themselves, rather than to be sought after by others from there, in order both to have a better knowledge of foreign nations on every side and not to set out to forget their knowledge and experience of sea-going.

SLAVES

The wondrous fairness of this nation

They do not hold as slaves just any captives in war, but only those captured in a war the Utopians fought themselves, nor do they keep the children of slaves as slaves; nor, finally, someone they could purchase already serving as a slave in a foreign nation; but either if someone’s shameful deed among them is turned into slavery, or those whom a crime committed in foreign cities (which kind is much more frequent) has marked out for punishment. For many of these they carry off, sometimes having been assigned a low price, more often acquired for free. Both kinds of slaves they keep not only in constant labor, but also in chains, treating their own people more harshly, whom they think more of a lost cause and deserving worse
punishment because they had been so excellently equipped for virtue by so excellent an upbringing, and were not able to refrain from crime even then.

There is another kind of slave: when some average worker, hard-working and poor from some other people voluntarily chooses to be a slave among them. They treat these people honorably and (except that a little bit more work is given them because they are used to it) they regard them not very much less mildly than their own citizens; when one wants to leave (which does not happen often) they neither keep him against his will nor send him away empty-handed. The sick, as I said, they very lovingly care for, and omit nothing whatsoever which can restore them to health, whether by exact care in medicine or diet. And even those suffering with an incurable illness they console, by sitting and talking with them and applying what comforts they can. But if an illness is not only incurable but is also causing continual vexation and torture, then the priests and the magistrates exhort the person as follows: since, unequal to all life’s duties, an annoyance to others, and a burden to himself, he has now outlived his own death, he should not make a unilateral decision to keep on feeding the illness and the decay, nor, since life is a torment for him, should he hesitate to die; why, he should rely on good hope and either remove himself or by his own choosing allow himself to be snatched away by others from his bitter life, as if taken from a prison or off some hook; they say that he would be prudent to do this, since he would be putting an end not to good things but to torture, and what’s more, since he would be obeying the advice of the priests in this matter (and they are the interpreters of God), they say that he would be acting piously and in a holy way.

Those whom they persuade about this either end their life by voluntarily fasting or, made senseless, are set free without a sensation of death. But they do not dispatch anyone against his will nor do they diminish their duty toward him in any way. It is honorable to be persuaded and die under these conditions. On the other hand, someone who decides to commit suicide without the approval of the priests and the Senate is deemed unworthy of burial or pyre, and is shamefully tossed unburied into a swamp.

A woman does not marry before eighteen, a man not until four years later than that. Before marriage, if a man or woman is convicted of intercourse secret passion, a serious punishment is brought against him or her: they are totally forbidden to marry, unless the city-ruler’s clemency pardons the offense; both the father- and mother-of-the-household where the disgrace was committed are subject to great public humiliation for not being sufficiently careful in their roles as parents. The Utopians punish this crime so severely because they foresee that without being carefully kept from promiscuous intercourse, few couples would unite in married
love who see that a whole life must be spent with one person, and that all the annoyances, besides, which that brings must be endured to the end.

Now, in choosing spouses they seriously and solemnly observe what is to our way of thinking a most absurd ritual. For the woman, whether a virgin or a widow, is shown naked to her suitor by a serious and respectable matron, and in turn some highly respected man stands the naked suitor in front of the girl. Although we laughed at this custom as absurd and did not approve it, the Utopians for their part were amazed at the clear foolishness of all other nations, who, when it comes to obtaining a new horse, are so cautious over a matter of a little money, that although the animal is already almost bare, customers still refuse to buy it unless the saddle has been taken away and all the clothes stripped off to expose some hidden sore; when it comes to choosing a wife (from which situation either pleasure or disgust will accompany one through all of life) they act so carelessly, that—the rest of the woman’s body being covered with clothes—they judge the whole woman by the space of one span (since nothing is seen but her face) and they unite her to themselves at no small risk (if anything offensive appears afterwards) of not sticking together.

For all are not so wise as to regard only character: even in the marriages of wise persons, the charms of the body do make a small addition to the virtues of the mind; certainly, so foul a deformity may lie hidden under those coverings as to absolutely estrange a man’s mind from his wife, when he can no longer be separated from her in body. If this kind of deformity happens to be acquired after the marriage has been contracted, everybody has to bear his misfortune as best he can, but beforehand, there should be steps taken by the laws so that no one is taken in by a trap, and they had to see to this all the more zealously since they are the only people in those regions of the world who are content with one spouse; marriages are not very often dissolved there by any way other than death, unless by reason of adultery, or intolerably annoying character traits. In this case, of course, the offended person is granted permission by the Senate to change spouses; the other partner leads a disreputable and permanently celibate life. Otherwise, they under no condition allow someone to repudiate a wife against her will who with no fault of her own has been beset by some physical impairment: they judge it cruel for someone to be abandoned at the very moment when she is especially in need of support, and they think that the protection for old age, since it brings diseases and is itself a disease, will be weak and uncertain.

But sometimes it happens that when the characters of the husband and wife are not enough in agreement with each other and they have both found other persons with whom they expect to live more pleasantly, they separate by mutual consent and contract new marriages; not, however, without the authorization of the Senate,
which does not allow divorces unless the case has been carefully investigated by the senators and their wives. And even then they do not easily give consent, because they know that holding out an easy hope for remarriage is of little practical value toward strengthening the mutual affection of the spouses.

Violators of marriage are punished with the harshest slavery, and if neither party was single, those who suffered the injury reject their adulterous spouses and the two injured spouses themselves (but only if they wish to) join in marriage with each other or with whoever seems best. But if one of the injured parties nevertheless holds fast in love to the undeserving spouse; he or she is not denied use of the marriage contract, if he or she is willing to follow one condemned to public works; sometimes it happens that the repentance of the one and the dutiful persistence of the other moves the ruler to pity, and wins them back their freedom. But on one who has relapsed into crime, however, death is imposed.

For other crimes, no fixed penalty has been established by any law; but the Senate judges the punishment for each crime, according as each crime has seemed to them savage, or the opposite. Husbands correct their wives, and parents their children, unless they have committed a crime so big that it is in the interests of public morality for it to be publicly punished. But almost all the most serious crimes are punished with the nuisance of slavery, since they believe that is not any less harsh to the criminals, and of more benefit to the commonwealth, than if they hurried to put the offenders to death and be rid of them. For they are of more use with their labor than from their execution, and, by their example, they deter others longer from a similar crime. But if they are treated in this way and are rebellious and uncooperative, then, finally, they are slaughtered like untamable beasts that cannot be held by prisons or chains. But hope is not entirely lost for those who are submissive: indeed, if they are tamed by their long-lasting punishments and display a repentance which proves that they are more displeased by their wrongdoing than by their punishment, then sometimes at the ruler’s discretion, sometimes by popular referendum, their slavery is mitigated or cancelled altogether.

There is no less criminal liability for attempting to seduce someone than in succeeding with the seduction. In every disgraceful act they consider a definitely intended attempt equal to the completed deed. For they do not suppose that a failure to accomplish some deed should benefit someone who did nothing to keep the deed from happening.

They are delighted by fools, and while it is a great dishonor to insult them, they also do not forbid anyone from taking pleasure in their silliness. In fact they consider this to be of the greatest benefit to the fools themselves, and if anyone is so severe and sober as not to be able to laugh at anything said or done by a fool, such a
person, they believe, must not serve as a guardian to the fool, fearing that he would not be cared for graciously enough by someone to whom he would not only be of no use, but not even a source of delight, which is the only quality they are really effective at.

To mock a disfigured person or one missing a limb is considered mean and deformed, not for the person who is laughed at, but for the one who does the mocking, who is stupidly insulting someone for what was not in the person’s power to avoid instead of for a fault. While they consider it the characteristic of a lazy and indolent person not to care for inborn beauty, so also is it disgraceful arrogance, in their opinion, to seek help from cosmetics. For they know from their own experience that there is no attractive feature of a wife’s appearance that can win over a husband so much as her goodness and reverence. For although some men are caught by beauty alone, no man is held permanently, except by a woman’s virtue and obedience.

Not only do they deter from disgraceful deeds with punishments, they also invite to virtuous deeds by proposing rewards, and for this reason they place statues in the city center for famous men and for all those who have performed outstanding service for the commonwealth, in recollection of great achievements and, at the same time, for the glory of the ancestors to serve their descendants as a spur and motivation for their own virtue.

Anyone who campaigns for a magistracy is automatically disqualified for any of them. They live together amiably, since, of course, no magistrate is haughty or fearful; they are called Fathers, and show themselves to be so. Honor is conferred on them, as it should be, by the willing, not demanded from the unwilling. Even the ruler is not distinguished by special garment or crown, but is identified by a bundle of grain that he carries in his hand, just as a high-priest’s insignia is the candle carried before him.

They have very few laws. For only a very few suffice for them, trained as they are, and indeed this is something they especially disapprove among other people, that an infinite number of volumes of laws and of interpretations of laws are still not enough. The Utopians think it most unfair that any human beings should be bound by these laws which are either too numerous to be read, or too obscure to be understood by anyone who does read them.

Moreover, they keep out all lawyers whatsoever, since they treat legal cases craftily and dispute the laws cunningly. For they deem it useful for each to plead his own case and to tell the judge the same things he would tell his lawyer. In this way, they think, there will be less evasion and the truth more easily drawn out. While the one who speaks has not been instructed by his lawyer how to deceive, the judge weighs
each point skillfully, and helps those with more simple understanding against the calumnies of the crafty. It is difficult for this to be maintained among other nations, with their great heaps of the most perplexing laws. But among the Utopians, each person is an expert in the law. For the laws (as I said) are very few, and they judge that all the interpretations which are most unrefined are the most fair.

For, since all the laws are promulgated (they say) for this reason alone, that each Utopian may be reminded by them of his duty, a more subtle interpretation admonishes very few (for there are few that comprehend it), whereas a simpler and more obvious meaning of the laws is open for everyone to grasp; otherwise, when it comes to the common people, who are both the most numerous and have the greatest need of admonition, what difference would it make whether you made no law in the first place, or whether you interpreted some already-made law to have a meaning so obscure that no one could draw it out without being extremely smart and making a very long argument? Neither the unrefined judgment of the common run of men would succeed in tracking it down, nor would a life busy with earning a living be sufficient.

Their neighbors have become inspired by these virtues, who, although they are free and operate autonomously (for the Utopians themselves had in times past freed many of them from tyranny), get their magistrates from the Utopians (some for a one-year term, others for five years), and when these magistrates have completed their terms of authority, they conduct them back to Utopia with honor and praise, and bring new Utopian magistrates with them back to the home country. And indeed these nations take care of their commonwealth in the best and most beneficial way. Since both its well-being and corruption depends upon the character of the magistrates, whom, after all, could they have chosen more prudently to be magistrates than Utopians—since they can by no bribe ever be dissuaded from what is honorable (since it is useless for those who are going to be moving back shortly), nor, being unknown to the local citizens, can they be influenced by an improper favoritism for anyone, or a feud? Wherever these two evils—favoritism and greed—have oppressed the law courts, they immediately destroy all justice, the strongest sinew of the commonwealth. The Utopians call “allies” the peoples for whom rulers are requested of them; others, whom they have enlarged by their benefits, they call “friends.”

Treaties, which other nations so often enter into with each other, and then break and renew, Utopians do not create with any nation. For what is the purpose of a treaty, they say: it’s not as if nature doesn’t already unite one human being to another well enough—and if someone scorns nature, do you really think they would care about words?
They are drawn to this opinion mostly because in those regions of the world, the treaties and agreements of rulers are usually observed with too little good faith. But in Europe, and especially in those areas where the faith and the religion of Christ holds sway, the majesty of treaties is sacred and inviolable everywhere, partly by the justice and goodness of the rulers, partly through reverence and fear of the Supreme Pontiffs, who, just as they undertake nothing that they do not discharge with the utmost scrupulousness, just so they bid all other rulers to abide by their promises in every respect, and those who renege they compel with pastoral reprimand and sternness. They are surely right in thinking it a very shameful thing if there is no “faith” in the treaties of those who are called by a term specific to them the “faithful.”

But in that new world, separated from our world not so much by the equator as by differences in life and customs, there is no trust in treaties. Each of these, the more numerous and holy the ceremonies it has been entangled with, the more quickly it is broken—some misrepresentation easily being found in the words which people cleverly dictated on purpose—so that treaties can never be tied up with any bonds strong enough to keep people from slipping out somewhere, and violating both the treaty and their faith at the same time. And if they were to find this craftiness (or really, fraud and deceit) interfering with the contract of private parties, they would very sternly deplore it as a sacrilegious thing, worthy of the gallows—the very people, of course, who glory in having developed just such a plan for rulers!

By this it happens that all justice seems either nothing but a plebian virtue, and lowly, coming to rest a great distance below the royal heights; or at least that there are two kinds of justice: one fit for the common people, pedestrian, creeping on the ground, and, to keep it from leaping any fences, tied down all over with many chains; the other a virtue of rulers, as if it were more venerable than the peoples’ kind, so is it a great deal more free as well, as is natural for one to whom nothing is not permitted except what he doesn’t feel like doing.

So, this character of rulers over there, who, as I said, keep treaties so badly, is the reason I think the Utopians do not strike any treaties; perhaps they would change their opinion if they lived here. Even though treaties may be kept very well, it nevertheless seems to the Utopians unfortunate that the habit of making treaties ever became ingrained, by which it happens that people suppose they are born rivals and enemies of each other (as though no fellowship of nature joined one people to another whom just a hill or a stream separates by the smallest space), and justifiably lie in wait for mutual destruction unless prohibited by treaties; in fact, they think, once treaties are set up, friendship does not grow up between the parties, and the license to plunder remains so long as an imprudently drafted treaty has left something insufficiently covered in the terms of the agreement to prevent it.
The Utopians, by contrast, think that no one should be considered an enemy from whom no harm has been received. The community of nature, they say, does what a treaty does, and human beings are more effectively and surely connected to each other by good will than by contracts, by the heart more than by words.

**THE MILITARY**

War, clearly a bestial thing, but nevertheless not practiced by any species of beasts as persistently as by man, they absolutely abominate and, contrary to the custom of almost all nations, consider nothing so inglorious as glory gained from war. And so, although they train themselves in military discipline on scheduled days, not only men but also women, in order not to be unready for war when need requires it, they nevertheless do not wage war rashly, but only to defend their own territory or to drive off enemies who have invaded their friends’ lands or, taking pity on some nation oppressed by tyranny, to employ their forces to free them from the yoke and slavery of the tyrant (and this they do for the sake of humane conduct).

Although they give help as favor to their friends, not always just so the friends can defend themselves, but sometimes so they can requite and avenge injuries that have been done to them, even then the Utopians only do it at long last—provided they themselves have been consulted before any hostilities begin and the cause has been approved, and if, demands for restitution having been asked and refused, someone must be brought in to start a war—they decide to do it, not only if their friends’ goods have been taken away by an enemy’s incursion, but also, and much more keenly, when merchants of their friend-nations, in any part of the world, have suffered unjust calumny in the guise of justice (i.e. through the pretext of bad laws or by the false interpretation of good ones).

Nothing other than this caused the war that the Utopians waged for the Nephelogetans against the Alaopolitans shortly before our time: namely, when some Nephelogetan merchants suffered a certain injustice (as it seemed to them) while sojourning among the Alaopolitans, under the pretext of law; now, whether it was just or unjust, the injury was, of course, vindicated in a savage war, as each side’s power and hatred were enlarged by the passions and wealth of nearby nations, shaking some very flourishing countries to their foundations and afflicting others most grievously; one disaster followed another, until it all finally ended with the surrender and enslavement of the Alaopolitans; in this way, and since the Utopians were not fighting for their own interests, the [Alaopolitans] passed under the power of the Nephelogetans, a nation that previously could hardly be compared with the once mighty Alaopolitans.
So fiercely do the Utopians prosecute wrongs done to their friends (and to themselves, not so much) even in financial matters—since, if the Utopians are constrained to lose their goods, provided there is no violence done to their persons, their anger extends only to the avoidance of trade with that people until restitution is made; not that they care less for their citizens than for their allies: rather, they are more aggrieved when others have money stolen than themselves, because the businessmen of their friend-nations, losing their private funds, feel a heavy wound from their loss. But for their own citizens, nothing is lost, unless from the public store, which was, besides, in abundance and, extra, as it were, otherwise not needing to be sent abroad.

By this it happens that loss occurs without anyone noticing it. And for this reason they judge it too cruel to avenge that loss by the death of many, when none of their people detects an inconvenience to their life or livelihood from the loss.

But if anyone of their people is ever wrongly maimed or killed, and whether the injustice was done by public or private action, once the matter has been ascertained through ambassadors, unless the responsible perpetrators are handed over to them, the Utopians cannot be appeased and will declare war right away. Those who are handed over for punishment they punish with either death or slavery.

A bloody victory they consider not only grievous but shameful, thinking it stupidity to buy wares however precious at too great a price, and they greatly exult whenever they have conquered enemies by skill and treachery, conducting a public triumphal parade on account of the victory and erecting a trophy, just as if they were celebrating some vigorous achievement. For it is then that they boast that they have conducted themselves in a manly way and with virtue, as often as they have won in a way no animal but a human being could—by the power of intellect. For, the Utopians say, bears, lions, boars, wolves, dogs and other beasts contend with the power of their body, and as most of these outdo us in strength and ferocity, so all are surpassed by us in intelligence and reason.

Their one goal in war is to obtain that which, if they had acquired it beforehand, they would not have started the war, or failing that, they carry out such severe punishment on the ones they consider responsible that terror frightens them from daring the same thing ever again. These are the aims of their undertakings, and they pursue them quickly, but only in such a way that their care to avoid danger takes precedence over their desire to win praise or fame.

And so, as soon as war is declared, they prepare handbills certified with the Utopians’ public seal to be posted in the enemy land, all at once and in especially conspicuous places, with which they promise huge rewards for anyone who does away with the hostile ruler, followed by lesser, though still substantial rewards decreed for each head of the other persons whose names are proscribed on the same notice.
these being the ones they believe to be responsible (in second place after the ruler) for forming a plan against them. Whatever reward they specify for an assassin they offer double that sum to anyone who brings them one of the proscribed persons alive, in which case they invite the proscribed persons themselves with the same rewards and with impunity in addition, to betray their allies.

And so it quickly happens that their enemies become suspicious of all other human beings, even of themselves, and neither trusting nor trusted, live in the utmost fear and in no less danger. For it is well known that it has often happened that a good part of the enemies and especially the ruler himself have been betrayed by the very persons in whom they had placed their greatest hope, so easily do bribes, on which the Utopians place no limit, drive them to any crime at all. But, keeping in mind the great peril of the peril to which they thus urge their enemies, the Utopians take particular care that the magnitude of the danger is counterbalanced by an abundance of benefits. And for this reason they promise not only an immense amount of gold, but also very profitable estates to be held by them in perpetuity in the most secure locations amongst friends, and the Utopians make good on these promises with the utmost fidelity.

This custom of bidding for and purchasing the life of an enemy, condemned by other countries as the cruel deed of an ignoble mind, they consider worthy of great praise, as if they were prudently ending the worst wars in this way, without any battle whatsoever, and being humane and even merciful, since they are ransoming, with the assassination of a few guilty people, numerous lives of the innocent (partly of their own, partly of their enemies), who would have died fighting: the crowd of masses whom they pity hardly less than their own people, knowing full well that they did not willingly go to war, but were only driven to it by the madness of their rulers.

If this method is not effective, they cast seeds of dissension and nourish them, while drawing the ruler’s brother or some other of the nobles into the hope of possessing the kingdom. If internal factions have lost their strength, they incite and engage the nations adjacent to the enemy, unearthing some ancient title to rule (something kings are never short of) and, promising their financial support for the war, supply money lavishly, while supplying Utopian citizens very sparingly, whom they consider so singularly valuable, and they value each other so greatly that none would willingly exchange one of their own even for the enemy ruler. But since they keep all gold and silver for this one purpose, they have no problem in parting with it, seeing that they would live no less comfortably even if they paid out every ounce of it they had.

But besides their domestic riches, they also have an unlimited treasure abroad
in so far as very many nations, as I said earlier, are in their debt. In this way they send soldiers hired from all parts to war, especially the Zapoletes. These people live five hundred miles east of Utopia: terrible, rustic, fierce, preferring the forests and rugged mountains where they were raised. They are a hardy nation, enduring heat, cold, and labor, without experience of delightful things, not practiced in agriculture, and, having no interest in building houses or making clothes, the raising of cattle is their only concern. For the most part they live on hunting and plunder. Born only for war, they zealously seek an opportunity to wage it, and when they find an opportunity, they eagerly embrace it and go out in great numbers to offer themselves at a cheap rate to anyone needing soldiers. This is the one craft they know in life, and by it they seek death.

They fight bitterly and with uncorrupted loyalty on behalf of those under whom they serve. But they do not commit themselves to fight for any set period, taking up their partisan role on condition that the next day they will stand even on the side of the enemies, if higher pay has been offered, and on the next day after, return to the same side again, if offered a little more still.

There is hardly ever a war in which a large part of them are not in each army. And so it happens daily, that blood relatives who were completely familiar with each other when hired for the same side, meet as enemies a little later when separated into opposing camps, and, with souls full of hatred, forgetful of kinship, mindful of their friendship, they stab each other, incited to each other’s destruction for no other reason than that they were hired by different rulers at a small pitance, of which they keep such an exact account, that they can easily be driven to change sides with the addition of one penny to the daily wage. So eagerly have they imbibed this avarice, though it is no benefit to them! For what they seek at the price of their blood they straightway consume through luxury, and that too is miserable.

These people fight for the Utopians against any one at all, because no one anywhere pays them better for their efforts. Just as the Utopians seek out good persons in order to enjoy their company, so also do they seek out these very bad men to exploit them. And when need requires, motivated by great promises, they go forth to face the greatest dangers, from which most of them never return to demand what was promised, but the Utopians render the goods that were promised on good faith to the survivors, who by this means may be roused to further, similar ventures. For they do not give a thought to how many of them they destroy, thinking they would deserve the greatest favor from the human race, if they managed to purge the world of all the filth of that foul and nefarious people.

In second place after these, the Utopians use the troops of the nations for whose sake they are fighting, followed by the auxiliary squadrons of their other friend-
nations; finally they add their own citizens, from whom they select a man of proven virtue to be put in charge of the whole army. Two men are placed under him on the understanding that both will remain private individuals if the general is unharmed, but if he be captured or killed, one of the two inherits his place, as it were, the third succeeding the second if necessary. This has been arranged in consideration of the changing hazards of war: to prevent the whole army from being disorganized if the general is in danger.

Recruitment is carried out in each city from those who submit their names of their own accord. For no one is forced against his will to fight abroad, since the Utopians are convinced that if anyone is naturally rather timid, not only would he do nothing with any promptitude, but fear would also overtake his companions. But if any war breaks out against their homeland, they place such cowardly sorts (provided they are physically able) in ships, mixed in with better soldiers, or scatter them here and there along the walls, where there is no place to escape. Thus, shame before their peers, the enemy at close quarters, and the removal of any hope of flight, overcomes their fear, and often extreme necessity is turned into virtue.

But while no one from among them is unwillingly dragged off to fight a foreign war, on the other hand any wives who are willing to accompany their husbands into battle are not only not prohibited from doing this but are actually encouraged and incited up to do so, by means of praise. Each of those who have set out with their own husbands they put together with them in the battle line. Then each man’s children, relatives by marriage and blood relatives stand around him, in order that those persons may be close at hand to assist who are by nature most driven to offer their help. It is a great disgrace for a spouse to return from war without the other spouse, for a son to come back without his parent. And so it happens that, if it comes to hand-to-hand combat, and if the enemy stands his ground, they will fight to the death in a long and disastrous battle.

Indeed, as they take every precaution not to have to fight a war themselves when they can take care of it by a substitute band of mercenaries, just so, when their entrance into battle cannot be avoided, they are just as fearless in undertaking it as they were cautious (as much as they could be) in refusing it, and they are not so much fierce in their first attack, as rather increasing their strength slowly through delay and endurance, and with hearts so stubborn that they can sooner be killed than put to flight. Indeed, the security of the livelihood each has at home, and the release from anxious concern about the support of his survivors (this is a worry that breaks the hearts of noble persons everywhere) gives them a spirit both lofty and disdainful of defeat.

In addition, their experience in military training gives them confidence, and
lastly, they have additional courage from their right beliefs (in which they were steeped from childhood, both by their education and by the good institutions of their commonwealth). By this virtue they neither consider life so cheap as to want to spend it rashly, nor so inappropriately dear as to grasp it greedily and dishonorably when their own sense of integrity persuades them to give it up.

When the battle is everywhere raging fiercely, a most carefully chosen band of young men, sworn and devoted to the purpose, demand the enemy general for themselves, and they rush against him openly, they spring upon him in a surprise attack; the same is sought out at a distance, the same in hand-to-hand combat, and is attached by a long, persistent wedge formation, with fresh troops constantly dispatched in place of those tired out. And it rarely happens (unless he has prepared an escape-plan beforehand) that the general does not either die or get taken alive into the enemy’s power. If the victory goes to the Utopians, they do not proceed to the slaughter, for they would rather capture those routed than kill them. Nor do they ever pursue enemies on the retreat without keeping one battle line still drawn up under standards. To such an extent is this the case that, after they have defeated the remaining parts, unless the Utopians gain victory with their very last contingent, they would just as soon let the whole enemy slip away rather than get into the habit of pursuing those in retreat and risk putting their own ranks into confusion. Mindful that it has happened more than once in their experience that when the bulk of their whole army was defeated and crushed, and the enemy, exulting in victory, was pursuing them as they fled this way and that, a few Utopian soldiers, placed among the reserves and waiting for the right moment, advanced against these scattered enemy troops who had grown careless in presuming their victory was safe, and changed the outcome of the whole battle. By wresting such a certain and indisputable victory from their hands, the conquered, in turn, conquered the conquerors.

It is not easy to say whether they are more clever in laying ambushes or more cautious in avoiding them. You would suppose they were preparing to flee, when that’s the last thing they have in mind; but, when they do have such a plan, that’s the last thing you would think they are planning. For if they believe they are ill-matched in numbers or position, then they either move camp at night by a silent march or they escape by some stratagem, or slowly withdraw by day with their ranks kept intact, so that there is no less danger in attacking them while they are retreating than while they are advancing. They fortify a camp very carefully, with a very deep and wide ditch, and throw the excavated dirt back into the camp, nor do they use the efforts of common laborers for this work. The affair is managed by the hands of the soldiers themselves. The whole army takes part in the work, except
those who keep watch in front of the rampart against sudden attacks. And so, with so many contributing to the work, they complete a high and vast fortification for the place with incredible speed.

They use armor sturdy enough to receive blows, and suitable for every movement or stance, to such an extent that they do not feel uncomfortable even when swimming in it. For one of the rudiments of their military training is to become accustomed to swimming in armor. Their long-range weapons are arrows, which they cast very forcefully and at the same time very precisely, whether standing on the ground or riding on horses; for hand-to-hand fighting, however, not swords but axes, deadly both in sharpness and weight, deliver the blows by striking or chopping. They have very cleverly devised siege engines, and when they have made them they conceal them very carefully so that they are not revealed before they are actually needed (and thereby become more the object of jokes than useful); in constructing them they take special care that they are easy to transport and maneuver.

They enter into and observe truces with an enemy so religiously that they do not violate them even if they are provoked. They do not pillage an enemy’s land, nor do they burn their crops; in fact they take as much care as they can to not let their men and horses tread on them, with the idea that the crops are growing for their own use. They harm no one who is unarmed, unless he is a spy. They protect surrendered cities, and they do not plunder them after they storm them, but they execute those who prevented the surrender, and consign the other defenders to slavery. The whole civilian population they leave alone, untouched. If they discover anyone who encouraged the surrender, they share some part of the goods of the condemned with them, and give the remaining portion to their auxiliaries. For no one of their people takes anything from the booty.

But when the war is finished, they do not charge the expenses to the friend-nations for whom they undertook them, but to the conquered, and for this account they demand partly cash which they reserve for similar uses in war, partly estates in order to gain no little annual income in perpetuity in the enemy’s land for themselves. They now have revenue of this sort in many nations, arising little by little from various reasons, and exceeding 700,000 ducats a year, and for the purpose of collecting this revenue, they send out some of their citizens with the title of “financial officer,” to live magnificently and represent, for others, the role of nobles, but even then there is a surplus for the treasury unless they prefer to credit it to the same nation, which they often do until such time as the Utopians need to use it, and it hardly ever happens that they demand it all back. Part of these estates they designate for those who undertake at their own urging the sort of danger that I mentioned before.
If any enemy ruler has taken up arms against them and is preparing to invade their domain, they meet him immediately with great strength outside their own territory, for they do not rashly wage war in their territory, nor is the need ever so great as to force them to bring foreign auxiliaries onto their island.

The Religions of the Utopians

Religions vary, not only throughout the whole island, but even within each city: some worship the sun as a god, others the moon, still others one of the planets; there are some who honor some particular human being, whose virtue or glory was once distinguished, as not only a god but as even the highest god. But the very largest majority, and by far the wiser group, believe nothing of the sort, but instead believe there is a kind of single divinity, unknown, eternal, immeasurable, inexplicable, above the comprehension of the human intellect, and diffused throughout this whole universe, not in material mass but by energy. They call him their parent. To him alone do they ascribe all beginnings, growth, progress, changes, and ends of all things, and do not ascribe divine honors to others.

And even though all the others believe various things, they still agree with these last mentioned Utopians in holding that there is in fact one supreme being responsible for the making and present governance of the universe, whom they all alike call Mithras in their native language, but they differ in that the same deity is conceived differently by different groups. While each person asserts that, whatever it is which he considers the supreme being, it is absolutely the same nature, to whose divinity and majesty the supreme authority over all things is ascribed by the agreement of all nations. But all of them are now gradually deserting their variety of superstitions, and uniting into that one religion that seems to be more reasonable than the rest. Nor is there any doubt but that the other religions would have long since disappeared, if their fear were not interpreting whatever unlucky event that chanced to befall anyone who was thinking about changing his religion as chance, but sent from heaven, as if the divine power whose worship he was abandoning were punishing the impious plan against it.

But after they heard from us the name of Christ, and his teaching, character, and miracles, and the no less wondrous constancy of so many martyrs, whose blood freely shed has drawn so very many nations far and wide into their way of life, you would not believe with what eager affections they too gave way to it, either by the secret inspiration of God, or because it seemed closest to that sect which is most prevalent among them, although I believe this also was of no small importance, that they had heard that the communal way of life of his own people was pleasing to
Christ, a way of life still in use, they heard, among the most genuine communities of Christians. But whatever the impulse was for this to take place, not a few joined our religion and were washed in the sacred water of Baptism.

But since among the four of us (for only so many of us were left, since two had yielded to fate) there was, I am sorry to say, no priest, though they have been initiated in all the other matters, they still lack those sacraments which no one among us except priests confer; nevertheless they understand them, and they wish for nothing more earnestly. They are even debating this question carefully among themselves, whether someone chosen from their number can receive the priestly character without the commission of a Christian pontifex. And it really seemed that they were about to choose one, but when I left they had not yet done so.

And those also who do not profess Christianity do not nevertheless deter anyone from pursuing it or attack someone initiated—except for one person from our community who was punished while I was there. When he was newly baptized, although we advised him against it, he was lecturing on the religion of Christ publicly with more zeal than prudence, and he grew so passionate that he not only preferred our rites to others, but went so far as to condemn all other rites right away. He loudly proclaimed them to be profane, and their followers as impious, sacrilegious people, doomed to everlasting fire. They apprehended him after he had been preaching such things for a long time, and brought charges against him, not for rejecting religion, but for inciting the people to riot, and when he was found guilty, they sentenced him to exile, since they count it among their oldest institutions, that no person’s religion should be a source of injury to him.

For from the very beginning, when Utopus had heard before his arrival that the inhabitants were fighting constantly with each other over their religions, and when he realized that the very fact that the individual sects were fighting for their homeland while disagreeing in general presented him with an opportunity to conquer them all: once he had gained the victory, he ordained first of all, that each be allowed to follow any religion he wished, but that, if he strove to win others to it, he would be permitted to do so just so long as he supported his view calmly, modestly, and with reasonable arguments, and not bitterly demolish other views, if he failed to be persuasive; nor use any violence and refrain from insults. They punish someone arguing too aggressively about it with exile or slavery.

Utopus instituted these measures not only out of a regard for peace (which he saw being thoroughly undermined by constant strife and implacable hatred) but because he thought that by making this decree he would be acting on behalf of religion as such, concerning which he did not want to lay down any rash definitions, not sure, in a sense, whether God did not in fact wish to have various and multiple
forms of worship, and therefore inspired different people with different ideas of it; certainly, he judged it was truly arrogant and absurd to demand by violence and threats that what you believe to be true also appear true to everyone else. And then, he easily foresaw, if one religion were the truest, and all the others false (provided the debate was conducted with reason and modesty), it would come about that the power of truth itself would at some point emerge on its own and prevail. But if the matter were contested with arms and mob violence, since all the worst people are the most obstinate, the best and holiest religion would be overwhelmed by the falsest of superstitions, like a good crop of wheat among the thorns and brush.

And so he made the matter accessible to all, and left each person free to decide what he should believe—except for solemnly and severely forbidding anyone from departing so far from the dignity of human nature as to think that the soul is destroyed with the body, or to think, removing providence, that the world proceeds by chance. And for this reason they believe that, after this life punishments are decreed for vices, and rewards await virtues. Someone who thinks otherwise—as one who casts aside the sublime nature of his soul for the worthlessness of a merely bestial carcass—they do not even consider human, let alone allow to be classed among citizens, whose institutions and customs he will treat as worthless (if fear did not prevent him). For who would doubt that he would strive either to evade the public laws of the country secretly through craft, or violate them openly, so long as he was serving his own desires privately with nothing to fear besides the laws and no hope for anything beyond his bodily existence. Therefore no honor is conferred on one who thinks this way, no magistracy is entrusted to him, he is assigned no responsibility of public office. In this way he is scorned everywhere as having an inactive and indolent nature. But they do not punish him in any way, because they are convinced that a person cannot really help what he believes; nor do they compel him with any threats to hide his thoughts, nor allow any pretenses and lies, which, as if they are closely akin to criminal fraud, they hate to an amazing degree. They do, however, prohibit him from arguing for his own opinion, for, all the same, in isolation, they not only allow this in the presence of the priests and other important men, they even encourage it, trusting that his madness will at last give way to reason.

There are others also, and not a few (since they are not prohibited, being neither altogether without reason for their view nor wicked) who believe, with a very different error, that the souls of the brute animals are eternal, although their souls are still not comparable in dignity to ours, nor born for equal happiness. For almost all consider it certain and proven that the beatitude of human beings will be so immeasurable, that they mourn for everyone’s illness, but for no one’s death, unless they see someone being torn from life anxiously and against his will. Of course, this
they consider a very bad omen, as if the person’s soul, in despair and with a guilty conscience, were dreading death through some inkling of imminent punishment. Besides, they think someone’s arrival would not be pleasing to God, who does not come gladly running, though summoned, but is dragged off unwilling, and fighting against it. Those therefore who look upon this kind of death are horrified, and the bodies of anyone dying this way they sadly and silently carry away, and, beseeching God to be kind to their departed shades and mercifully pardon their weaknesses, bury the corpse in earth.

On the other hand, whichever people die cheerfully and full of good hope, no one mourns them at all, but perform the funeral rites with a song, and, entrusting their souls to God with great enthusiasm, cremate their bodies with more reverence than grief, and erect a pillar on the site, inscribed with honors to the deceased. Returning home, they recount his character and deeds, and they discuss no part of his life more often or more gladly than his happy death.

They think that this recollection of goodness is the most effective incitement to virtues for the living, and the most pleasing tribute to the dead, whom they believe to be present at conversations about themselves, though unseen (since the vision of human beings is dim).

For it would not be fitting for the state of the blessed to lack freedom to move wherever they wished, and it would have been a mark of ungrateful souls to cast off immediately any desire to visit the friends to whom they were bound in life by mutual love and affection, which, just like other good things, the Utopians believe increases rather than diminishes for good men after they die. Therefore they believe that the dead move among the living, as observers of their words and deeds, and that the living undertake their tasks the more confidently, relying on such defenders, while being restrained from doing shameful things in secret, by their belief in the ancestors’ presence.

Augury and the other divinations of empty superstition, the observance of which is so widespread among other nations, they completely disregard and deride, but miracles that happen with no assistance from nature they revere as the works of one present and witnesses to a divine power; they say that such occurrences frequently take place there, and from time to time on the occasions of great events or decisions, they arrange for them in public ceremonies with great confidence, and obtain them.

They think that the contemplation and the praise of nature consequent on it is an act of worship pleasing to God and deserving of praise. Nevertheless there are some, and these are, again, not a few, who, led by religion, disregard letters, do not strive for knowledge of things, and take no time out for leisure, only tasks, and they
resolve to earn a future happiness after death in other good deeds. And so some
serve the sick, others fix the roads, clean ditches, repair bridges, dig up sod, sand, or
stones, cut down and chop up trees, carry wood, crops, and other things like that
into the cities on carts, acting as assistants and super-servants, not only for the pub-
lic, but also for private individuals.

For wherever there is any task that is harsh, difficult or filthy, that would deter
most others by reason of toil, disgust or futility, they gladly and cheerfully take it
upon themselves to accomplish the whole job, providing others with leisure, and
busying themselves in constant work and labor, and, still, do not claim credit for it,
nor do they scorn their way of life, or boast of their own. The more these people act
as servants, the more they are honored.

But there are two sects of these persons: one celibate, who not only abstain
from all sexual activity, but also from eating meat, some of them from all animal
products too; and entirely rejecting all pleasures of the present life as harmful, they
long for the future life through toils and vigils, in the hope of obtaining it very
soon. In the meantime, they are cheerful and active.

The other sect, no less eager for work, prefers marriage, and since they do not
spurn the comfort it brings, so they also think they owe to nature, in return, the
work of procreation, and children to their country. They avoid no pleasure unless it
detains them from work. They like the flesh of four-footed animals perhaps for this
reason, because they reckon that they are made stronger for any work by this sort
of food. The Utopians deem adherents to this latter sect more prudent, but the for-
mer more holy. And because the former prefer celibacy to matrimony, and a harsh
life to a peaceful one, they would deride them if they relied on rational arguments,
but as it is, since they confess that they are led by their religion, the Utopians re-
spect and revere them. For they take more care about this than anything else: not
to speak rashly about any religious observance. These, then, are the sort of persons
they call Buthrescae—a special word in their own language, a word that could be
translated religiosi in Latin.

They have priests of outstanding holiness, and for this reason there are very few
of them. For they do not have more than thirteen in each city, equal to the number
of shrines, except when they go to war. For when seven of them have set out with
the army, seven are meanwhile substituted for them; when the priests return from
the war, each takes back his own position, and those who are left over are the atten-
dants of the high priest, until by succession of rank they replace the other priests
who have died. For one priest is appointed high priest above the rest. The priests are
elected by the people, and, in the manner of the other magistracies, by a secret vote,
in order to avoid the forming of factions.
Priests preside over divine services, see to religious matters, and function as inspectors of character; it is considered very shameful for anyone to be summoned or rebuked by them for living a life that is not upright enough. But it is the priests’ role to encourage and remind, while it is the role of the city ruler and the other magistrates to check and inflict punishment on criminals, except that the priests prohibit from participating in religious rites those whom they find especially wicked; there is almost no punishment the Utopians fear more. For they are stunned by the ultimate disgrace, and are lacerated by hidden fear from their religious observance; while not even their bodies will be safe for long, since if they do not quickly demonstrate their repentance to the priests, they are arrested and punished for impiety by the Senate.

Children and youths are educated by them, nor is the concern for letters given priority to the concern for character and virtue, and they apply the utmost industry to instilling the tender and impressionable minds of the children at the outset with beliefs that are good and beneficial for the preservation of the commonwealth; once these are deeply rooted in the children, they stay with them throughout their whole adult lives, and are most useful for protecting the integrity of the commonwealth (which only declines by the moral vices that spring from erroneous opinions).

Wives for the priests are very carefully chosen from the people (unless the priests are women; for that sex is not excluded from the priesthood, though rarely chosen, and not unless she is a widow and advanced in years).

There is not any magistrate among the Utopians for whom there is greater honor, so much so that even if they commit a disgraceful deed, they are subject to no public trial, but are left to God and themselves. For they do not think it is right to pollute with mortal hand someone, no matter how wicked, who has been dedicated to God in such a special way, as a sacred offering. And it is easier for them to observe this custom because the priests are so few and so carefully chosen.

For it does not readily happen that an excellent person, chosen out of many good people, and elevated to such high dignity by reason of his virtue alone, would degenerate into corruption and vice; and if it even happened at all (considering how fragile human nature is), nevertheless, as few as they are, and because they are not entrusted with any power other than their honor, there would certainly be no cause to fear any great harm to the public coming from such as these. And this is exactly the reason why they have priests so few and far between, to prevent the dignity of the order, which they now revere so highly, from being cheapened through sharing the honor with many, especially since they think it is difficult to find very many people who are good enough to match the dignity of the office, ordinary virtues not being sufficient.
And they are not held in higher estimation by their own people than they are by foreign nations. And this is readily clear to see from what I also take to be its origin. For when their troops are fighting a battle, the priests kneel in a separate place not very far away, clothed in their sacred vestments; they lift up their hands to heaven, praying for peace in the first place, in second place for a victory for their own troops, but a victory without bloodshed to either side; if their troops are winning, they rush into the battle-line, and prevent cruelty toward the losers. Merely to catch sight of them when present and call out to them is enough to save one’s life, while grasping their flowing vestments defends one’s remaining fate from every injury from wars.

As a result of this they have acquired so much reverence and genuine majesty in the sight of all nations everywhere, that they have often brought no less safety to their fellow citizens from the enemy than they brought to the enemy from their fellow citizens. Indeed it has sometimes happened, when their own battle line had given way and they were in retreat and despairing of success, while the enemy was hastening to plunder and kill, that their destruction was interrupted by the intervention of the priests: the armies were separated, and fair terms for peace were arranged and agreed upon. For there was never so fierce, cruel, and barbaric a nation as not to hold the bodies of the Utopian priests as sacrosanct and inviolable.

They celebrate the first and last day of each month, and the first and last day of each year, as a holy day; a year is divided into months, measured by the orbit of the moon, just as the course of the sun marks the year. In their language the first days are called *cynemerni*; the last days, *trapemerni*; and these words mean the same as “first-feast days” and “end-feast days.”

Their temples are outstanding sights, not only because for their workmanship, but because they are capable of holding an immense number of people, which is necessary since there are so few of them. Yet they are all a bit dark, and they say this happened not through ignorance of architecture, but by the design of the priests, who believe that too much light scatters thoughts, while minds become collected in more sparing, uncertain light and reverence is strengthened.

And since the religion there is not the same for them all, nevertheless all the forms of religion, despite being varied and manifold, enter in by a variety of paths, as it were, to a single end: the worship of the one divine nature. For this reason, nothing is ever seen or heard in the shrines which is not considered to accord with all the religions together. If there is any ritual particular to one denomination, each carries it out within the walls of his own home; they conduct public rituals in such a way, that they do not in any way detract from private ones. Consequently, no images of the gods are seen in any shrine, so that each is free to conceive of God with...
whatever form he wishes with the greatest reverence. They invoke God by no particular name except Mithras, a word they all agree upon for the one nature of the divine majesty, whatever it is, and no prayers are composed which anyone at all could not utter without offense to his own denomination.

And so they meet at their temples in the evening for End-feast days, having fasted all day, to give thanks to God for their prosperity during the year or month for which that holy day is the last day; on the next day, for it is the day for the First-feast, they flock to the temples in the morning to pray for favor and success during the next year or month beginning with that holy day.

But on End-feast days, before they go to place of worship, wives throw themselves at the feet of their husbands, children at the feet of their parents, and confess that they have sinned, either by commission or some duty negligently performed, and beg pardon for their offense. In this way if a small cloud of a quarrel in the house had overspread them, it is dissipated by such apologies, that they may be present at the sacrifices with a clear and tranquil mind. For there is a religious taboo against attendance with a troubled mind. And for this reason, those who are conscious of hatred or anger towards anyone do not attend the sacred rites without first being reconciled and having their ill feelings purged away, in fear of swift and heavy punishment.

When they arrive, they separate, the men to the right side of the temple, the women to the left. Then they seat themselves in such a way that males of each household sit together in front of the father of the household, and the mother of the household closes the ranks of the female members. In this way it is assured that all the actions of all people are observed outside the home by those by whose authority and instruction they are governed at home; moreover they assiduously take care also to place a younger person next to an older person wherever they are, in order that children not rely on other children and spend that time in childish foolishness, when they are supposed to be conceiving a most religious fear toward the gods, which is the greatest and practically the only incitement to virtues.

They do not slaughter any animal in their sacrifices, nor do they think that divine mercy, who bestowed life on animate beings for this very reason, that they might live, delights in bloodshed and carnage. They burn incense and other kinds of perfumes, and display many candles, not because they are ignorant of the fact that this, and even the prayers of human beings, add nothing to the divine nature, but because this harmless kind of worship is pleasing, and they think that human beings are in a way elevated by means of these odors, lights, and other ceremonies, and rise to the worship of God with more eager minds.

In the shrine the congregation is clothed in white, while the priest wears multi-
colored vestments, wonderfully wrought and designed, though not of very expensive material. For they are not woven with gold thread or studded with rare stones, but are decorated with various plumages so skillfully and artistically, that the value of no material would equal the price of the workmanship. In addition, they say certain secret mysteries are contained in the feathers and plumage of birds, and in their fixed patterns, which are distinguished on a priest’s vestments, and by their correct interpretation (carefully handed down by those who carry out the rites), they are reminded of God’s benefits toward them, of their pious duty toward God, and their mutual duty toward each other.

As soon as the priest dressed in this way presents himself from the sanctuary, all immediately fall prostrate to the ground in reverence, with such profound silence in every direction, that even the sight of this ritual inspires a certain terror, as if from the presence of some divine power. They remain on the ground for a little while until the priest gives a sign and they arise.

Then they sing praise to God, accompanied by musical instruments, most of them different from the kinds which are seen in our hemisphere. Just as most of them far surpass in sweetness those in use among us, so certain kinds cannot even be compared to ours. But in this one matter it is obvious that they are far superior to us: all of their music, whether instrumental or sung with the human voice, imitates and expresses natural emotions and fits the sound to the reality; whether it is a prayer of petition, whether happy, conciliatory, troubled, sorrowful or angry, the form of the melody so represents the a certain impression of the reality that it stirs up, penetrates, and inflames the minds of those listening.

Lastly, the priest and the people together repeat solemn prayers with set words, written in such a way that what they all recite together, each applies privately to himself. In these prayers each person recognizes God as responsible for creation, and governance, and all the other goods besides, and gives thanks to him on account of so many blessings received. In particular, however, that by God’s favor he has found himself in the commonwealth that is the happiest, and has been allotted the religion that he hopes is the truest. And if he is wrong about this matter, or if there is any better commonwealth or religion, and more approved by God, he prays that God in his goodness will lead him to the knowledge of it; for he is ready to follow in whatever direction God may lead him, but, if this Utopian form of commonwealth is the best, and its religion the most correct, then he prays that God may make him steadfast, and lead all other human beings to the same ways of life, and to the same belief about God, unless, in fact, in this variety of religions there is something that delights his inscrutable will.

Finally, each prays that he may die easily and be received by him, how quickly
or late he certainly does not venture to determine. Nevertheless, if it would not disturb God’s majesty, it will be much more agreeable to him, to meet a very hard death and to reach God, rather than to be separated from God too long even by a very prosperous span of life.

After saying this prayer, they prostrate themselves on the ground again, and, rising after a little while, depart for lunch, and spend the remainder of the day in games and training in military exercises.

I H A V E D E S C R I B E D F O R Y O U as accurately as I could the form of commonwealth that I myself certainly think is not only the best, but also the only one, which can deservedly claim the name commonwealth for itself. Since, in other places, the people speak everywhere about the public interest but take care of their private interest; here, where nothing is private, they seriously conduct public business; with good reason, certainly, in both places. For elsewhere, who doesn’t know that unless someone provides for himself separately, however much the commonwealth is flourishing, he will perish from hunger; and this is why necessity urges him to think he must take account of his own interest instead of the people’s—that is, others’—interests. But here, where everything belongs to everyone, no one doubts that nothing at all private will ever be lacking for anyone (provided care is taken to keep the public granaries full). For the distribution of goods is not meager, nor is anyone here a poor man or a beggar. And although no one has anything, all are still rich.

For how can you be wealthier than to live free of absolutely all anxiety, with a happy and tranquil mind? No one is fearful for his livelihood, or vexed by the querulous demands of his wife, in fear of poverty for his son, or anxious about the dowry of his daughter, but instead, each feels secure about the livelihood and even prosperity both of himself and of his family—wife, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, great-great-grandchildren, and as long a line of descendants as any aristocrat foresees having. Furthermore, no less provision is made for those who have already worked, but are now unable, than for those who are working now.

Here I would like someone to dare to compare this fairness with the justice of other nations, where I would be damned to find any trace of justice and fairness. For what kind of justice is this, that any noble, or goldsmith, or usurer, or any other kind of person who does either nothing at all or, what they do is the kind of thing that is not very necessary for the commonwealth, achieves a lavish and splendid life from idleness or unnecessary work, while meanwhile, a laborer, cart-driver, smith, farmer work so hard and so long that beasts of burden could hardly stand to do the same, but whose work is so necessary that without it no commonwealth could survive even
a year; yet they earn such a paltry living and lead so miserable a life that the condition of beasts of burden seems better by far, whose labor is actually not as constant, quality of life is not much worse, but actually more pleasant for beasts, who have, meanwhile, no fear about the future. But these people are goaded in the present by sterile and profitless labor in the present time, and wearied by recalling a poor old age, for their daily wage is too little even for that one day, never mind it growing and there being something extra which can be set aside every day for use in old age.

Is this not an unfair and ungrateful commonwealth that squanders such gifts on the so-called aristocrats and goldsmiths, and the rest of this sort, or the indolent, or just flatterers and makers of empty pleasures? For farmers, on the other hand, coal-workers, laborers, cart-drivers and smiths, without which there would be no commonwealth at all, it makes no kindly provision, but, once the labor of their productive years has been used up, and they are heavy with age and sickness, and in want of everything, the commonwealth, without a thought for their sleepless nights and forgetting their so many great services, ungratefully repays them with the most miserable death.

What about the fact that from the daily allowance of the poor the wealthy scrape away something every day, not only by private fraud, but also by public legislation, so that what seemed unjust before—to give the worst repayment for their favor to those who deserved the most from the commonwealth—these people have made this distorted, and then, by the promulgation of law, justice. And so, as I consider and contemplate all these commonwealths which are everywhere in prosperity today, nothing else, so help me God, meets my eyes but a certain conspiracy of the rich acting in their own interests, in the name and pretext of the commonwealth. And they contrive and devise all ways and means, first, to keep without fear of losing whatever they have amassed by evil schemes, and secondly, to buy the work and labor of the poor as cheaply as possible, and abuse the poor themselves. Such devices, once the rich have decreed them to be observed in the name of the public—that is, of the poor—at last become laws. But when these worst of people have divided among themselves with insatiable greed all those things which should have been enough for all, how far away are they, even so, from the happiness of the Utopian Commonwealth? Since, along with the use of money, all greed for money has been entirely removed from there, what a mass of troubles was cut back, what a crop of crimes was torn out by the roots! For who does not know that fraud, theft, rapine, quarrels, mob violence, disputes, rebellion, murder, treachery, poisonings (all which things daily punishments do not prevent but only take vengeance on) would all die away, once money is done away with; and not only that, but at the very moment money disappears, so would fear, anxiety, worries, toil, and sleeplessness
Raphael’s Peroration

likewise? Even poverty itself, which alone seemed to lack money, would itself immediately decrease once money were completely removed.

To see this more clearly, imagine for yourself some barren and unproductive year: a year in which hunger has carried off many thousands of people. I firmly maintain that, if the storehouses of the rich were emptied out at the end of that time of scarcity, you would be able to find so much food, that, if it had been distributed to those taken off by starvation and disease, no one at all would have felt the dearth of the weather and the soil. A livelihood could be acquired so easily if only that blessed money, which was, of course, so nobly invented for the purpose of opening an access to livelihood, were not the only thing that closes off for us the way to that livelihood.

No doubt the rich also know this, nor are they unaware how much better that condition would be of lacking no necessary thing than to abound in many superfluities, and how better it is to be rid of countless evils than to be besieged by great riches. Nor am I, at least, overcome with doubt that either reasoning about one’s own interest or the authority of Christ the Savior (who neither in his wisdom could fail to know what is best, nor in his goodness advise what he knew to be not best) would have long since easily brought the whole world under the laws of this commonwealth if one single monster, the ruler and parent of all plagues, pride—were not fighting against it.

Pride does not measure prosperity by her own advantages, but by the disadvantages of others. She would not even wish to become a goddess if there were not others in misery that she could not rule over and scoff at; her happiness shines forth when compared with their misery; by displaying her wealth, she torments and exacerbates their poverty. This serpent of Hell creeps through the hearts of human beings and like a suckfish pulls them back and delays them from taking up a better way of life. And since pride is too firmly fixed in humans to be plucked out easily, I rejoice that this form of commonwealth, which I would gladly wish for all, has at least been the good fortune of the Utopians to have, who have followed the institutions of life by which they have not only most successfully laid the foundations of a commonwealth, but also, as far as human conjecture can foresee, one that will last forever. For, because they have thoroughly removed the roots of factionalism along with all the other vices of ambition, they are not threatened by the danger of being worn out from domestic discord, the one thing that has ruined the outstandingly well-protected prosperity of many cities. But if harmony is preserved at home, and the institutions are sound, the envy of all the neighboring rulers combined (which have all too often made the attempt before, though always beaten back) could not shake or disturb that power.
When Raphael had told us all these things, even though not a few things were coming to mind that seemed very absurdly established in the customs and laws of that people, not only in their manner of waging war, in their religious practices and beliefs, and in other of their institutions besides, but most of all in that which is the greatest foundation of the whole system, namely, their common life and livelihood without any exchange of money: by this one institution all nobility, magnificence, splendor, majesty are profoundly overthrown — the true (according to public opinion) glories and ornaments of a commonwealth; nevertheless, I knew he was worn out from speaking, and I was not certain that he could endure to be disagreed with especially when I remembered that he had reproached certain people for this reason, as if they were that they would not be considered smart enough unless they discovered some way to criticize other people’s discoveries. For this reason I praised their system and his speech, took him by the hand, and led him in to dinner, but only after saying that there would come another time for us to think about these same matters more deeply and to discuss them with him more fully, and wished that that would happen someday!

Meanwhile, while I cannot agree with everything that was said by the man, who is without doubt both extremely learned and quite experienced in human affairs, at the same time, I readily confess that there are very many things in the commonwealth of the Utopians, that I would wish for in our states rather than hope for.

END OF BOOK TWO

The end of the afternoon conversation of Raphael Hythloday on the laws and institutions of the island of Utopia previously known to a few, according to a most illustrious and well-educated man Sir Thomas More, citizen and sheriff of London
Jerome Busleyden to Thomas More, greetings.

It was not enough, most distinguished More, to have bestowed for so long all your care, labor, study to the benefit and advantage of individuals, unless you were dedicking even these things (which is so characteristic of your sense of duty and your generosity) to the whole, thinking that this favor of yours, for what it might be worth, the more it will benefit more people (since it has been more widely extended and bestowed on more people), it earns the greater favor from this, hunts out the greater gratitude, catches the greater glory. Which, even if you have striven to offer always at other times, still, you have in fact obtained this with an amazing success recently, obviously with that afternoon conversation reported, by you, to the world of letters, which you have published concerning the rightly and well established commonwealth of the Utopians, one to be desired by all people.

In the successful description of this most beautiful institution, there is nothing in which the utmost learning or absolute expertise in human affairs is found lacking, since both of these meet in it with such equality and such uniform agreement that neither “extends the grass” to the other; each strives for glory with “equal Mars,” since you shine with such multi-faceted learning, and again with so much, and that with a considered expertise in affairs, that, by experience, you affirm whatever you have written; you write most learnedly whatever you have decided to affirm. The success is in fact amazing, and clearly all the rarer to the extent that it, begrudging itself to most people, only offers itself to a few people, mostly to the sorts of people who just as they want to, through their goodness, so they know how to through their learning, are able to by their trustworthiness, can through their authority so dutifully, rightly, providently take thought for the common good, just as you already do well, since you—because you think you were born not only for yourself, but even for the whole world—considered it worthwhile to oblige the whole world by this most splendid meritorious service of yours, which you could have provided in no other way more correctly or better than to lay down that form of the commonwealth, that system and most perfect representation of character.

No institution has even been seen which is healthier than it, or which seems more desirable, since it is much more excellent and leaves behind it, by a great interval, so many quite celebrated commonwealths, so much praised, of Lacedaemonians,
Athenians, Romans. If they had been undertaken with the same auspices, governed with the same institutions (as this commonwealth of yours), laws, decrees, character, certainly these would not have fallen yet and been razed to the ground. Oh, what a pity, would they now lie snuffed out without any hope of restoration? But, on the contrary, they would be active, still safe and sound, happy, successful, quite fortunate, meanwhile masters of affairs, having as their lot their own power broadly held on land and sea.

You, having pitied the pitiable lot of these commonwealths, you wanted to see to it, ahead of time, that others which have gained control of affairs may not, likewise, suffer the same plight, obviously with this most perfect commonwealth of yours, which has taken the most pains not so much in establishing laws as in forming the most acceptable of magistrates. Nor is this beside the point, since otherwise all (or the best) laws, if we believe Plato, are judged dead without these. It is precisely with reference to the representation of these magistrates, the picture of uprightness, the pattern for character, the image of justice that the whole state and right trajectory of any perfect commonwealth is to be shaped. In this, there should be agreement, primarily, between the prudence of the ruling class, fortitude in the soldiers, temperance in individuals, justice in all.

Since your (which we celebrate so much) commonwealth has been so wonderfully balanced with these, as is clear, it is no wonder if it should, as a result, arrive on the scene not only as a thing to be feared by many, but even to be revered by all nations, and, at the same time, proclaimed in all ages. And the more so because, with disagreement of all ownership out of the way, no one has anything of his own. Moreover, to the common advantage itself, all things are common to all, so much so that every matter, whichever the action, either public or private, should not have reference to the desire of many people, not to the whim of a few, but the whole of it should be related to maintaining justice alone, fairness, and sharing (for whatever it might be worth). When it has been wholly related to this, any and all wood, torch and kindling which contributes to corruption, wasteful luxury, envy, injustice must necessarily depart. It is into these that sometimes, either the private possession of goods or the burning thirst to have, and the most wretched ambition for all things pushes mortals (even as they wrestle against it), to their own very great injury, and that beyond any compare, since from this, dissensions between minds, the taking up of arms, and wars more than civil often suddenly arise. It is by these that not only the quite flourishing state of the happiest of commonwealths is utterly sunk, but their glory long ago obtained, their celebrated triumphs, their noble trophies, their glorious spoils on so many occasions, brought back from conquered enemies, are entirely wiped away.
But if in these matters this piece of writing of ours has not achieved, by chance, as much credence as I would like, certainly witnesses will be ready to whom I might send you, quite reliable, namely the numerous and great cities long ago destroyed, states ripped apart, and commonwealths laid low, villages burned and destroyed. As scarcely any remains or traces of their great calamity are seen today, so history, however old and long drawn out, does not remember any of their names. Our commonwealths, if there are any, will easily avoid these remarkable instances of ruin, destructions, utter defeats and other disasters in war only by ordering themselves precisely in accord with the sole standard of the commonwealth of the Utopians, so that they don’t withdraw from it one inch. Doing so at long last, they will finally realize quite abundantly in actual practice how much this favor of yours bestowed on them has helped, and, most of all, how much, as a result of this coming to them, they have learned to preserve their commonwealth safe, sound and triumphing, hence, who will owe to you, their most excellent savior as much as he, with good reason, deserves, since he not only has saved some citizen from the commonwealth, but even the whole commonwealth itself.

In the meantime, farewell, and continue to ever practice, carry out, work out something with success which, conferred on the commonwealth, might add permanence to it, and immortality to you. Farewell, most learned and most humane More, the glory of your Britain and of this world of ours. From our house in Mechlin, 1516.
Reader, do you love sweet things? Here are all the sweetest things,
If it is what is useful that you seek, you will read nothing more useful.
Or if you will want each, with each this island overflows,
With what you can bedeck your speech, with what you can instruct your mind.
Here the eloquent one opens up the sources of right and wrong,
More, the chief glory of his London.

Do you want new marvels, since a new world has just now
a little while ago been found,
Do you want ways of living in a varied way?
Do you want what are the sources of virtues? Do you want
to know where the causes of evils are from?
And to know how much lies empty in the midst of things?
Read these, which that well-known More has given with a varied coloring,
More, the honor of the London nobility.
Thomas More to his friend Peter Giles, greetings.

I was delighted, very much so, my dear Peter, at the criticism which you are aware of, the criticism of that very sharp man who used this dilemma against our *Utopia*: if the matter has been reported as it really is, I see there a few somewhat ridiculous things; but if it is made up, then, in some matters I miss the very precise judgment of More. I am very much thankful to this man, my dear Peter, whoever he was (whom I both suspect is learned and see is a friend). With his extremely frank judgment, he has done me as great a favor as perhaps as anyone else since the little book’s publication.

For first, whether enticed by an interest in me or in the work itself, he seems not to have grown tired of the labor, so as not to read the whole book or to do this as a matter of routine or too hastily, as priests are accustomed to do the Liturgy of Hours, that is to say, those who are accustomed to, but so cautiously and diligently that, meanwhile, he weighed our individual matters astutely, then, after criticizing certain passages, and that in a sparing way, he states that he very much approved of the rest, not haphazardly, but through considered judgment. Finally, with the very words he gets his licks in with, he still bestows more praise than those who praised me on purpose. For he easily indicates what a splendid opinion he has about me since if he has read anything not precise enough he is complaining that there he missed what he had hoped for, though for me, at the same time, it is more than I had hoped if I can even publish at least a few things, from a great number, not utterly ridiculous.

Although, so I myself may plead with him, in turn, no less frankly, I do not see why he ought to seem to himself so perceptive and what the Greeks call ὀξυδερκῆς either since he caught a few somewhat ridiculous things among the institutions of the Utopians or caught me, as I shaped the commonwealth, thinking up some things with too little utility, as if there were nothing ridiculous anywhere else in the world, or any of all the philosophers had ever arranged a commonwealth, a ruler, or, finally, a private house such that he instituted nothing which would be better off changed. In which matter (if the memory of those who are for me the greatest

*This letter Thomas More published only in the 1517 edition of *Utopia*. 
men were not hallowed, as they are consecrated by age) I certainly would be able to bring forward some things from each, in condemning which I would, without doubt, plan on reporting a detailed accounting of all things.

Now since he doubts whether the matter is real or made up, here I actually miss the precise judgment of this very man. Still neither do I deny, if I had decided to write about a commonwealth, and, still, had such a story occurred to me, that I perhaps would not have shrunk from that pretense by which the truth, as if it were smeared with honey, might flow a little more pleasantly into minds. But, still, I would certainly have moderated it in such a way that if I wanted to misuse the ignorance of the vast majority of people, for those a little more educated I would have put out front some tracks by which they might have easily traced my plan.

And so, if I had put nothing other than the names of the ruler, at least, of a river, a city, an island such as could warn the more experienced that the island was nowhere [nusquam], that the city is vanishing, the river without water, the ruler was without a people, which would not have been difficult to do, and would have been much more charming than what I did, and, unless the faithfulness of history had forced me, I am not so stupid that I would have wanted to use those names which are barbarous and mean nothing, Utopia, Anydrus, Amaurotum, and Ademus.

Otherwise, my dear Giles, since I see there are some so cautious that they, as guarded and wise men, are hard to bring to believe the things I, a simple and gullible man, wrote out as Hythloday reported it, so that my credibility in their eyes cannot be endangered, together with the credibility of history, I am glad I am permitted to say, on behalf of my offspring, what Terence’s Mysis says concerning the boy of Glycerium, who, so that he is not regarded as fraudulently introduced into the family says, “I thank the gods that there were several free women present at the birth.” For this too has happened to me, quite conveniently, that Raphael not only told these things just to me and you, but to many quite honorable and very serious men besides, probably even more and greater things, and certainly neither fewer nor less important things than he told to us. But if those unbelievers were not to believe even these people, it is possible for them to approach Hythloday himself. For he is not dead yet. I just heard from some people recently arriving from Portugal, last March on the first of the month, that he was as healthy and strong as he has ever been at any time. So let them ask the truth of him, or dig it out of him with arguments if they like. Just have them understand that I must present my work alone, not the credibility of another.

Goodbye, my dearest Peter, with your most charming wife and clever little daughter, whose long-term well-being my wife prays for.
This illustration by Hans Holbein the Younger is the last page of the 1518 editions of Thomas More’s *Utopia*. The Greek at the top and bottom is Matthew 10:16: “so be wise as serpents and innocent as doves.” The Latin at the left is from Martial 10.47 (regarding what constitutes a happy life): “shrewd simplicity and love of doing right.” The Hebrew at the right is from Psalm 125:4: “Do good, O Lord, to those who are good, to those who are upright in their hearts.”
This title page of More’s Epigrams first appeared in the 1518 Utopia. At the bottom, left, is pictured the Roman hero Gaius Mucius Scaevola holding his right hand in the fire while defiantly opposing King Porsenna, who is invading Rome. See Livy 2.12.
SELECTED EPIGRAMS by Thomas More
(The epigrams selected are those referenced in the endnotes of Utopia.)

25. ON SUSPICION, from the Greek
Opinion has great power and weight in affairs. You do not wish
To do harm: even so, if you appear to wish it, you perish.
So even long ago they killed Philolaus in Croton
Whom they falsely believed wanted to play tyrant.

32. ON TWO BEGGARS, ONE LAME, ONE BLIND
There’s nothing more expedient than a trusted friend,
The sort who’d recoup your losses by his service.
Together two beggars formed bonds
- Of real friendship – a blind man with a lame.
The blind man to the lame says: “You’ll ride on my shoulders.”
He replied: “By my eyes will you be guided, blind friend.”
From lofty courts of proud kings love flees,
For in the pauper’s hut, required love is king.

33. ANOTHER WAY
A blind man makes an agreement with a lame man such that by mutual obligation
The one carry the other on his shoulders; the other lead him with his eyes.

37. A RABBIT SPEAKS WHICH, AFTER SLIPPING AWAY
FROM A WEASEL FALLS INTO
THE NETS OF HUNTERS WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP
I fled from the weasel by slipping off in a hole to the side
But oh, a wretch, I am borne away into the traps of men.
Here I do not obtain a swift life, I do not obtain a swift death.
I am saved so that, oh, I might be thrown to swift dogs.
While they tear my innards apart with their wicked bite,
- a man watches and laughs when my blood is spilt.
O harsh race, and more savage than any wild animal.
Harsh slaughter offers him a cruel joke.

109. HOW A TYRANT AND A RULER DIFFER
Between a legitimate king and the most
savage tyrants is this difference:
Those whom a tyrant governs as slaves,
the king thinks of as his own children [liberos].

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1 IN SUSPICIONEM, E GRAECO: Magnum habet in rebus vin ac pondus opinio. Non vis / Laedere: velle tamen si videare, peris. / Sic et Philoleon quondam occidere Crotone / Quem falso credunt velle tyrannum agere.
2 IN CAECUM ET CLAUDUM MENDICOS: Utilius nihil esse potest quam fidus amicus, / Qui tua damna suo leniat officio. / Foedera contrazere simul mendicar uteroque / Cum clando solidas caecus amicitiae. / Claudio caecus ait, collo gestabere nostro. / Reulit bis, oculus caece regere meis. / Alta superborum fugitat penetralia regum, / Inque casa concors paupere regnat amor.
3 ALITER: Cum clando caecus sic legge pacis situ acqua, ut / His ferat illum humeris, bunc regat ille oculis.
4 CUNICULA LOQUITUR QUAE ELAPSA / MUSTELAE INCIDIT IN DISPOSITA / VENATORUM RETIA: Mustelam oblique dilapsa foramine fugi. / Sed feror humanos ben misera in laqueos. / Hic ego non vitam celarem, non impetru mortem. / Servor ut bene rapidus obticus canibus. / Quis mea dum levisit sylvestri viscera morzu. / Spectat, et offuso sacrique ridet homo. / O darum genus, atque fera truncidentis omnis. / Nec cui crudelam praebet acerba iocum.
5 QUID INTER TYRANNUM ET PRINCIPEM: Legitimus immoantissimi / Rex hoc tyrannis interest. / Servos tyrannus quos regit, / Rex liberos parat suas.
111. THAT A GOOD RULER IS A FATHER, NOT A MASTER
A dutiful ruler will never lack children [liberos].
   He is the father of the whole realm.
The ruler abounds, then, most fortunate,
   in as many children [liberos] as citizens.

112. ON THE GOOD KING AND THE PEOPLE
The whole kingdom is one person, and it holds itself together through love.
   The king is the head, the people forms the other limbs.
However many citizens the king has (so he is pained to lose anyone)
   he himself accounts as parts of his own body.
The people leaves itself exposed for the king and anyone at all
   thinks the king is the head of his own body.

115. ON THE GOOD AND BAD RULER
What is a good leader? He is a dog, a defender of the flock,
   hence the one who drives away wolves with his voice.
What is a bad one? The wolf itself.

120. NOT A HENCHMAN BUT VIRTUE
RENDERS A KING SAFE
Hateful fear does not protect a king, nor do lofty palaces,
   Nor wealth (if pillaged from the people),
Nor a stern bodyguard, hired for low pay,
   Who would serve one man just as easily as another.
He will be safe, if he rules his people in such a way
   That the people believe no man to be more useful to them.

121. THE PEOPLES’ CONSENT CONFERS
OR REVOKES THE KING’S AUTHORITY TO RULE
Any man who rules alone over many men
   Owes this to those over whom he rules:
He owes it not to rule any longer
   Than they want him to rule for them.
Why then are powerless princes so proud that
   They hold power at the pleasure of the people?
157. AGAINST A PHILOSOPHER IN BEARD ONLY, from the Greek
If an overgrown beard makes one wise, what stands in the way
Of a bearded goat being a Plato?

169. ON AN ASTROLOGER
While astrologers, whom our mistake celebrates as seers,
Call forth your fate from a star’s position,
While one star shows you favor and another threatens,
Your mind is suspended between hope and fear.
If good tidings will come, they will come even if they keep silent;
As it happens, a good occurrence that comes unforeseen is more happily received.
But it will be good to remain ignorant of those adversities that are to come,
And to enjoy the use of the time in between, as long as it lasts.
In fact, I advise, though the fates themselves hold me back,
That you keep a level head and pass your days in good cheer.

198. WHAT IS THE BEST FORM OF CONSTITUTION?
You ask whether a king or a senate governs better.
Neither (which is often the case) if each were to be bad.
But if each were to be good, I think a senate is better, by superior numbers,
and that there is more good in many good men.
It is difficult, perhaps, to find a number of good men.
Similarly, it is easy, more often, for one to be bad.
And often a senate will have been midway between each,
but hardly ever will you have a middling king.
A bad senator is guided by more virtuous advisors,
but the king himself leads his own counselors.
As the one is chosen by the people, so the other is born.
Here, blind chance rules; there, sure deliberation.
The one thinks he was made for the people; the other that the people were made for him,
of course so that there might be people that he himself might govern.
A king is, in his first year, always very agreeable.
Well the, a consul will be a new king every year.
A greedy king, over a long lifetime, will have chewed up his people.
If a consul is evil, there is hope for a better one.
Nor does the well-known fable convince me, that bids us to put up with a well-fed fly,

11 IN BARBA TANTUM PHILOSOPHUM, E GRAECO: Si promissa facit sapientem barba, quid obstat / Barbatus possit quin caper esse Plato?

12 IN ASTROLOGUM: Dum tua quos noster celebrat pro valibus error / Fata cinct positis sideris astrologi, / Haece dum stella favet, dumque haece tibi stella minatur, / Pendula mens inter spemque metumque tua est. / Prospers exa venient, venient retiecentibus illis, / Asselet et subitum laetius esse bonum. / Sen venient adversa din nescire invabit, / Uzura et medii temporis usque frui. / Quin iubeo fatis etiam prohibentibus ipsi, / Fac tibi mens hilares transigat aequa dies.

13 QUIS OPTIMUS REIPUBL[ICAE] STATUS: Quaeris uter melius, Rex ne imperet anne Senatus. / Neuter (quod saepe est) si sit uterque malus. / Sin sit uterque bonus, numerum praeceper Senatem. / Inque bonis multi plus eor esse boni. / Difficile est numerum forsan reperire honorem, / Sic facile est unum saepsissimus esse malum, / Est fuerit medius saepi inter utrumque Senatem. / Sed ilii vicit usquam Rex mediocris erit. / Consiliumque malus regitur melior Senatem, / Rex consultores sed regit ipse suos. / Alter ut eligatur populo, sic nascitur alter. / Sors hic caeca regit, certum ibi consilium. / Illaque se factum populo, populum sibi factum / Scilicet hic ut sint quos regat ipse populo. / Rex est in primo semper blandisissimus anno, / Omni anno consul Rex erit ergo novus. / Rex cupidus longo populo cornuertit aevum. / Si consul malus est, spes melioris adest. / Nec me nota movet quae pastam fabula muscam /
so that a badly-fed one not cruelly take its place. He is deceived, whoever believes a greedy king can be satisfied; this bloodsucker will never let go of skin when it is not empty. But, you say, “The plans of the fathers are disturbed by serious disagreement; with a king, no one disagrees.” This is the more serious evil. For whenever there is a difference of opinion about important matters — But all the same, why do you ask this question? Is there a people anywhere whom you yourself can put a king or a senate in charge of by your decision? If you can do this, you reign: Consider no longer to whom you should hand over supreme command; the more important question is “Would it be useful?”

243. ON THE LUST FOR RULE
Out of all the many kings, there will be hardly one king, If there’s even one, for whom one kingdom will suffice. Out of all the many kings, there will be hardly one, If there is even one, who could rule a single kingdom well.

244. ON THE SURRENDER OF TOURNAI TO HENRY VIII, KING OF ENGLAND
Though you were once unconquered, Tournai, Warlike Caesar subdued you, But not without most grievous damage to both sides. You Henry captured; and what’s more, he captured you without bloodshed: A Prince so much greater than Caesar and better. The king believed he’d gained an honor by capturing you, and you, Yourself believed it no less useful to be captured too.

14 20Ferre iubet, subeat ne male pransa locum. / 21Fallitur, expleri Regem qui credit avarum, / 22Nunquam haec non vacuam mittet hirudo cutem. / 23At patrum consulta gravis dissensio turbat, / 24Regi dissentit nemo, malum hoc gravis. / 25Nam quam de magnis varia est sententia rebus, / 26Quaestio sed tamen haec nascitur unde tibi? / 27Estne usquam populus, cui Regem sive Senatum / 28Praeficere arbitrio tu potes ipse tuo? / 29Si putes huc, regnas: nec iam cui, consule, tradas / 30Imperium: prior est quaestio, an expediat.

15 DE CUPIDITATE REGNADE: Regibus e multis regnum cui sufficit unum, / Vix reg unum erit, si tamen unum erit. / Regibus e multis regnum bene qui regat unum, / Vix tamen unus erit, si tamen unus erit.

16 DE DEDITIONE NERVIAE / HENRICO VIII, ANGLIAE REGI: Belliger invictam domuit te Nervia Caesar, / Non tamen extremis abique utriusque malis. / Te capit Henricus, capitis et sine sanguine, princeps / Magna tam maior Caesar quam melior. / Sensit honorificum sibi ree expiisse, tibique / Utile sensistis non minus ipsa capi.
NOTES AND COMMENTARY

Abbreviations


AP Anthologia Palatina, see Paton.


CWE The Collected Works of Erasmus, 86 volumes, Toronto University Press, 1974-

EWTM The Essential Works of Thomas More, Yale University Press, 2020


Pl Planudean Anthology, Venice, Aldus Manutius, 1503


TMSB A Thomas More Source Book, Catholic University of America Press, 2004

ii.1–8, iii.1–8 DE OPTIMO REIPUBLICAE STATU DEQUE, nova insula UTOPIA libellus vere aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus, clarissimi disertissimique viri THOMAE MORI inclutae civitatis Londinensis civis et Vicecomitis: This is the full Latin title of More’s book, though it is usually shortened to Utopia. See Epigram 198, pp. 113–114, which was published with the 1518 Utopia.

iii.2 COMMONWEALTH (REIPUBLICAIE): Translators often render the first part of More’s title as the “best state of a commonwealth” because commonwealth is a reasonably good Anglo-Saxon equivalent of the Latin res publica, with “common” (publica) and “wealth” (res: “thing, possession”). Cicero translated the Greek title of Plato’s Politeia as De re publica. In Quintum fratrem 3.5.1 Cicero explains that his De re publica deals with de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive (“the ideal constitution and the ideal citizen”). As Quentin Skinner has pointed out, the character Morus echoes Cicero “almost word for word” in his response to Raphael (“Thomas More’s Utopia and the Virtue of True Nobility” in Visions of Politics, vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues, Cambridge UP, 2002, 222; The Meaning of More’s “Utopia,” Princeton UP, 1983, 222).

iii.3 Utopia: The word “utopia” means “no-place,” from the Greek ou-, “not,” and topos, place. If one hears the Greek en in the playful “utopia,” on the other hand, the word could also suggest “good place.” Which is it? See the poem on page 7 and consider that More’s original title was Nusquama (“no place”) as indicated, for example, in More’s letter to Erasmus, 31 October <1516> (EWTM 278.46).

iii.4 golden: a surprising adjective, since the Utopians will claim later that gold has little value

iii.5 beneficial ... entertaining: With a variety of words, More affirms this classic description of good literature (famous from Horace’s Art of Poetry (333ff: delectare/prodesse) not only here, but elsewhere in Utopia (see 108.8) and also in his prefatory letter to his Lucian translations (vulpiatis/utilitis, CW 3.1: 3.5–6, EWTM 20.7–8) and in the Letter to Brixius (melliti numeri/opiniones bonae, CW 3.2: 644.6–7), EWTM 468.63–65.

iii.8 sheriff (vicecomitis): Although Thomas More was actually an undersheriff (subvicecomes), vicecomitis is the common term for sheriff. Here and at 18.6, 48.5, and 102.28 More identifies himself by his special legal and civic role as well as his general role as “citizen,” a key term later in Utopia. For the complexities of the word vicecomitis

2.1 **John Froben:** He (ca. 1460–1527) was a leading publisher of this time. See Erasmus’s praise of him in his November 1527 Letter 1900 to Jan of Heemstede, CWE 13: 420–426.

2.2 **fellow father (compater):** Since Erasmus was the godfather of John Erasmus, Froben’s son, he can refer to him as a “fellow father.” This term, *compater,* could apparently be used either of the godfather or, by the godfather, of the natural father, as here. It could thus refer to a mutual relationship; so Froben referred to Erasmus as his *compater* in a letter of June 17, 1515.

2.4 **my judgment:** See in the Letter to von Hutten Erasmus’s assessment of *Utopia* at EWTM 1374.4–11; see note at 10.29.

2.18 **Progymnasmata:** “Preparatory Exercises” – i.e., Epigrams 1–18 of More’s 260 epigrams that were published with the 1518 *Utopia*

3.1 **Budé … Lupset:** William Budé (ca. 1468–1540) was the leading humanist in France; Thomas Lupset (1498–1530) was an Englishman who studied in Paris from 1517–1519. For a helpful rhetorical analysis of Budé’s letter, see Andrea Frank, “Humanist Guillaume Budé’s Artful Rhetoric: Responding in Kind to *Utopia*,” Moreana no. 54.2 (December 2017): 204–24.

3.31 **gadfly (oestrus):** For some of the most important classical references, see Plato, *Republic* 577e; Euripides, *Heraclis* 862, *Hippolytus* 1300, *Aulis* 665, *Orestes* 791, and *Iphigeneia in Tauris* 1456.

4.11 **knotted (pactilis):** The word *pactilis* is used of “plaited” or “knotted” cords, but he may be playfully hinting at the use of *pactum* to refer to contracts. See the reference to *pactiles … nexus et contractiles nodos* below (note to 5.1) with its likely reference to *pacta* (“compacts”) and *contractus* (“contracts”).

4.11–12 **experts … law (iuris … consulti):** Budé expands the often used phrase *iuris consulti,* “experts in law,” with playful adjectives to render it “experts in debatable, perverted, inverted law.”

4.16 **commonly held view (sensus communis):** This is not the *sensus communis* of Thomas Aquinas, a “common sense,” “central sense,” or “mental association” which unites the various sense organs, but the “social tact” or “common sense” seen in Seneca’s *De beneficiis* 1.12.3 and *Epistulae morales* 105.4. “Tact” is “diplomacy,” that sensitivity to time, setting, occasion, and audience allowing a person to do and say what is “apt” or “fitting”; see notes to 40.22, 41.8, 70.31 and pages 34.33 vs. 41.15–16.

4.20 **right:** The word “right” here and in the next sentence (inos) could also be translated “law,” and suggests the written code of law which Budé has already suggested is, in its nature and especially its interpretation, often corrupt.

4.26 **customs (ritus):** See notes to 5.25, 6.27.

5.1 **pinched-like knots:** Or “compact obligations and contractual knots.” Both words may well be either coinages or novel reuses of preexisting, but rare, words – so the double meaning is likely intentional. See above (note to 4.11) for the reference to *pactilis iuris,* at once “knotted law” and, perhaps, “contractual law.”

5.23 **Udepotia:** Whereas *Outopia/Utopia* means “Nowhereness” (rendered by More himself *Nusquama,* which also seems to be an abstract noun and has the same translation), *Oudepotia/Udepotia* would mean “Neverness.”

5.25 **Christian practices:** As elsewhere in the letter, context suggest “practices,” though *ritus* often has religious undertones and suggests “rites.” Together with the adjective *Christianos,* with its own strong religious associations, Budé seems to suggest the meaning of “rites” as well.
5.28 civility (civilitas): Means both the science of politics (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.25, 2.17.14) and civility or “unassumingness.” Budé seems to imply politics should ideally presuppose civility.

5.30 “overthrowings” (everricula): The reading in CW 4. It should be noted that this word is not extant, which may well explain his apology (“if I may say so”). But it is possible the intended word is *everriculum,* a fisherman’s net designed to sweep up (everrere) everything. In fact, Cicero uses phrasing reminiscent of Budé in *De natura deorum* 3.74: “hence that net to catch wrong-doing of all sorts, the ‘action for malicious fraud’ promulgated by our friend Gaius Aquilius, a charge of fraud that Aquilius likewise holds to be proved when a man has pretended to do one thing and has done another” (inde *everriculum* malitarum omnium iudicium de dolo malo, quod *C. Aquillius* familiaris noster protulit, quem dolum idem Aquilius tum teneri putat cum aliud sit simulatum aliud actum).

5.38 termites: See Guillaume Le Talleur, *Dictionarius familiaris et compendiosus,* s.v. teredo.

6.5 best and greatest (optimus maximus): Budé adopts the epithet *Optimus Maximus* used in Classical Latin for Jupiter, much as he has repurposed terms such as *superi* (5.32: “gods”) and *adversarius Stygius* (5.35–36: “Stygian foe”) for aspects of life known only through Christian revelation.

6.18 Hagnopolis: “Holy City”

6.27 practices (ritus): See notes to 4.26, 5.25.

6.29 embellished (illustravit): “embellished” or “made clear”

6.36 had ... removed: to prevent fruit from being produced

6.37–7.3 since ... wise: This italicized text was originally given in Greek.

7.12 your: He uses the plural form here, and so he seems to be saying that Linacre is no longer merely a possession of the British, but part of a wider world of letters.

7.23 customary habits: The word *translatitios* translated here as “customary,” that is, “traditional” and “passed down” from generation to generation, can also mean “transferred,” that is, moved “from place to place.” See the *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* s.v. *translatitius.*

7.26 Unlike Giles’ poem on page 9, this is written in a discernible Latin meter, iambic trimeter. It is typically used in comic poetry or in poetry with a harsh and critical tone, as in Horace, *Epodes* 16.

7.27 Anemolius: For the meaning of *Anemolius* as “windy,” see note to 64.20.

9 As Peter Giles states at 11.5–6, he contributes this alphabet and poem.

10.1 Peter Giles: He (ca. 1486–1533) was a humanist scholar and city official in Antwerp as well as an active collaborator in *Utopia’s* design and publication as indicated at 11.4–7. See 19.8–20, and More’s two letters to Giles on pages 13–16 and 107–8.

10.29 sources (fontes): See note to 23.1 for another use. That *Utopia* is designed for this very purpose — to reveal these *fontes* of human action, is affirmed below at 106.7, 14 and here by Peter Giles. Erasmus wrote the same to William Cop: “As for More’s *Utopia,* if you have not yet read it, be sure to ask for it when you want to be mused, or more truly, if you wish to see the very wellsprings [fonte] of all troubles in a commonwealth [republicae malae]” (*EE* 537.17–18, 24 February 1517). Erasmus gave a similar assessment in his Letter to Ulrich von Hutten: “He published *Utopia* with this purpose, to indicate under which circumstances it happens that republics are less well off” (*Utopiam hoc consilio aedidit, ut indicaret quibus rebus fluent ut minus commode habant republicae*) (*EE* 999.256–58, 23 July 1519 or *EWTM* 1374.4–6).
11.2 talent (ingenio): For the importance of ingenio, see notes to 13.18, 14.12, 15.17, 15.30, 19.3, 21.6

11.17 Literally “elevation of the pole,” which involved calculation of the height of celestial bodies. On this type of celestial navigation, sublatio poli, see, for example, Ptolemy, Tetrabiblus 2.6 (to tou polou exarma) and Geminus 6.24.

13.1 PREFACE: The first edition of Utopia entitled this letter “PREFATIO / In opus de optimo republicae statu”; the 1518 edition pictured here has this formal title page with an elaborate border, and “Prefatio” appears at the top of the following pages. On the letter as a whole, see Elizabeth McCutcheon, My Dear Peter: The Ars Poetica and Hermeneutics for More’s Utopia (Moreanum, 1983).

13.6 invention (inventio): the first part of rhetoric, “finding” what to say

13.7 disposition (dispositio): the second part of rhetoric, the order in which to say things

13.9 style (eloquentia): the third part of rhetoric, the choice of single words and figures of ornament

13.9 conversation (sermo): “ordinary speech” as opposed to oratio, “elaborate or artificial speech”

13.12 careless simplicity (neglectam simplicitatem): literally “neglected simplicity”

13.16 nothing: Morus repeats “nothing”; the Latin nihil occurs eight times in this context, with five other negatives.

13.17 devising / internal arrangement: excogitation / oeconomia: These are variations for “invention” and “disposition” explained as above; oeconomia is translated as “internal arrangement” to bring out the original meaning of “economy.”

13.18 no little time and study: Literally, “not nothing of time or of study” – an instance of litotes, that rhetorical figure by which one affirms something by means of negating its contrary, e.g. saying something is “not bad” to mean it is good. See Elizabeth McCutcheon, “More’s Use of the Litotes in Utopia,” Moreana nos. 31–32 (Nov. 1971): 107–121.

13.18 no mean ... learning (ingenio neque infimo neque … indocto): litotes again. On ingenium and doctrina see also notes to 14.12 and 19.3.

13.19 elegantly (diserte): Another variant used to indicate elegance of style, the third aspect of rhetoric (see note to 13.9).

13.23 it was really no trouble (nihil erat negotii): Since the word for “business” or “trouble” is already a negative, through litotes More describes the Utopia as the fruit of otium, or “non-business.” On the theme of negotium vs. otium, see Quentin Skinner’s “Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the Language of Renaissance Humanism” in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Language of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 126–131; for Augustine on negotium, otium, see Wegemer 1996, 131–33. See notes 23.8, 25.8, 26.5, 27.27, 28.27, 44.37, 62.6–7.

13.26 duty (officia): The study of “duties” is the “most fruitful” part of philosophy according to Cicero (De officiis 3.5).

13.28 letters: The word litterae, in the sense of “learning” or “scholarship,” includes fields as divergent as arithmetic and dialectic. See More’s description of the meaning of litteratus in the Letter to Dorp, EWTM 393.59–60 or CW 15: 12.20–21.

13.29–30 I must ... servants: This sentence distinguishes several types of conversation or sermo: fabulare, garrire, colloqui.
13.32 pleasing (*iucundissimum*): The serious work of making life pleasant for others will be highlighted in Utopian moral philosophy (see 68.7–8, 27–28 and note at 69.2–7); *laetus* and *hilaris* (translated as “cheer” at 15.19, 68.28, 93.9,) are other adjectives used for this pursuit. See also note to 19.16 on *lepis*.

14.3 companionship (*comitate*): The caution against corrupting “companions” (*comites*) by “companionship” (*comitas*) introduces a moral qualification. More identifies himself as a *vicecomites* on the title page and on pages 18.6 and 48.5. See notes to iii.8, 18.11, 20.17, 53.6, 94.34.

14.3 indulgence (*indulgentia*): Here and later in this letter at 15.19, “indulgence” is contrasted unfavorably with seriousness and discipline; in *Utopia* 2, Raphael’s uses of the word are positive at 63.24 and 73.22 (both regarding nature’s indulgence).

14.12 inborn talent (*ingenio*): Here and above at 13.18, attention is drawn to *ingenium* (inborn talent) in contrast to the work of culture, learning and discipline (*doctus* and *doctrina*). There is an inborn talent, but it must be brought to perfection by assiduous labor and study. The same contrast appears in *Utopia* at 22.36 (*ingenium / industria*) and at 24.13 (*natura / discendo atque exercendo*).

14.14 John Clement: Born in 1500, John Clement was educated as one of the first students in John Colet’s school of humanistic studies, St. Paul’s, and then Oxford. He served as a tutor in More’s household and in 1526 married Margaret Giggs, a scholar and one of More’s adopted daughters. Clement became a Greek professor at Oxford, studied medicine, and became President of the Royal College of Physicians; eventually he fled to the continent where he died in 1572.

14.26 rather ... falsely: This subtle distinction is also a playful reminder of Morus’s stated purpose of being concerned with “truth alone” – as a faithful reporter of what he (along with Peter Giles and John Clement) heard Raphael saying.

14.28–33 And yet ... located: In the first part of the letter, Morus gives an apology for the existence of the book as a whole (and its lateness in coming). This second part is concerned with truth and gives “doubts,” which Morus asks Peter Giles to solve through recourse to Raphael. The first doubt (how long the bridge is) is comically less important than the second (where Utopia is really located) since the second leads to the question of the Christianization of the Utopians.

15.3 bishop ... Utopians: At 91.5–7, Raphael will mention that the Utopians were in need of their own bishop for the ordination of Catholic priests.

15.3 ambition (*ambitus*): literally, a canvassing for office. Already in late antiquity this Roman political term (see Cicero, *Pro Sulla* 11) was applied to the Christian concept of “holy ambition.”

15.5 honor (*honoris*): The word refers either to honor, more generally, or to a public office, such as the office (*antistitium*) of bishop mentioned in line 15.4 above.

15.15 delightful novelty of his account (*gratiam ... novitatis historiae suae*): Gratia is the charm of originality, which More artfully ascribes to Raphael.

15.16 And yet, ... : The third and concluding part of the letter begins here. See Elizabeth McCutcheon’s *My Dear Peter*, p. 20.

15.17 dispositions (*ingenia*): Here and at 15.30 the word indicates inborn disposition and talents. See note to 15.30.

15.21 disdain (*fastidientibus*): See 60.38, 70.35, 94.7, where *fastidium* is the “displeasure” or “tedium” that is particularly to be avoided in *Utopia*. 

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15.21 ungrateful (*ingratiis*): Ingratitude, mentioned twice in this sentence and again at 15.35, reflects the preoccupation with gratitude and ingratitude in More’s earlier work *The Life of Pico*. More frequently uses *gratia / gratus or ingratus* elsewhere in this letter and in the first pages of the *Utopia* (15.38, 16.2, 19.8, 20.21).

15.27 snub-nosed (*simi*): Since the nose is the faculty of quick smell, the “snub-nosed” are those without an appreciation of satire or wit.

15.27 just as ... water: Such “fear” is caused, allegedly, by the impaired swallowing ability of those with rabies.

15.30 judge the talents of writers (*de scriptorum indicant ingeniis*): Here *ingeniun* has the meaning of “literary talent.”

15.33 “out of rage”: The original Latin text has Greek words here: *éxō bélous*, literally “outside the shot”; see Erasmus, *Adages* 293 (*CWE* 31: 311).

15.34 an honest man's hair (*pilus boni viri*): A metaphor taken from wrestling. As McCutcheon points out (*My Dear Peter*, p. 62), More is defining the right kind of reader of *Utopia*.


16.8 your ... wife: More’s inclusion of Peter Giles’ wife in his letter strikes a note of friendship in harmony with his mention of his own family affairs earlier in the letter.

18.1 Conversation: For Cicero’s classic rules of propriety for *sermo*, see *De officiis* 1.132–35. See notes at 13.9 and 34.36.

18.7 invincible: Erasmus comments on the absurdity of the title “invincible” in *Education of a Christian Prince* 59 (CUP, 1997). How is one “most invincible”? 

18.7-8: Henry ... adorned ... ruler (*principis artibus ornatisimus*): See the juxtaposition of Epigrams 243 and 244. Even in these early years, More was aware of Henry’s thirst for imperial conquest and military glory. See also Epigram 19 in *CW* 3.2, especially the reference to Achilles on line 68. To say in this opening sentence that Henry VIII is “adorned” with all the skills (*artibus*) needed for an outstanding *princeps* is quite different from saying that he has and exercises the virtues needed to be an outstanding ruler.

18.8 ruler: The word used is *princeps*, which is translated in this edition as “ruler” unless it clearly refers to an actual king, as is the case in the next paragraph with reference to the Emperor Charles. Latin *rex* will be translated as “king.” Consider the different ways *princeps* is used in these opening paragraphs. The term has a long history, hence the significance of its use to describe the leader of each Utopian city. See David Baker’s “First Among Equals: The Utopian *Princeps*,” *Moreana* nos. 115–16 (Dec. 1993): 33–45. See below, note to 22.38.

18.9 business ... dispute: This dispute is over important trade agreements, especially regarding the wool trade, between the Netherlands and England. Regarding such agreements, see notes to 81.34, 89.15 and Epigram 32.3–4, and consider the contrast with the Utopians’ making no treaties at p. 81 (although they “observe religiously” truces made with enemies at p. 89).

18.10 Charles, Prince of Castile: In 1515, Charles V was Prince of Castile and Duke of Burgundy; in 1519 he became the Holy Roman Emperor.

18.11 orator (*oratorem*): Consider Cicero’s *De oratore* and *Orator* in assessing the significance of this word choice in identifying himself. See also Budé’s comments at 6.30–33 and Giles’ similar remarks at 10.12, 22–25, 30–32.

18.11 companion and colleague (*comitem et collegam*): More uses these same Latin terms on his epitaph (*EWTM* 372.20-21); for other uses of *comes*, see notes at ii.8, 14.3, 20.17, 53.6, 94.34.
18.12 **Cuthbert Tunstall:** A long-time friend of More, Tunstall (1474–1559) later becomes bishop of London, then of Durham.

18.14 **trust (fides):** Unless noted, this term will be translated “trust” or “trustworthiness.” This term recurs frequently in Utopia, as it does in Cicero, who claims that fides is the bond necessary for justice. See De officiis 1.15, 23, 82, et al.

18.17 **to show … a lamp:** Erasmus, Adages 1406–7 (CWE 33: 245)

18.20 **Georges de Themsecke:** Themsecke (? – ca. 1536) was a doctor of laws, an experience diplomat, and a member of Charles V’s Grand Council in Mechlin.

19.3 **long ... negotiations:** See note to 13.18 for the same characteristics of natural talent (ingenium), learning (ars, doctrina), and practice (here, assiduous usus rerum, is translated as “long experience in negotiations”; at 23.3–4 below, usus rerum and peritia rerum are translated as “practical experience”). Themsecke’s experience is specific and has been seen in action (unlike Raphael’s).

19.8 **gratifying (gratior):** See note to 15.21 for the many uses of gratus and ingrat us in Morus’ introductory letter. See also the note at 69.6 for the related concept of Roman caritas.

19.8–20 **While ... sweet conversation:** This paragraph sketches a model citizen (optimus civis) having the important qualities of honestas and fides of Cicero’s “leading citizen” as well as the qualities urged by Christ: wise as the serpent, innocent as the dove. See note at 19.15–16 and see page 109.

19.11–15 **For he ... friendship:** Twice in this sentence our attention is drawn to friendship; see also 2.4–5; 7.8, 10; 7.16; 18.14; 19.12, 15; 107.8.

19.15–16 **in no one ... simplicity:** This phrase, nulli simplicitas inest prudentior, alludes to Mt 10:16: “be prudent as serpents and innocent as doves” [estote ergo prudentes sicut serpents et simplices sicut columbae]. A similar allusion occurs in the Latin version of The History of King Richard III, in the narrator’s comment that King Henry VI was more innocent than prudent (CW 15: 320). See note to 68.37–38 and the illustration on page 109.

19.16 **charming (lepidus):** The conversations of Socrates and Lucian were famously marked by lepos (i.e., “charm, wit”). See ahead for Lucian at 75.22 and to More’s earlier remarks saying the same at CW 3.1: 2.18 and 4.12 or EWTM 20.26 and 20.62. Cicero says Socrates is the best model for conversation, marked as it was by lepos (De officiis 1.134; see also De republica 1.16). In De oratore, Cicero records that the humanitas of Crassus was shown in his lepos (1.27, also 1.159, 2.220). Morus draws attention to this quality of lepos at 35.9, 40.30, 108.16.

19.21 **divine ... temple:** As he does in Richard III, More deliberately uses a classical vocabulary, even when Christian terminology is expected. Here, instead of attending “Mass” (missa) at a “church” (ecclesia), he attends a “divine service” (res divina) at the templum divae Mariae. Consider the invocation “by Hercules” used at 33.32, 40.9, 70.18.

19.23 **sacred ritual ... lodging:** Compare this setting with that of Plato’s Republic: Socrates is coming back to Athens from the port at Piraeus, having attended the festival for a new goddess.

19.34 **account (historiam):** The word historia has important generic implications; see note to 44.8. The Greek word originally meant “inquiry, research, disciplined or scientific knowing,” including natural science (as in Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia) as well as a researched, narrative account of human and political actions (history in the familiar modern sense). It was already used by Herodotus in the latter sense. Another meaning is just a simple narrative or story (Ovid Amores 2.4.44 and Aulus Gellius 1.8), and is in fact the origin of the English word story. Here the meaning is the first, original meaning of “scientific or philosophical account.”
20.1 Palinurus is the faithful and skilled helmsman who dies in service to Aeneas (Vergil, *Aeneid* 5.1090–1141.)

20.2 Raphael means “God heals” or “God’s healer,” from the Hebrew *rapha El*.

20.3 Hythloday means “skilled in idle talk,” from Greek *hythlos*, “idle talk, nonsense,” and *daios*, “skilled, knowing, cunning.”

20.6 except ... *Cicero*: For a similar judgment about Cicero and Seneca, see More’s Letter to the University of Oxford, *CW* 15: 143 or *EWTM* 419.60.

20.6–7 He left the inheritance: Pico della Mirandola also gives up his inheritance and public duties to his nephew, as More recounts some years earlier in his *Life of Pico*. See *EWTM* 68–71.

20.8–10 joined ... last one: *The Four Voyages of Amerigo Vespucci* is the popular book that was then “read ... far and wide” (20.9–10), but Vespucci himself made only three voyages; the fourth one detailed in that best-selling book was fabricated, and included activities about naked natives that would appeal to readers, since Vespucci’s accounts of his three voyages were too uninteresting. See F. J. Pohl, *Amerigo Vespucci: Pilot Major*, Columbia University Press, 1944, p. 154.


20.15 favorable (*propitius*): Divine favor is also claimed at 98.28 for the Utopians; for the duty of showing favor to yourself, see 68.23–24.

20.17 comrades (*comitibus*): See earlier and later uses of this term – distinct from *amici*. The nature and types of society are referenced throughout. See notes to iii.8, 14.3, 18.11, 53.6, 94.34.

20.18 *Taprobane* is the name given in the text, the earlier name for Ceylon and now Sri Lanka.

20.18–20 *Taprobane ... homeland*: This would make Raphael the first to sail around the world, over ten years before Magellan.

20.21 related (*narravit*): There are several Latin words Thomas uses for “telling, saying, narrating, and relating”; in terms of frequency in *Utopia*, the counts are as follows: forms of *dicere* 52, *narrare* 23, *referre* 18, *loqui* 13, *repassere* 8, *colloqui* 6, *fabulare* 1, *confabulare* 1, *garrire* 1.

20.21 obliging: *officiosus*

20.26 conversed (*confabulamur*): See the woodcut on page 18, depicting a characteristic Ciceronian dialogue setting, and see *De oratore* 1.26–29, 2.16–23, where the Roman style of philosophizing is understood as an improvement on the Greek, by being more civilized and tactful. See notes to 4.16, 40.21–22, 41.8, 70.31.

20.27 associates (*socii*): See Book 2’s distinction between nations who are *amici* and those who are *socii* (pp. 83–90).

20.37 not very badly established commonwealths (*non pessime institutas ... respublicas*): See note to iii.2 on the word *respublica* in the full title of *Utopia*: “republic,” “state,” “commonwealth,” or “political organization” have been used by various translators. Note the *litotes*: “not the worst” instead of “excellently” or “fairly well” established.
20.38–21.1 both sides ... embraces: i.e., the tropics, where the sun starts “turning” back southwards or northwards (Greek *tropos*, “turning”).

21.3 without cultivation (*inculta*): Cultivation and lack of cultivation (what is needed for growth) are other themes developed throughout *Utopia*.

21.6 innate dispositions (*ingenia*): Here the word is applied to animals; contrast notes to 11.2, 13.18, 14.12, 15.17, 15.30, 19.3, 21.6.

21.16 not unskilled (*non imperiti*): litotes (see notes to 13.18, 20.37, 30.26–27, 35.5–6, 62.7).

21.17 taught ... use of a compass (*tradito magnetis usu*): The sense of “teaching” or “instruction,” along with the meaning of “handing over,” is implicit in the root *trad-*. Here it describes a kind of advance in “technology training,” one that introduces a convenience but also a danger to these sailors. See note to 44.4.

21.21 more carefree than careful (*securi magis quam tuti*): There is word play in the Latin: *securus* means “secure” in the sense of “without having to worry,” but the implication is that you need to worry sometimes to be truly “safe” (*tuti*).

21.23 design (*institutum*): “that for which this work was established.” See notes to 20.37, 21.30–31, 56.24, 57.13–14, 66.10, 76.35–77.2, 77.27–30, 79.23–25 on the importance of *institutum*.

21.25–26 right and prudent measures (*rete prudenterque provisa*): More emphasizes prudence and the conscious and intentional aspect of politics; see notes to 21.32, 68.37–38.


21.29 Celaenos: Vergil’s *Aeneid* 3.209–58. In Epigram 147, More describes Vergil as a “poet who is second to none” and who “wrote long ago that in *pietas* Aeneas was second to none” (*CW* 3.2: 195).

21.30 fictions (*portenta*): “fictions” or “monsters”


21.30–31 but sensibly ... citizens (*at sane ac sapienter institutos cives*): See the description of cities and republics (note to 20.37).

21.32 mistaken ideas (*perperam consulta*): Other translations such as “usages” and “practices” would not capture the intellectual element in *consulere*, hence “ideas.” See note to 21.25–26 above, on *provisa*.

21.33 recounted (*reconsulit*): See note to 20.21 above.

21.37 the conversation ... current (*sermo ... quo velint tractu quodam ... deventum est*): For other nautical metaphors, see notes to 36.25, 40.12–13, 40.33–34.

22.8 to entertain (*oblectare*): “to delight” is here paired with *exemplis ... instruere* “to instruct with examples,” which is another variation on the familiar Horatian formula of literary teaching with delight (*delectare/prodesse*). See the full title of Utopia (notes to iii.4, iii.5, iii.1–8 above) and the Utopians’ respect for fools at 79.35: *usus*/*oblectamentum*.

22.14 fulfilled the obligations: Raphael has already said above (see note to 20.6–7) he does his duty by giving away what he later claims is the source of all evil: money and property. See 42.13–43.23 and 99.17–101.27.
22.27 I live as I wish: This phrase, vivo ut volo, recalls Cicero’s vivere ut velis at 1.70 of De officiis in referring to kings or to those who plan their lives “to suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty.” See also Augustine’s City of God 14.25: “No man lives as he wishes, unless he is happy.” See also More’s translation of Lucian’s Cynic at EWTM 26n35 and The Life of Pico at EWTM 71.13–17 and 78.56.

22.28 royal courtiers (purpurati): “those clothed in purple,” the normal color of royalty

22.38 ruler (princeps): As noted in the opening paragraph of Book 1, princeps is here and generally hereafter translated as “ruler,” since the usual modern meaning of “prince” [king’s son] is different. Latin princeps [lit., “taking first place’] means chief or leading ruler. See Wegemer, The Young Thomas More 40–44.

23.1 spring (fonte): For this classical commonplace, see Erasmus, Education of a Christian Prince 2, 11, 39, 82; Plato, Laws 4.711c; Xenophon, Education of Cyrus, 8.8.5; Cicero, Letters to His Friends, 1.12; Plutarch, Moralia 778a. See note to 10.29.

23.3–4 learning ... practical experience (rerum usus ... rerum peritia): rhetorical variatio – appropriate here for the “variety” of experience

23.8 leisure ... business: For this traditional debate and tension between the contemplative (otium) and the active (negotium), see Augustine’s City of God 19.1–4 and George Logan’s The Meaning of Utopia (Princeton University Press, 1983), 100–103, 173–75, 179. More investigates this issue in his first work published in English, his Life of Pico, in which Pico, Earl of Mirandola, argues against negotium in the name of liberty and gives away his temporal responsibilities and much of the property associated with them (see EWTM 68.55–71.17; 78.56–58).

23.9 public interest: The phrase publica res might be translated either “public interest” or “commonwealth.”

23.11–12 arts of peace: Sallust uses the same phrase, pacis bonis artibus, in his “First Letter to Caesar” 1.9; Anchises includes the art of peacemaking – along with the art of law – in his famous description of what is most distinctive of future Romans in Vergil’s Aeneid 6.852–53: Hae tibi erunt artes: pacique imponere morem, / parcere subiectis et debellare superbos (“These will be your arts: to establish the ways of peace; to spare the conquered and fight down the proud”). Erasmus has an entire section on the “Arts of Peace” [Artes Pacif] in The Education of a Christian Prince, 65–73.

23.13 by fair means or foul (per fas ac nefas): at 67.29 as well; also see note to 31.27

23.12–14 far greater ... already: Epigram 243 expresses this same idea. See p. 114.

23.15 those who ... are all: The Latin use of double negatives, eorum nemo est qui non aut ... aut (“There is no one who does not . . .”) has been adjusted to English idiom: “those who . . . are all . . .” in order to keep the meaning clear.

23.17 freeload (supparasitantur): “to be parasites upon,” “to take a free ride on”: by agreeing with the statements of the favored courtiers they hope to become the favorites of the favorites. There is an example of this very phenomenon in Cardinal Morton’s court described later in the first book of Utopia (pp. 33–34).

23.20-21 favors ... own offspring: Erasmus, Adages 115, 121 (CWE 31: 158-60, 167-68)

23.31 we ignore (valere sinimus): an expression often used by More to mean “say farewell to,” “let go,” “ignore,” possibly derived from the Greek expression chaírein eán

23.38–24.1 civil rebellion ... slaughter: The civil war refers to the rebellion of June 1497 by Cornishmen.
23.4 respected (venerabilis): See Raphael’s other uses of the same root at 68.4, 95.35, 96.11 (veneratio); 90.8, 93.30 (veneror); 98.11 (venerabundus); see Morus’s use at 22.32 (veneror).

23.4 no less ... virtue: The Latin non ... magis quam, literally, “no more than,” has been adjusted in translation to better suit English idiom.

24.8 presence of mind (animi praesentiam): Cicero’s De officiis 1.80 gives this quality of animi praesentia as a necessary component of the honestas possessed by the princeps.

24.18–19 prudence in affairs (prudentia rerum): See More’s Letter to the University of Oxford, where More maintains that rerum humanarum prudentia is a fitting educational goal both for theologians and civil servants (CW 15: 138.17–18; EWTM 418.81–82).

24.22 strict justice (rigidam illam iustitiam): For More’s concern throughout his life and writings for equity (“the quality of being equal or fair”) rather than rigid adherence to the letter of the law, see Travis Curtright’s The One Thomas More (CUAP 2012), esp. 89–104. See also notes to 29.11–12, 29.34, 41.25–26, and 76.29.

24.22–23 strict ... England: Holinshed reports that 72,000 thieves were hanged in King Henry VII’s reign (Chronicles England, Scotland, Ireland, 6 vols., 1807: 1.314).

24.28 for the public benefit (ex usu publico): For this distinction of justice and utility, see below 28.32–33 and note to 28.33.

24.29 for punishing theft (ad vindicanda furta): Vindicare is a legal term for “punish, avenge, make compensation for.”

24.31 trade: The word ars is translated “trade” here, but below the same word is used when he refers to “practical arts” (line 37).

24.37 practical arts (artes mechanicae): Raymond of Lull (De septus donis Spiritus Sancti, Summa sermonum 2.41) gives examples: the work of the scribe, clerk, or merchant; and navigation, fishing, carpentry, iron-working, agriculture and shepherding.

25.2–3 as recently ... French: For the war with the Cornishmen, see note to 23.38–24.1 above; the war with the French could refer to any one of several campaigns in France, from the Hundred Years War (ending 1453) to the attempts to take Boulogne (1492), or even – anachronistically, given the fictional date of this reported conversation – Henry VIII’s campaigns of 1512 and 1513.

25.7 consider (contemplemur): i.e., with a scientific attitude. See 20.8, of Amerigo Vespucci’s travels, and 71.28, where the Utopian pleasure in the contemplation of the truth (veri contemplatio) is described.

25.8 idly (otiosi): without the good connotation of otium; see notes to 25.13, 25.39 and the Utopian discouragement of idleness at 62.5–8.

25.11 frugality (frugalitatem): Cicero explains in Tusculan Disputations 3.16–18 that Roman frugalitas “connotes all abstinence and inoffensiveness …, embraces all the other virtues,” and “is derived from ‘fruit’ [frug].” See More’s uses of this term in his first published work, the translation of Lucian’s Cynicus in CW 3.1: 11.15–18, 15.32, and 17.36 or in EWTM at 22.21, 24.16, 80.

25.13 followers (otiosi stipatores): Stipatores are the retinue who “crowd around” their leader (from stipare, “to thicken, crowd around”).

25.25 to serve (inservire): what Raphael did not want to do for kings
25.32–33 In fact ... each other: Erasmus, *Complaint of Peace* (CWE 27: 317). On the parallel between robbers and soldiers, see Augustine’s *City of God* 4.4: “Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but great robberies?” See Raphael’s closing critique of all existing commonwealths at pages 99–101.

25.36 another more pestilent pest: More uses alliteration in the Latin text: praeterea pestis pestilentior.

25.39 idle attendants ... should be supported (otiosos ministros alendos): The same verb is used several times in this passage and elsewhere in *Utopia* (translated as “support” or “keep”) to indicate “undesirable, wasteful upkeep” of the “idle” (otiose).

26.1 ‘wise fools’ (morosophis): as in the expression “sophomoric”

26.5 the hand ... idleness*: *Catiline* 16.3, recalled in Augustine’s *Confessions* at 2.5.11: ne per olium torpesceret manus aut animus

26.9 government: imperium

26.12–14 that not even ... as superiors: Most famous was Henry V’s victory at Agincourt in 1415. Henry VIII’s youthful ambition when he became king at seventeen was to be another Henry V; Henry VIII’s first invasion of France was in 1513, his second in 1522, and his third and most costly of all in 1542.

26.15 urban craftsmen ... farmers: The lawyer had contrasted “farmers and craftsmen” unfavorably with the nobly-born (25.27–29). Hythloday is countering the excessive regard for “nobility” associated with the arts of war and military prowess, with praise of the peaceful arts of laborers and artisans. He is suggesting that unemployed “nobly-born” soldiers would be more useful to the commonwealth and more virtuous themselves if they were educated in the ways of farmers and artisans.

26.21 good arts (bonis artibus): The contrast is again between the arts of peace (see notes to 23.11–12, 39.8, 66.15) and making an honest living (see notes to 24.31, 24.37), and the arts of war and theft, which “so nicely … agree with each other” (25.33).

26.24 commonwealth: As noted before (see note to 23.9 above), More uses the phrase publica res here, likely a slight variation of the phrase res publica done to emphasize the adjective (publica) to contrast, implicitly, with res privata (“private business,” “one’s own affairs,” or “private property”). The lawyer had implied that these private retainers should be publicly supported (or at least encouraged) at 25.27.

27.2–3 turn ... into wasteland (vertunt in solitudinem): See Tacitus, *Agricola* 30: ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

27.10 farming (res rustica): translated also as “farm labor” a few lines later. See res publica used elsewhere. More treats both as a singular.

27.13 sell off (venundant): “used chiefly of the sale of captured slaves” (L. & S)

27.14 when they are forced to leave (quam extrudi neesse est): Quam with the indicative emphasizes the temporal aspect more than the causal.

27.16 of course (scilicet): Often a marker of ironic statements in More’s earlier work Riébard III. See note to 41.26.

27.16–17 to become vagrants and beg (vagentur atque mendicant): The verb mendicare had an ambiguous meaning at this time, since the mendicant (literally, “begging”) religious orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans were so called because of their intentional dependence on charitable donations for which they “begged.”
27.18 vagabonds (*errones*): This term, implying an irregular or quasi-criminal behavior or social status, will be translated “vagabonds.”

27.27 from work into idleness (*ab opera … in otium*): See notes to 13.23, 23.8, 25.8, 26.5, 28.27, 44.37, 62.6–7.

28.4 damage: *incommodum*

28.14 nobly-born spirits (*generosis animis*): Again Raphael connects the nobility with the ignoble “art” of stealing.

28.17 extravagant (*insolentia*): Translated as “extravagant,” this adjective is used by Morus to describe Raphael’s speech and manner at 40.35; Raphael objects strongly at 41.8, 17 (“unusual”), but uses the same term at 43.13 (“insolent”).

28.23 make laws (*statuit*): At some places in Book 1, Raphael insists on the importance of laws, yet he also says that such laws are like giving medical treatment to sick bodies past cure – arguing that there is “no hope at all” of a cure and a return to a healthy condition without eradicating all private property (43.17–20).

28.27 idleness (*otio*): In its exploration of *humanitas*, Utopia raises the question about true leisure (*otium*) and its relationship to business (*negotium*). See notes 13.23, 23.8, 25.8, 26.5, 27.27, 44.37, 62.6–7.

28.28 usefully (*utiliter*): Cicero explores the relationship between *utilitas* and *honestas* in his treatment of the best way of life in *De officiis*.

28.30 vagabonds and unemployed servants (*errones et otiosi ministry*): See notes to 25.8, 25.13 and 25.39 above.

28.31 you: Here More uses the second person plural (*medemini, iactetis and sinitis*), so Hythloday seems to be addressing all those present at this meeting with Cardinal Morton and, presumably, all those reading the book, including those in power in England, by extension.

28.33 useful (*utilem*): This formulation of “just or useful,” implying that the truly just is the truly useful, echoes Cicero’s view.

29.11–12 discharge … reserve: For an explanation of the technical legal maneuver and joke Morton plays on the lawyer here, and for an excellent analysis of the judicial process of equity dramatized in this surprisingly long exchange, see Bradin Cormack’s *A Power to Do Justice* (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 114ff.

29.19–20 But if … over them: See above, 24.27–32, where the same point is made: the punishment is not deterring the crime.

29.28–29 absolute justice ... absolute injustice (*summum … ins, summa iniuria*): Cicero quotes this proverb at *De officiis* 1.33. Tilley’s *Dictionary of Proverbs in England* (R 122) gives several variations such as “extreme right is extreme wrong” and “extreme justice is extreme injury.” Terence also refers to it at *Heautontimoromenos* 795–96, and Erasmus’s comments upon it in *Adages* 925 (*CWE* 32: 244).

29.29-30 Manlian: Livy 8.7.1–22: Manlius, with extreme severity, ordered his own son to be put to death for disobeying an order not to engage in single combat with the enemy; see also Cicero’s *De finibus* 1.23–24, 34–35 and *De officiis* 3.112. Erasmus comments upon it in *Adages* 987 (*CWE* 32: 274–75).

29.32–35 Stoics ... affinity: Cicero rejects this Stoic position at *De finibus* 4.21–23, 75–77 and at *Pro Murena* 61.

29.34 equity: For the importance of this passage and the others on equity, see Andrew Majeske’s *Equity in English Renaissance Literature* (NY: Routledge, 2006), especially pp. 70 and 81, and chapter 2 of Cormack’s *A Power to Do Justice*. See notes to 24.22, 29.11–12, 41.25–26, 76.29.
29.36 God ... killed: Raphael does not distinguish between murder and killing. He also does not mention the Old Testament’s approval of capital punishment under certain conditions (theft is not one of them, excluding the kidnapping of persons, Ex 21:16, or the exemption from blood-guilt for mortally wounding a thief caught in the act, Ex 22:1).

29.38 commandment: More uses praeceptum for commandment, which was the common designation for the Latin Fathers of the Church.

30.11–12 Finally ... death: Ex 22

30.26–27 in no small degree: The litotes here seems to work better with a slightly rearranged word order.

30.28–29 Romans ... commonwealth: For ancient Rome’s distinctive mastery of the arts of rule, see Augustine, City of God 5.12.

30.34 Polylerites: “people of much nonsense,” from Greek poly (much) and leros (nonsense, humbug)

31.4–5 suitably ... distinguished: “Suitably,” here, for commode, which other translators render as “comfortably”;

31.5–6 In fact ... neighbors: This would also “explain” why no one in Europe at the time had heard about them before.

31.8 not to ... elsewhere: Erasmus criticizes this practice of giving stolen goods to the king in his Education of the Christian Prince 86–87 or CWE 27: 270.

31.19 serve the public interest: publicae rei servient

31.26 wage ... less: See the Rule of Benedict, cap. 57, where the artisans of the monastery are instructed to provide things “a little bit cheaper” than they are provided outside the monastery.

31.27 lawful (fas): By using this term reserved for what “is right or permissible by divine law,” Raphael makes a provocative statement. See 23.13, 67.29, 95.24 for other uses of fas.

31.30–31 hair ... cut off: Translators are divided about whether the fashion of servants mentioned in the side-note refers to the distinctive color of clothing or the haircut over the ears.

32.7 humane: The term used here, humanitas, Cicero heavily invested with the meaning of a “fullness of humanity” that includes justice and friendly concern for those in society. He used this term hundreds of times in his writings. For other important uses in Book 2 of Utopia, see 48.32, 68.12, 69.3–4, 83.14. It occurs in the Latin version of More’s History of King Richard III, CW II: 17.17, 47.14. See notes to 48.32, 83.14; also to 19.16, 28.27, 68.9.

32.7 beneficial (commodo): See notes to 31.4–5, 42.21, 68.31–32. This fundamental philosophic question of what is “beneficial” or “suitable” to human beings was raised in the Lucian’s dialogues that More translated (see ETWM 22.7, 24.1, 34n3) and by Cicero in De officiis at 3.26–28.

32.17–19 For how ... away: Raphael’s detailed straight-faced descriptions are somewhat amusing and ridiculous upon reflection: as if a naked man on the run would not rouse suspicion unless someone closely inspected his ear.

32.27 raising the expectation: A similar expression (praebere spem) was used to describe the opposite sort of expectation at 28.36 above.
32.36 went over to his side (*pedibus in eius ibant sententiam*): This is an idiom, a technical phrase used in the Roman senate. See Livy 9.8.13, 5.9.2, 22.56.1 for examples, as well as Erasmus, *Adages* 1612 (CW: 34: 8–10).

33.1 the ruler (*princeps*): Here the word refers to King Henry VII.

33.2 withholding ... sanctuaries: See the long discussion of sanctuaries or safe places of refuge for persons sought by the law in Richard III, *CW* 2: 27–41 or *CW* 15: 361–97 or *EWTM* 109ff.

33.15 hanger-on (*parasitus*): literally, “one who dines beside,” from the Greek *para siton*, “next to the food”

33.19–20 ‘if the dice ... Venus’: In antiquity, the winning “Venus” throw was four dice, each with a different number; see Erasmus’s *Adages* 113 (CW: 31: 154–55).

33.32 make a law (*legem ferre*): This is the etymological basis for the word “legislator,” who is a “law-maker,” not just someone who “passes” a law. For a similar use of this legal phrase, see below at 42.31 (with reference to Plato) and Richard III, *CW* 15: 464.26.

33.33 beggars (*mendici*): see note to 27.16–17 above. Franciscan and Dominican friars were understood to be mendicants or “beggars” supported by alms rather than by agricultural work and landed property, as the Benedictines and Cistercians were.

33.35 The Cardinal ... seriously: See note to 35.5–6.

34.8 with vinegar: See Horace, who uses the word “vinegar” to refer to crude insults, however witty, hurled at hapless victims (*Satires* 1.7.32). See also Erasmus, *Adages* 1252 (CW: 331: 164).

34.10 ‘son of perdition’: Jn 17:12; 2 Thes 2:3

34.13–14 In patience ... souls: Lk 21:19

34.15 Be ye ... not: Ps 4:4

34.18 Zeal ... me: Ps 68:10(69:9)

34.19–20 Zeal ... bald man: See 2 Kgs 2:23–24.

34.20 zeal: This is the word noted in the marginal gloss. It refers to a mistaken Latin case-ending in the spoken Latin of the friar. By saying “*zelus*” instead of “*zelum,*” it sounds like the friar is saying “*zelum*” or “crime, misdeed,” so he accidentally says that the scolding words of the bald man (the prophet, here) are a “crime” instead of “[good] zeal.” The side-note lends humorous realism to the scene by pointing out the angry friar’s unconscious mistake.

34.20 ribald: The term *ribaldus* is also of dubious Latinity, perhaps allowing More to further characterize the friar as an awkward speaker of Latin.

34.26 Answer ... folly: Prv 26:5

34.28 zeal: Once again the friar speaks incorrectly. See note to 34.20.

34.32 sent away (*ablegato*): *Ablegare* is commonly used only for banishment into exile, or dismissal from office.

34.36 talk (*sermone*): This word is used in the title of both books of *Utopia* at 18.1, 48.1; see notes at 13.9, 18.1.
35.5–6 by way of … not rejecting: See notes to 13.18, 20.37, 30.26–27, and 62.6–7. More’s familiar *litotes* (“not rejecting”) fits well with the “joking” assent of the Cardinal (33.35). The courtiers miss the effect of the joke and the *litotes*: they interpret “not rejecting, taking as a joke,” as equivalent to “seriously approving.”

35.11 regained … youth (*reperuercere … iucunda*): See Cicero *De oratore* 2.22 for a similar expression.


35.26 deeply tainted (*infecti penitus*): See *insedit penitus* of note to 40.12–13.

35.31–38 imagine me … mind: All these intrigues, and the ones described next, recently occurred in Europe. Two “marathon sentences” (as Clarence Miller described them) immediately follow in the Latin: the first one is 464 words and will extend to p. 37; the second is 926 words long and extends from pp. 37–40. The long, continuous sentences seem to prepare us, by steps, for the extended picture of Utopia in Book 2, and we have tried to reproduce them in the English. This remarkable verbal sequence perhaps explains More’s concern, at the end of Book 2, that Raphael may be tired out from talking.

36.6 Swiss: *Helvetii*

36.7–8 divine … offering: Raphael uses sarcasm here, using vocabulary associated with religious observance, such as “divine power” (*numen*) and “propitiated” (*propitiandum*), to refer to the Holy Roman Emperor.


36.26–28 considering … to it: This same thought is expressed in More’s Epigram 243 (“On the Lust for Rule”). See p. 114.

36.29 Achorian: “People without a country”: from the Greek *a* (without) and *chora* (country)

36.30 island of the Utopians: Utopia was first mentioned at 21.36, and the present context is Raphael’s own first mention of Utopia. Raphael’s next mentions of Utopia will be at pages 39.29, 41.9, 42.21, 43.34, 44.16.

36.30–37.2 once upon … warfare: Note the similarity to the situation in England described earlier in the dialogue.

37.10 ruler: *princeps*: as often in *Utopia*, used as a synonym for “king” and other offices.

37.16–17 he should … by them: See More’s Epigrams 111 and 112. See p. 112.

37.17 make it flourish (*ornaret*): alluding to one of Erasmus’s most famous adages – Erasmus, *Adages* 1401 (*CWE* 33: 237-43).

37.22 If … : Now follows in the Latin a second, twice-as-long “marathon sentence” of 926 words, ending at 40.8. The two exceptionally long sentences are separated by More’s one-liner at 37.21.

37.24–26 the value … collect: This manipulation of currency values was practiced by Kings Edward IV, Henry VII, and later by Henry VIII.

37.27 feign a war: Henry VII’s tactic in 1492.

37.29 pious ruler: This famous phrase, *pius princeps*, would remind a Renaissance humanist of Virgil’s epic hero, *pius Aeneas*. More uses this phrase in his *History of King Richard III* at *CW* 15: 424.8–9 and in Epigram 111. See p. 112.
37.30 antiquated (antiquatas): from antiquare, a technical legislative term meaning “to reject or abrogate a bill”

37.33 character of justice (iustitiae … personam): a kind of “false personification”; Henry VII’s royal tax collectors Empson and Dudley became so notorious and hated for this practice that young King Henry VIII imprisoned them shortly after his coronation and then had them executed.

38.11 false charge (calumnia): “a false accusation, malicious charge, esp. a false or malicious information, or action at law, a perversion of justice” (L & S)

38.14 own advantage: suo commodo

38.19 scrupulous: religiosos

38.20–21 concur ... Crassus: in Crassiano illo consentiunt atque conspirant also points to conspiratorial behavior: “are agreed on that saying of Crassus and conspire together”

38.21 ‘no amount ... army’: See De officiis 1.25.

38.22–23 a king ... themselves: Contrast this statement with Epigram 121 (see p. 112) and what Richard III says to the London citizens when he tries to get their consent to become king at the end of History of King Richard III, CW 15: 480.21–22.

38.27–28 poverty and scarcity: In the Latin, “poverty and scarcity” are treated as a single subject with a singular verb, and so likewise in the English here.

38.27–29 poverty ... rebellion: See Aristotle’s famous discussion about how tyrannies are preserved in Politics 5.11, esp. sections 5, 8, 10, 15, 18–19, and 21.

38.34 well: commodo

38.34–37 it is more ... shepherd: See More’s Epigrams 109, 111, 112, 115, and 120 for the same thoughts expressed here. See pp. 111–12.

38.36 duty of the shepherd: Shepherding is one of the crafts Plato has Thrasymachus, and later Socrates, compare to governance in the Republic (343d and 345c).

39.8 these methods (his artibus): See notes to 23.11–12, 24.31, 24.37, 26.21, 66.15.

39.9 name of “commander” (imperii nomen): In this context “command” (imperare, imperium) is virtually synonymous with “kingly rule.”

39.10 command: imperium

39.12–13 prefer ... himself: Plutarch, Moralia 194f and Cicero, De senectute 16.56 (where the saying is attributed to Mucius Curius).

39.13 authority: imperare

39.17–19 he who ... free people: See More’s Epigram 109: Servos tyrannus quos regit / Rex liberos putat suos: “The slaves that a tyrant rules / a king thinks are his own children / free men” [in Latin, literally “free ones,” the normal word for children, and hence there is word play in the political context]. See p. 111.

39.18 benefits: commodis
39.29 Macarians: “Blessed Ones,” from Greek makarios (“blessed, happy”)

39.33 by an excellent king: Note that the Macarians’ excellent law was established by the king himself. See 68.35–37 for the Utopian listing of legitimate modes of making law.

40.7 deaf … to the story: Erasmus, Adages 1387 (CWE 31: 376)

40.12–13 steal … has established: Military imagery is implicit in these verbs: an opinion has “seized” [praeoccupavit] the fortress of men’s hearts ahead of time and has established [insedit] itself deeply [penitus: see note to 35.26]. A persuasive argument would need to “flow” or “sneak into” [influere] their hearts like a quiet stream or a spy. Instead, Raphael wants to take the fortress by force, “wielding” [ingerendi] his speech like a weapon. Morus counsels against Raphael’s approach because such speech will not be granted entrance [admissum in].

40.15–16 But ... no place: See De oratore 2.16–20 for Cicero’s treatment of “tactful” and “apt” speaking. The Roman orator and statesman Crassus says: “Of all the words in the Latin language, none has so wide a signification as this word … ‘tactless’ [ineptus]” (2.17). He then goes on to point to a major difference between Roman and Greek culture: “The Greek nation, with all its learning, abounds in this fault [of tactlessness]. … They do not even bestow a name upon this fault” (2.18).


40.21 simile (in sidenote): Originally in Greek, homoiōsis (“likeness, comparison”) is here translated as simile.

40.21 stage (scenam): Erasmus, Adages 91 (CWE 31: 131–32)

40.21–22 adapting ... decorum: See Cicero’s De officiis 1.114 about the importance of choosing and playing “aptly” and “decorously” one’s part in the drama of life.

40.22 maintains ... decorum: See the argument in Cicero, Orator 123.

40.25 Seneca ... Nero: Octavia 440–588. In More’s time this play was attributed to Seneca. It shows the philosopher Seneca giving advice to Emperor Nero. For his first five years as emperor, Nero listened to Seneca – before Nero became the famed tyrant and before he ordered Seneca’s death.

40.26 A silent rôle: This side-gloss is given in Greek: kōphon prosopon.

40.33–34 the ship ... winds: For Cicero’s use of the same navigation metaphor, see Epistulae familiares 1.21 and Pro Sextio 46; for Seneca’s, see De consolatione ad Marciam 6.2 and Epistulae 85.33; Plato’s most famous is Republic 6.488d–e. More uses the same image in Historia Richardi Tertii, CW 2: 16–18; Responsio ad Lutherum, CW 5: 28–29; Dialogue of Comfort, CW 12: 6.13, 29.6–7, 56.30–31, 120.12–18 and in De tristitia Christi, CW 14: 265.1–3 or EWTM 1276.28–31.

40.37 an indirect approach (obliquo ductu): literally, “by indirect leading.” See notes to 40.12–13, 40.15–16, 41.32.

41.6–7 my discourse: Raphael is referring to his two examples of “preaching” in the previous long sentences with the fictional examples of the Achorians and Macarians.

41.8 unusual .. tactless (ad ineptias insolens): See notes to 28.17 and 40.15–16.

41.8–9 Plato ... theirs: More’s literary pretense, by which the Utopia is a real place in contrast with the pretended Republic of Plato, is also present in the “Utopian verses” at the beginning of the work; see p. 7.
41.16–21 if we ... ears: See Mt 10:27 and Lk 12:3 and the context of each. Apart from taking Christ’s teaching out of context here, Raphael will go on to indicate that Christ’s teaching requires the abolition of private property.

41.25–26 a ruler made of lead: See Nicomachean Ethics 5.1137b30 for Aristotle’s important discussion of equity and the measuring-stick made of lead (molibdinos kanon). See also Erasmus, Adages 493 (CWE 31: 465) and the notes above about equity, especially notes to 24.22, 29.11–12, 29.34, 76.29.

41.26 I suppose (scilicet): Again, an indication of irony, here: sarcasm; see note to 27.16.

41.31–32 “a helper ... insanity”: Adelphoe or The Brothers, 1.145–147: Si ... adiutor siem eius ... / insaniam profecto cum illo: “If ... I help him ... / I will be insane along with him.”

41.32 ‘indirect guidance’ (obliquus ductus): “indirect leading.” See notes to 40.12–13, 40.15–16, and 40.37.

41.34 advantageously (commode): again distinguishing commodum from the “simply good,” bona

41.34 the least bad (minime mala): responding to Morus’s advice regarding minime malum at 40.38–41.1.

41.36–37 gives inadequate praise (maligne laudaverit): i.e., to “damn with faint praise.” This may be what Raphael would call “indirect” advice.

42.6–7 Plato ... public affairs: Plato’s Republic 6.496d–e, but Raphael adapts the metaphor in the context Plato creates. Lord Chancellor Cardinal Wolsey used this “image” to justify war as indicated in More’s Letter 206 (TMSB 322, note 8 or EWTM 1312.87–1313.28).

42.14–15 private property ... commonwealth: Hythloday is seeking to contrast here res privata (private possessions, here denoted by privatae ... possessiones) with respublica (“commonwealth”).

42.19 considered happy in every respect (habitos undecumque commodè): literally, “[considered] advantageously disposed [when observed] from every direction.”

42.21 conveniently (commode): See notes to 28.4, 31.4–5, 32.7, 38.14, 44.26, 39.18, 41.34, 42.19, 44.4, 22.26, 55.26, and 68.31–32.

42.30–32 Plato ... equally: Diogenes Laertius (3.23) says that Plato declined to help the Thebans and Arcadians form a constitution for the new colony Megalopolis when he learned that they were opposed to equality of possessions.

42.32 share all ... equally: Erasmus, Adages 1 (CWE 31: 29-30)

42.35 private ownership (singulorum proprià): In Plato’s Republic, however, only the guardian class holds all in common. See Plato’s Laws 5.739b–e for the conditions suggested for complete communism.

43.19 healed: This common Socratic comparison of the good ruler to the good doctor occurs, for example, at Republic 4.425e–426a, Statesman 297e–298e, Epistle 7 330c–331a.

43.20 as long as ... property (dom sua cuique sunt proprià): literally, “while (their) own (things) belong to each (person)”

43.25–32 For how ... imagine: Aristotle gives two of these reasons in his Politics: when many people own something, each assumes someone else will care for it (1261b33–39); discontent arises because any distribution of limited goods inevitably gives rise to complaints (1263a10–15). Aristotle gives a third reason that More implicitly uses, one based on pleasure and our natural inclination toward benevolence: each naturally loves to have things of
one’s own (1263a40–1263b4); proper education of this love leads to growth in virtue, especially the benevolence and liberality characteristic of friends (1263b4–14). Cicero’s own extensive defense of private property in De officiis (2.73–85) is based on this “natural inclination to love our fellow men” – the “foundation of justice” (De legibus 1.43; see also De amicitia 23. Cicero defines the respublica as the property of all the people (De re publica 1.43).

44.4 conveniences of life (ad vitam commode): for the first mention of this theme in Utopia, see notes 21.17, 42.21.

44.8 histories (historia): Raphael’s tale of Utopia is also called in Latin historia in the first Letter to Giles (15.15) and in Budé’s letter (7.22) – but there and elsewhere translated as “account”; Busleyden’s letter claims at 105.1–6 that histories are hardly ever “reliably” recorded. Morus, in the second Letter to Giles, raises the question again of the trustworthy character of Utopia’s history at 108.4ff, as does Budé (5.23–25 and 6.12–13). Giles introduces Raphael to Morus as unmatched in ability to give an “account of unknown peoples and lands” (19.34–35: bominum, terrarumque incognitarum narrare possit historiam).

44.9 cities ... here: More again distinguishes between humans and civilized humans. See, for example, the savage and civilized peoples Raphael met on his world travels (21.2–9) and the rude and factious natives Utopus found in contrast to the peaceful cities he left as his legacy (48.30–33). Earlier, Morus identified his interest specifically as “people who were living together as citizens [populos ... civiliter conviventes]” (21.26–27).

44.14 Ultra-equatorials: See the location of the new world as somewhere “beyond” the tropics (20.38–21.2), and More’s uncertainty of Utopia’s exact location (14.28–33).

44.20 starting points (quaerendi seminibus): literally, “the seeds of discovery”

44.25–30 they immediately ... happily: Hythloday’s praise of the Utopians as being open to learning also implies that Christian-Europeans are not as receptive of new cultures, nor as industrious in learning from other civilizations, as they should be. More is setting the stage for the detailed descriptions in Book 2, by this expression of curiosity – as if he were taking Hythloday’s challenge to heart.

44.26 advantageously: commode

44.33–34 you think ... think (putes ... putabii): taking the second of the two instances of Latin verb putare (“to think”) as a (future) command

44.37 leisure time (otium): For the importance of this theme, see especially notes to 13.23, 23.8, 25.8, 25.13, 25.39 28.27, 62.6–7.

45.7 sat for a little while: Why draw attention to this dramatic pause?

48.1 Conversation: See note to 18.1.

48.7 two hundred miles across: In size, Utopia is similar to England; for the topics treated, see Aristotle’s Politics, Books 7–8.

48.30 Utopus: In devising laws that bring about significant changes, Utopus is similar to famous founders such as: Solon, whose laws prepared early Athens to be a democracy; Lycurgus, whose laws made early Sparta a highly disciplined and egalitarian military society; and Numa, whose laws promoted justice and trustworthiness (fides) while making Rome more peace-loving, humane, and respectful of the gods. Aristotle praises Solon of Athens and Lycurgus of Sparta for having established not only laws but an entire way of life (Politics 1273b30ff), while Plutarch laments that Numa’s effect on Rome did not extend beyond his own lifetime (see Plutarch’s Comparison of Numa with Lycurgus).
48.31 **Abraxa**: Abraxas was the name of an ancient Gnostic deity, the highest of the 365 spheres of the universe according to Basilides, a Gnostic writer of the early second century AD. The Utopians also use the name of the ancient Persian god Mithras: 90.19, 97.2.

48.32 **humane conduct** (*humanitas*): See the other uses of this rich Ciceronian term at 32.7, 68.12, 69.3, 83.14.

48.34 **digging ... Isthmus** (in sidenote): As Erasmus notes in *Adages* 3326 (*CWE* 36: 76–77), given the many failed attempts to dig a canal through the Isthmus of Corinth, the project became proverbial for an impossibly difficult task.

49.6 **fifty-four cities** (*civitates*): In More’s time, England and Wales were divided into fifty-three counties, plus London. See Erasmus’s Letter to von Hutten where Erasmus writes that, in *Utopia*, More “represented the English commonwealth in particular” (*CWE* 7: 23.281, *EWTM* 1374.6–7). This confederacy of fifty-four large city-states, each the size of London, led Alexander Hamilton to reject this arrangement as contrary to “the accumulated experiences of the ages.” See note at 49.17–18.

49.12 **Amaurotum**: From Greek *amauros* (dark, gloomy), thus a “ghost” or “phantom” or (see 108.14, 18) “vanishing” city. In the first edition of *Utopia*, in 1516, the name of this city was *Mentirano* (“City of Lies”). See the note to iii.3 for another significant change from Latin to Greek.

49.14 **first and leading** (*prima princepsque*): Yet Raphael insists at 50.26 that all fifty-four cities are “entirely similar to each other.”

49.17–18 **No city ... territory**: In *Federalist Papers* no. 6, Alexander Hamilton’s critiques this arrangement as simply impossible.

49.25 **phylarch**: from Greek *phylarchos* (leader of the tribe), with perhaps a play on *philarchos* (fond of ruling).

50.34 **Anydrus**: From Greek *an* (without) and *hydr-* (water); see Morus’s comment on this name and other names on page 108.14–18.


52.11–12 **one thousand ... island**: In the year of Utopia’s founding, 244 BC, King Agis IV of Sparta was put to death for trying to undermine private property. Cicero cites the example of Agis in *De officiis* 2.80 as part of his defense of private property. See Richard J. Schoeck, “More, Plutarch, and King Agis,” *Philological Quarterly* 35 (1956): 366–75.

52.26 **sypheos**: Perhaps “old men of the sty,” from the Greek *gerontes* and *sypheos*. These words and meanings are also found in the Greek dictionary by Hesychius that Raphael claims to have brought with him (*CW* 4, commentary at 183.1). See Ward Allen, “Speculations on St. Thomas More’s Use of Hesychius,” *Philological Quarterly* 46.2 (April 1967): 156–66.

52.26 **phylarch**: See note at 49.25. It is surprising that Raphael uses the older names for the magistrates except at 49.25 and 50.20. In referring to the magistrates in charge of each city, Raphael always uses *princeps* and not their actual name as given at 56.10–11, although Morus draws attention to this name at 108.14–18.

52.28 **tranibor**: Perhaps “clearly gluttonous” from the Greek *tranes* and *bors*. As Allen points out (see note to 52.26), “These derivations develop a consistent pattern which emphasizes the appetitive nature of the pre-Utopians” (157). In the period after Utopus’s conquest, the patterns suggest power as a major theme and question of the work.

52.28 **protophylarch**: “chief” or “head” phylarch; strangely, this word is used only here although the old name is used repeatedly
two hundred syphogrants: Given the limit of ten to sixteen adults in each household, Utopian cities would each have 60,000 to 90,000 adults, making them larger than the London of More’s day, which had 50,000 to 60,000 people.

city-ruler (princeps): See notes to 18.8, 22.38.

susicion of seeking tyranny: On the danger of even the suspicion of tyranny, see More’s Epigram 25: “On Suspicion” (CW 3.2: 117 or EWTM 227).

Senate or the public assemblies (senatus … comitia publica): On comitia, see notes iii.8, 14.3, 20.17, and 94.34.
council of the whole island: See 49.11–14.

craft (ars): Other words used to translate this word in earlier editions of Utopia have been: “science,” “job,” “occupation,” “pursuit,” “activity.”

vices … virtues: More may be thinking here of the Latin Christian epic Psychomachia by Prudentius (ca. 400 AD), which describes just such a battle of virtues and vices: “We have a way to win the moral battle, if we know at first hand the faces of the virtues and monsters that contend with them …” (Psychomachia, 18–20). Aldus Manutius produced the editio princeps of Prudentius and other early Christian Latin poets in 1501.

In the sidenote, the word doryphorēma (“bodyguard”) has a theatrical side, and is used to refer to any actor without a speaking part who follows a more important character, perhaps since this was often the case with those who were actual members of a bodyguard in comedies (see, for example, Lucian, How to Write History 4).

fitting use of nature (commodus naturae usus): See notes 31.4–5, 32.7, 42.21, 68.31–32.

useless crafts: The clever oxymoron in Latin, inertes artes (“inert arts”), is not easily captured in an English translation. The word inert is derived from Latin in + art- (“un- skilled”): “non-skilled skills.”

what pleasure … natural: The Utopian philosophy of pleasure, introduced here, is developed at 67.10ff.

five hundred (hominibus quingentis): following the 1517 and CUP editions

Barzanes: In their notes on this name, Hexter, Logan, and Miller all refer to Hebrew Bar “son of” and Doric Greek Zanes “Zeus,” but Lucian’s Menippus (translated by More) mentions “Mithrobarzanes” (CW 3.1: 31.5; EWTM 29.68). See also Ward Allen, “Speculations …” cited in note to 52.26.

Ademus: From the Greek a-demos (without people); see an-hydros (without water).

commonwealth has been established (constituta respublica): The language encourages the idea that architectural and building practices are of national political concern in Utopia.

of a house: Taking Latin domi as genitive “of a house, for a house” rather than locative “at home,” More is describing pre-fabrication. Even though a new building lot may not be ready, the work of prefabrication of a home (taking domi as genitive) would still require the carpenters to meet somewhere to work together, rather than “at home,” which implies that they would be working separately and individually.

fewer products (opera pauciora): “fewer works,” i.e., products of labor, or less consumption, rather than “less labor” or “reduced work,” as some translate

lead (eduanto): a military term for “leading forth” an army.

57.15–17 **as much time ... found**: Here is a preliminary statement of Utopian ethics, but with no hint of their philosophy of pleasure.

57.35–58.2 **But if ... cultivation**: Internal affairs here become the cause of external measures – such as colonization.

58.3 **admitting as citizens** (*ascitis*): used in Roman legal language as a technical term for making citizens (*L. & S. ascisco*, I.B)

58.11 **as nature prescribes** (*ex præscripto naturae*): translated as “law of nature” by some

58.18 **social life** (*convictus humanus*): See Cicero, *De officiis* 3.21, *convictus humanus et societas*.

58.19 **household** (*familia*): “all persons subject to the control of one man, whether relations, freedmen, or slaves” [OLD 674], as noted by Matthew Spring, “How a Utopian Education Paves the Way for the Usurpation of the Family,” *Moreana* nos. 187–188 (June 2012) 77–103, at p. 83.

58.24 **master of the household** (*paterfamilias*): See notes to 58.19, 59.7.

58.31–33 **pride ... Utopians**: These key themes of pride, money, and ostentation will be given special attention in the concluding pages of *Utopia*; see pp. 99–101.

59.7 **families** (*famuli*): See notes to 58.19, 58.24 for the linguistic pattern with *familiae* and *paterfamilias*.

59.29 **lying in bed**: *Decumbere* is often used of those who are lying ill at bed.

60.22 **like slaves** (in sidenote, *mancipiorum vice*): “like purchased slaves” would be another translation; Miller gives “lackies of princes”; Logan/Adams: “servants to royalty”

61.4 **natural disposition and talent**: Alternatively, this refers to their “character,” and these two words (*indolis ... et ingenii*) form a hendiadys: “natural disposition ... and character.” Cardinal Morton’s style of table conversation (24.13–15) is described in similar terms.

61.9 **the second course** (*mensa secunda*): this was, for Romans, traditionally associated with fruits and nuts, but did not always include specially prepared sweets.

62.6–7 **leisure activities that are not ignoble** (*otium non inhonestum*): See the similar use of litotes above, “no disadvantage” at 61.11–12 (*nihil incommodi*). Cicero often uses the phrase *otium honestum*, contrasting it with “laziness” (*desidia* or *inertia*) (see *Brutus* 8) and often suggests it includes study of “letters” (*litterae*) (*Epistulae ad familiares* 7.33.2) or philosophy (*Epistulae ad Atticum* 1.17.5). It might even be used to prepare for a return to public labors (for which, see *De officiis* 3.1).

62.8 **abundance of everything**: Note the connection between material abundance and the Roman concept of *frugalitas* (see pp. 56–57).

62.10 **as I have said**: See 49.11–14.
64.19 **emotional attitudes:** affectiones animorum

64.20 **Anemolian:** “Windy ones” is from the Greek anemos (breeze, wind); see also note to 7.27.

64.31 dazzling the eyes ... with the splendor of their apparel (oculus ... ornatus sui splendore praestringere): See Cicero, *De finibus* 4.37 and *De officiis* 1.16, 3.20 on the “splendor of virtue.”

65.13 **Crafty rogue!** This side-gloss is given in Greek: *O technítēn.*

65.14 **ambassadors’ fools:** For Utopian “fools,” see below, p. 79.35.

66.10 upbringing, having been brought up (educatio ... educti): In More’s Latin, the meaning of educatio as “rearing or training of the young” is contrasted here with Latin *doctrina et litterae* (i.e., what is now called education). The Utopian citizens acquire culture just from being born and raised in Utopia, where there are no wealthy persons to be worshipped just because they are wealthy. As Surtz/Hexter point out at CW 4: 158.4, it is a familiar humanist (and Platonic, Aristotelian) idea that a large part of education arises from “non-school” influences, such as “a well instituted state” (*ex bene instituta civitate*).

66.15 **liberal studies** (*bonae artes*): used frequently by More in his letters to describe the humanist education (also *studia bonarum litterarum, bonae litterae*). Sallust, however, used the expression with the more general meaning of “virtuous actions” or “noble means,” and in Book 1 Raphael uses the terms *bonae* (*malae*) *artes* with this more general meaning at 23.11, 39.8.

66.28 **recent dialecticians:** The critique of late medieval logical treatises (such as Peter of Spain’s *Parva logica*, which More mentions) is another important humanist theme. This is not a rejection of the medieval trivium as a whole – just of the excessive and decadent contemporary version of logical training in the schools.

67.2 **imposture of divination by stars:** Astrologers (as opposed to astronomers) are satirized by More in Epigrams 60–65, 67, 101, 118, 169, and 182.

67.10–11 they dispute ... as we do: Among the Utopians, there are limits to freedom of speech: for example, lack of belief in an afterlife is considered a kind of “heresy,” disruptive to public order and mores.

67.10–13 **In ... the soul:** This sentence, with its threefold division of “goods,” faithfully presents traditional ethical doctrine (Plato’s *Laws* 697b, 743e; Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 1098b12–14, *Politics* 1323a.24–26; Cicero’s *De finibus* 2.68, 4.56).

67.13 **soul** (*animus*): The standard word used in classical Latin for the whole complex of sensitive, emotional, rational and intellective powers relevant for ethics. *Anima* is used below when the emphasis is on the immortality or afterlife of the soul.

67.14–15 **in what ... consists:** This describes Cicero’s project in *De finibus bonorum* – the very words used in the marginal note.

67.15 **to lean too far:** *propensiores aequo:* “more prone than is right” – a rather unexpected assertion by an otherwise laudatory Hythloday, but consistent with what he has already said about the Utopians: in their customs, for example, at table “[t]hey are rather inclined in this direction (*aliquanto procliivores*) not to prohibit any kind of pleasure, provided no disadvantage is involved in it!” (61.10–12).

67.17 **human happiness ...:** From here until p. 74 is presented the Utopian moral philosophy, “the cornerstone of the Utopian edifice,” in the words of Logan, Adams and Miller, eds., *Utopia: Latin Text and English Translation* (Cambridge, 1995), p. xxxi. It resembles Epicureanism (but only in part) by emphasizing pleasure.
67.18 support (*patrocinium*): “patronage,” “sponsorship,” as coming from a higher, supra-rational level. Here the reader may begin to discern the non-Epicurean quality of Utopian thought. More playfully adapts a phrase of Cicero to describe the natural religion of the Utopians. Cicero twice describes (and rejects) the Epicurean school’s doctrine of pleasure as the “defense of pleasure” (*patrocinium voluptatis*; *De finibus* 2.67 and *De oratore* 3.63). The Utopians also “support” pleasure, but they must “seek” (*petunt*) such support from the transcendent principles of religion.

67.23 the soul (*anima*) is immortal: The combination of an “Epicurean” philosophy of pleasure with the non-Epicurean belief in the immortality of the soul is surprising, but it provides a justification for making the pleasure-principle supreme.

67.29 Only let him make sure (*Hoc tantum caveret ne*): Most translators have taken this as a potential subjunctive: e.g. Logan/Adams (1989): “His only care would be …,” as if the sentence were explaining what would happen if a Utopian did not believe in an afterlife and judgment. But it cannot mean that without an enim or nam, because the sentence states the same “pleasure-principle” that is soon repeated, with approval, at 69.15–18 and 73.34–36. More has shifted to an imperfect subjunctive, with a jussive force: in other words, this is the principle to be followed by a Utopian whose reliance on the Utopian religious principles is intact.

67.30–31 not to let … venegance upon: This is reminiscent of the Epicurean principles enunciated by the dialogue character Torquatus in Cicero’s *De finibus* (1.28–72), but More has creatively transformed them into a new religion-philosophy with an afterlife of the soul and incorporating Stoic and quasi-Christian aspects.

67.31 utmost madness (*dementissimum*): The identical word is used at 74.6, regarding the formulation of the Utopian (religious) pleasure-principle.

68.1 virtue alone: Reading *soli* (in agreement with *cui* [i.e., *virtuti*]) rather than *sola* (in agreement with *adversa factio*). The correction was first made by Egmond (Cologne, 1629), and has been re-affirmed by Lupton (1895) and Delcourt (1936). The “adverse faction” supports virtue “alone,” i.e., instead of being joined with pleasure and the hope of the ultimate pleasure of heaven. A member of such a faction would be the “rigid devote of virtue and hater of pleasure” (68.9) who would pursue a “empty shadow of virtue” (74.4) without hope for eternal reward.

68.9 sad and rigid (*tristis ac rigidus*): See 67.20. In Utopia, both religion and a Stoic-like cultivation of virtue (both recognized as “sad and rigid”) are reconciled with and subordinated to pleasure, yet Utopians promote common *humanitas* and the removal of the sadness of others.

68.15 do the same for himself as well?: As A. Prévost (p. 517) notes, this is a humorous inversion of “Do unto others what you would have them do unto you” into “Do for yourself what you would do unto others” (*L’Utopie de Thomas More*, Paris: Mame, 1978).

68.25 end of … operations (*finem operationum*): Use of the Christian word *operatio* contributes to the originality of Utopian moral philosophy, which is not simply “Epicurean” or “Stoic.”

68.30 in a common species (*eiusdem formae communione*): The use of the word “forma” here lends a certain “scholastic” flavor.

68.31–32 not to consult … troubles: Here the Utopian natural-religious principle of finding pleasure in one’s duty toward others and the common good continues from the previous page as part of the calculation needed to judge what is “good and honest” (67.37) pleasure. See also Cicero *De officiis* 1.153–55, 2.85 (invoking Plato), and 3.26–28 on the *commoda* of oneself and others.

68.35 material for pleasure (*materia voluptatis*): In this way, all Utopian legal relationships – private contracts and public laws concerning the equal distribution of goods – are integrated into the philosophy of pleasure.
68.37–38 **prudence ... piety:** The same unity of private and public virtues (*prudentia* and *pietas*) will appear with regard to euthanasia at 77.20–23 in the adverbs “prudent” and “piously” (*prudenter* and *pie*), but the distinction between the two is striking at 94.22–23. For the importance of prudence in the design of the book as a whole, see notes to 19.15–16, 19.8–20, 21.30–31, 24.29, and 102.18, as well as pages 14.26–27; 19.16; 21.25–27; 22.1; 30.34; 35.17–21, 32–33; 42.20; 43.16–17 vs. 24–32; 44.29–30; 77.19–20; 81.25–26; 82.37; 85.20.

69.2–7 **To deprive ... did without:** Here is expressed the special Utopian virtue of suffering for the sake of the pleasure of others – strikingly exemplified at 94.6–11.

69.6 **gratitude (caritas):** This is not the Christian virtue, but rather (in accordance with the Greek root meaning) the sense of human gratitude. The word occurs with the same meaning at 79.4 and 93.22. It has been translated variously as “love,” “affection,” or “gratitude.”

69.6–7 **brings ... without:** Based on comparing greater or lesser pleasures, this reasoning supports the “pleasure-principle” stated several times in this passage (see note to 67.18 above).

69.8–9 **religion ... agrees (persuadet … religio):** Here, a natural religious principle “assists” the Utopian reasoning about pleasure to believe in a reward in the next world for public spiritedness.

69.8–9 **Finally ... joy:** The reasoning in terms of the comparison of pleasures continues, and is a hybrid of Stoic and Epicurean ideas.

69.15 **appetitive ... nature:** See Cicero, *De officiis* 1.101 on appetite and reason as the “moving” and “clarifying” powers, respectively, of the soul.

69.15–18 **For, just as ... right reason seeks:** This re-statement of the “comparison of pleasures” rule (see 67.29–31 and 73.34–36) introduces the notion of justice (although in the negative, *iniuriam*) – now placed in the context of “right reason” and natural “appetite” ordered to the human being’s proper good.

69.28 **class ... pleasure:** Here begins a series of satirical attacks on six common pleasures of contemporary European society: clothing, shows of respect, precious stones, hoarded money, gambling, and hunting.

69.28–29 **those ... before:** See 56.33–38 above.

70.9 **as I have said:** See 65.25–26: “Utopians are amazed that any mortal soul could be delighted by the dubious gleam of a tiny gem….”

70.16–18 **But why ... true one?:** The pleasure-comparison principle here leads to a kind of moral superiority because it eliminates all the vain anxiety spent on getting assurance that the gem is genuine: the phony gem gives just as much pleasure to the eyes as the real one.

70.20 **contemplation (contemplatione):** See 20.8 (where *contemplandi* is translated as “behold”), 54.32, 71.28, and 93.35 for the other revealing instances of this word.

70.21 **true pleasure ... false one:** The comparison is between the superior pleasure of actually using money and the inferior pleasure of just looking at it. More uses a similar example but with significant differences at *CW* 12: 210 or *EWTM* 1202.

70.22–23 **hide ... lose it:** Instead of “losing” money by not using it and looking at it instead, this sort “loses” money by hiding it, and not even looking at it – a further reduction of pleasure.

70.29–30 **what difference ... safe?:** By the pleasure-comparison principle, there is no more pleasure in owning gold you are not using than in not having any to use at all.
inept (ineptus): On this distinctly Roman word, for a concept ("not fitting," in + aptus) not expressed in the Greek language, see Cicero’s De oratore 2.17–18 and notes to 40.15–16, 40.21–22, and 41.8 above.

they associate ... running: An essential component of Utopian moral reasoning is (amusingly) to establish just precisely where the relevant ("false") pleasure is located, and abstract from it. And so, just as gamblers do not really enjoy the “throw” of the dice as such, so hunters do not just enjoy watching the “running” of animals.

you ought ... dog: For More’s poem on this topic, narrated from the point of view of the rabbit, see Epigram 37 (CW 3.2 or EWMT), p. 111.

as we said earlier: See 59.1–12: “slaughtering … a practice that … diminishes mercy.”

ey consider ... craft: A positive – and traditional – view of hunting is given in Plato’s Laws 823b–24b.

pregnant ... honey: See The Four Last Things (CW 1: 132.17–19 and EWMT 479.41–43) where More uses the same example.

just as ... changed: See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8: “The lovers of what is noble find the things that are by nature pleasant” (1099a 13–14).

The pleasures ... types: At this point the argument moves from the satirical treatment of what pleasure is not, to a concluding account of what true pleasure is, from the Utopian perspective.


fond memory ... future good: These two kinds of pleasure show how a life of virtue and the religious hope of an eternal reward are essential components of the Utopian pleasure philosophy. “Contemplation of truth” refers to the present; the latter two pleasures refer to the past and future, respectively.

swollen (tumidus): well translated in CW 4 as “overblown”

foundation of all pleasures: Most of the remaining discussion on pleasure centers on the doctrine of basic good health as being true pleasure for Utopians. We have reached, as it were, the core of the doctrine. The earlier argument provides the framework: first, the social and religious principles whereby the “pleasures” of public self-sacrifice and next-life rewards are explained (67.10–68.32), and second, the satirical attack on false pleasures (69.18–71.25). Good health thus “counts” as the fundamental pleasure, and is superior to all other transitory bodily pleasures. Its stability (tranquillitas) qualifies it as intermediate between the temporal nature of the body and the immortality of the soul.

It is ... health: The marginal note gives Horace’s famous verse from Epistle 1.2.49–50: Valeat possessor oportet. Horace’s complete sentence is: valeat possessor oportet / si comportatis rebus bene cogitat uti (“If someone who possesses things plans to use well the things he has acquired, he ought to be healthy first”). Throughout his verse epistle, Horace argues for the priority of a healthy soul and strong character over material wealth.

rejected (explosum est): “To drive out by clapping,” “to hiss off the stage” is the literal meaning of exploso [ex + plaudere].
by means of some external movement (extrario … motu): Lupton proposed emending ex- to con-, but there is no justification for the change, especially because it would confuse the logic of the argument, which is not that health does not have an opposite: of course it does (see 72.35–37). The argument – which the Utopians have “exploded,” or “laughed off the stage” – is that health should not “count” as pleasure just because it doesn’t come to the attention so dramatically as the others (72.8–11).

health ... victory: The personification of health, hunger, and eating/drinking, is comparable to the personification of virtues and vices in the Utopian parlor game (p. 55), and facilitates another pleasure-comparison argument: if there is “joy” in the fight of food against hunger, there will be still more “joy” in the attainment of victory.

Therefore ... good life: The contemplation of truth is not listed here, although the Utopian love of truth-seeking was stated at 57.16–17 and 71.28. See also note to 70.20.

they resist ... sneaking up: The military image is in keeping with the context. The argument is Aristotle’s: Nicomachean Ethics 1119a.

it is better ... by it: If it is more pleasurable not to have such pleasures, the “comparison of pleasures” argument is becoming amusingly paradoxical.

if anyone ... pains: On the connection of pain with pleasure, see Plato’s Philebus 46d–47b, Gorgias 494b–95a.

the indulgence ... occasionally: After the true measure of the various corporeal pleasures has been taken (i.e., never lasting as long as the pain they remove, and always “dying” along with the “death” of the pain), the argument returns to a renewed piety toward nature (as an “indulgent parent”) through another comparison: although the pleasure of good health rarely has to be counteracted by the unpleasantness of medicine, the “daily sicknesses” of hunger and thirst, although they frequently have to be counteracted, at least bring the transitory pleasures of eating and drinking.

gifts of nature (naturae dona): More uses this phrase in his Lucian translation at CW 3.1: 13.39 and EWTM 23.49 in an argument of a similar kind.

form and beauty of the world (mundi formam pulchritudinemque): See Cicero, De amicitia 33.88: naturam mundi et pulchritudinem siderum; also De officiis 1.14, Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1078a36ff, Plato’s Symposium 211b7ff. Aristotle also stresses the role of beauty in right action in the Nicomachean Ethics 1099a (esp 22–25) and 1098a.

agreeable seasoning of life (iucunda ... vitae condimenta): “the condiments of life.” The final bodily pleasures listed here (beautiful sights of nature, fragrances, and music), founded on health, the core bodily pleasure, are transitional to the purely intellectual pleasures (of understanding truth, fond memories, and hope) already mentioned at 71.27–30.

this rule: another restatement and further qualification of the Utopian pleasure-principle

whenever the pleasure is dishonorable (si inhonesta sit): a point already mentioned at 67.36–37.

to refuse ... benefits: This passage recalls closely the statement made near the beginning of the ethics section (67.23–68.8). Such actions, “the Utopians” believe, show ingratitude to nature; they hold to “the indulgence of Mother Nature” (73.22). The strong condemnation of asceticism here certainly makes the Utopian philosophy seem “worldly.” But the main point of the criticism is that the painful practices would be done for their own sake, unreasonably, without faith in the eternal reward of virtue. As Baker-Smith points out, More is leaving room for an advance to a Christian life of faith and the redemption of suffering, which the Utopians do not know yet. But some of them are not far from Christian asceticism: we find out on pages 93–94 that the holiest Utopians are “led by [the Utopian] religion” (94.25) to give up pleasures of the present life and long for the pleasures of the future life.
74.6 utmost madness (dementissimum): used earlier at 67.31, where Raphael first seemed to reject fasting – in contrast, with More’s own articulation of the tradition’s insistence on it, including CW 8: 67 and 81 where More refers to Scripture’s examples of Moses’ and Christ’s fasting.

74.6 unless ... holy: Raphael indirectly alludes here to the question of the Christianization of Utopia, the beginning stages of which he will discuss below at 90.30ff. Raphael entirely approves of the mission, but at the same time emphasizes the religious freedom established by Utopus.

74.12–13 After all ... as well: Hythloday concludes his account of the Utopian religious and moral philosophy with this apparent disclaimer, but he will go on to speak of Utopia in unqualified superlative praise in the next sentence and at the end of Book 2.

74.33 our instruction (nosta interpretatione): i.e., “translation” since Raphael and his companions had to translate the Greek texts to them until they learned Greek themselves

74.34 to teach (legere): “to read aloud,” i.e., to recite and comment on (cf. the origin of the word “lecture”)

75.10–11 preserves ... magistrates: See anhydrus, amaurotum, phylarch at pages 49–51 and 108.12–18.

75.20 Hesychius’s … dictionary: First printed in 1514, yet Raphael says the Utopians had it a decade earlier.

75.22–23 gold ... anyway!: The Utopians’ peculiar treatment of gold and silver are recounted at pages 62–66. Although they possess much of it and hire mercenaries with it, they are said not to be attached to it in terms of their domestic economy, except to use as a way of identifying convicts and slaves.

75.25 Tricius Apinatus: A made-up name, meaning “stuff and nonsense.” See Erasmus, Adages 143 (CWE 31: 184).

75.26 Microtechne: the Ars medica or Art of Medicine, a popular medieval synthesis of Galen’s views on pathology

75.32–33 gain ... Author: Pleasure is again connected with natural piety.

75.33 Craftsman (opifex): probably a translation for demiourgos, the creator in Plato’s Timaeus; this Latin word is used in Ficino’s commentaries and summary of Plato.

75.37 craft: Literally, “work,” but “craft” brings out more obviously the reference back to opifex in the Latin text.

76.28–30 They do not ... slaves: Raphael states that there are limits on Utopian slavery. See page 89.21, where it is stated that the actual fighters of the war, not the civilians (as in ancient times), are the ones enslaved: … ceteris defensoribus in servitutem addictis, imbellem turbam omnem relinquunt intactam.

76.29 “fairness” in the side-note is aequitas. See notes at 24.22, 29.11–12, 29.34, 41.25–26.

76.35–77.2 treating ... upbringing: The all-encompassing education of Utopian society (see 66.9ff.) affects the penal system. The foreign convicts and “voluntary” slaves are given kindlier treatment than the natives who are specially punished in this way for not fulfilling the Utopian “promise.” See also the effect of Utopian social education on the military, at page 87.

77.8 as I said: at 59.10ff

77.20–23 prudent ... holy way: For a similar joining of prudence with piety, see the note at 68.37–38 and the illustration on 109.
77.27–30 It is honorable ... swamp: Raphael distinguishes between state-approved, public-spirited euthanasia and individually-chosen suicide.

78.24–25 since they ... spouse: The contrast between the Utopians and the “other countries in those regions” is similar to the contrast with regard to keeping treaties at pp. 81–82 where a comparison is set up with European countries, who sarcastically are described as most faithful to treaties.

78.33 old age ... a disease: Erasmus, Adages 1537 (CWE 33: 309–10)

79.19 nuisance of slavery: incommodo servitutis

79.23–25 But if ... chains: Compare this apparent lack of interest in any kind of rehabilitation with Raphael’s statement to Morton at 32.6–10 about punishments designed to be “humane and beneficial” (humanitatis et commodi).

79.36–37 In fact ... fools themselves: The point seems to fit the Utopian philosophy. The clowns are rewarded by causing delight for others; it is their mode of public service.

80.25–26 bundle ... hand: See Thomas More’s Letter to Erasmus of December 4, 1516 (EE 499; EWTM 279–80) where More says he dreamed of himself as a Utopian princeps, carrying just this symbol of authority.


80.28 trained as they are (sic instititae): Another reference to the Utopian culture, which is presented as performing much of the work of character education: see note at 76.35–77.2.

80.34 lawyers: The word used here for lawyer, causidicus, has a disparaging sense, even in an author such as Cicero who could look highly upon the legal profession (De oratore 1.202).

81.5 interpretations ... most unrefined ([interpretatio] maxime crassa): “unrefined, blunt, simple, thick.” Other translations have been less literal: “obvious,” “straightforward”; More may be thinking of the expression crassa Minerva of Horace’s Satires 2.233: “plain wisdom.”

81.14–15 common run of men: crassum vulgi iudicium

81.15–16 a life busy with earning a living (vita in comparando victu occupata): A very compressed way of saying that it might take a lifetime of leisure to figure out the legal complexities – certainly not available to the common man who must earn a living.

81.24–25 its well-being ... magistrates: See Cicero, De officiis 1.124, 2.27; De legibus 3.2; Pro Cluentio 146.

81.29–30 two evils – favoritism and greed (duo mala affectus atque avaritiae): referring to the two problems just described, bribery (greed) and influence (favoritism)

81.34 Treaties (Foedera): See notes to 18.9 and 89.15 as well as the use of this term in Epigram 32 on p. 111 – in contrast to foedera’s ten uses in this section.

82.3–4 in Europe ... everywhere: Raphael’s description of European faithfulness to treaties is sarcastic. At this point the Utopians are contrasted with their own neighbors (as with the question of marital infidelity or polygamy at 78.24–25).

82.23 two kinds of justice: The “two justices” are nearly personified here.

82.33 fellowship of nature (naturae societas): See “our natural fellowship” (pro naturae societate) at 68.8.
83.2 community of nature: *naturae consortium*

83.6 War ... bestial ... beasts: There is a pun in the Latin: *bellum* (war) and *belua* (beast), and *res beluina* (bestial thing).

83.14 humane conduct (*humanitatis gratia*): For the other uses of *humanitas*, see 32.7, 48.32, 68.12, 69.3.

83.15–16 so the friends can defend themselves (*quo se defendant*): Previous translators have not made it clear enough that the “friend” nations are “defending themselves” against their own enemies with the aid of the Utopians. As is clear a few lines below, the Utopians are not, in this circumstance, fighting in their own interest, in the sense of “defending themselves,” so the reflexive *se* (“themselves”), must refer to the friend nations, not the Utopians.

83.25–26 Nephelogetans ... Alaopolitans: *Nephelogetae*: a country of “people born from a cloud,” as if from Greek *nephelē* (cloud) and *genetai* (begotten, born from); *Alaopolitae*: a country of “non-people citizens” or “people without a country” as if from Greek *a-* (non) and *laos* (people) and *politai* (citizens).

83.34 passed under (*concessere*): In the flow of More’s long Latin sentence, the subject of this verb must be assumed from the context, and it would seem that the Alaopolitans are meant. The expression is intransitive (*L & S s.v. concedo, II.B*): *concedere in potestatem alicuius* means to “go under someone’s power,” submit to someone; consequently, the subject of *concessere* would not be the Utopians, as if they “granted” or “conceded” something to someone (transitive use *L & S s.v. concedo I.B.3a*). The military victory is finally that of the Nephelogetae over the Alaopolitans, and the Utopians only assisted.

85.33 valuable: *Caros* might also mean “dear” or “beloved.”

85.35 gold ... purpose: See 63.2–6.

86.1 as I said earlier: See 62.30–34.

86.2 Zapoletes: “busy sellers” – of military services.

88.5 integrity (*honestas*): See notes to 19.8–20, 24.8, 28.28.

88.17 unless: The Latin word *nisi* has been mistranslated “if” by earlier translators. This may be due to a printer’s error in the immediate context. *Nisi* will only make sense as “unless” (which it must mean) if the Latin phrase *ceteris superatis partibus* is corrected to *ceteris superatis partibus*.

89.15 truces (*indutiis*): a cessation of hostilities; an armistice. See Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.25; Cicero, *De officiis* 1.23; Sallust, *Jugurtha* 31.4. Compare this Utopian policy with their way of dealing with treaties (*foedera*) at pp. 81–82 and the use of *foedera* in Epigram 32.
89.21–22 The whole ... untouched: See p. 76.

89.33 “financial officer” (quaestor): a Roman magistrate originally appointed by the consuls and elected annually to perform mainly financial duties (OLD)

89.37–38 danger that I mentioned before: See p. 80.

90.13 energy: virtue

91.10 pontifex (pontificis): See 15.2 and note to 94.35.

92.28–31 They do ... encourage it: The restriction of open public discourse is contrasted with the encouragement of frankness with the authorities.

93.11 cremate: Strikingly, the traditional Christian method of burial is reserved for Utopian malfeasants, while the ancient “pagan” mode of cremation is reserved for the virtuous.

94.8 providing others with leisure: See 69.2–7 for the special Utopian virtue of suffering for the sake of the pleasure of others.

94.28 Buthrescae: From the Greek bou- (cow-like) and ibreskea (religious worship). The bou- prefix is used to mean “hugely,” “excessively.”

94.32 shrines (templia): used in classical Latin for temples of the gods, in Europe for churches, and, in Utopia, for the religious shrines of the Utopians. London had over 100 churches for a population between 50,000 and 60,000. A city of Utopia has thirteen shrines for 60,000 to 90,000 adults.

94.34 attendants (comites): On the title page, More identifies himself as a vicecomes, the translation of which is still uncertain. See notes to iii.8, 14.3, 18.11, 20.17, and 53.6.

94.35 high priest (pontifex): See Morus’s use of this term in his letter on page 15.2 and above at 91.10. Given the history of Europe, is this a hint of humor in suggesting there could be fifty-four popes or pontifici on an island the size of England—all in perfect harmony?

94.37 elected by the people: But as we’ve seen, the priests must belong to the scholar class, all of whom are nominated by the priests and elected by secret ballots of the 200 syphogrants. See 56.3–4.

95.13–17 they apply ... lives: See Horace’s Satire 1.2.69–70: “The jar preserves the fragrance longest of that with which it first was filled.” The same work of Horace was quoted in the side note on page 72.

96.9 one’s remaining fate: That is, one’s remaining life after the hazards of war. For this sense of religua fortuna, see Livy 5.40; Caesar, Alexandrian War 16.

96.25 temples (delubra): A word not used for Christian churches; used also at 97.20. See notes to 19.21 and 94.32.

97.18–19 in fear of ... punishment: Several times fear is indicated as a primary method of forming behavior for the Utopians. See esp. 97.28–29 and 67.24–25, 92.14–25, 95.5–11.

97.26 to place ... older person: This Utopian method of “social conformity” has been seen before at 60.24–29 and 87.14–16, 20–27.

97.28 religious fear: religiosum … metum

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99.31 goldsmith (aurifex): Literally a “goldsmith,” but, as Lupton points out, it means today’s “banker” or “money-manager” rather than some kind of artisan.

100.9 that squanders ... goldsmiths: See note to 99.31.

101.26 suckfish (remora): A fish that attaches itself to sharks, whales or ships, thought by the ancients to slow down the speed of ships. See remoratur (delays) and mora (delay).

102.10 I remembered ... people: See 23.22–26.

102.18 experienced in human affairs (rerum humanarum peritissimus): Cicero says that the philosopher and statesmen must learn to despise these things as passing goods. At De officiis 1.72, for example, he writes, “Statesmen, too, no less than philosophers – perhaps even more so – should carry with them the greatness of spirit and indifference to outward circumstances [despicientia rerum humanarum] to which I so often refer, together with the calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free … and lead a dignified and self-consistent life.” On the other hand, in More’s Letter to the University of Oxford, he urges learning the prudentia rerum humanarum as an essential preparation for theology (CW 15: 138.17–18, translation TMB p. 208n3, and EWTM 418.81–82).

102.19–20 I readily confess ... hope for: These last two lines restate almost word for word Cicero’s famous judgment upon Plato’s Republic. Compare the last five words of Utopia (civitatibus optarim verius quam sperarim) with Cicero’s civitateaque optandum magis quam sperandum (De re publica 2.30.52), but see the qualifications on page 227n6 in Thomas More on Statesmanship.

103.17 “extends the grass”: See Pliny, Natural History 22.8: “For in old times it was the most solemn token of defeat for the conquered to present grass to their conquerors, for to do so meant that they withdrew from their land, from the very soil that nurtured them and even from means of burial.”

104.17 ruling class (optimates): The term has strong associations with the oligarchic, republican government favored by Cicero (for the locus classicus, see Cicero, Republic 1.39, but the term is found throughout Cicero’s philosophical work, his speeches, and letters).

106.7 sources (fontes): See note to 10.29.

106.14 sources: See notes to 10.29, 106.7.

107.15 criticizing: The word notare might designate either noting a passage for its importance or for criticism.

108.3 accounting of all things: By calculi, More seems to have in mind the “counting stones” used to make detailed calculations. To “call to the counting stones” (ad calculos vocare) is to insist on a detailed accounting (see Livy 5.4.7), often where inappropriate (see Cicero, De amicitia 58). Here, he seems to dismiss the entire investigation into strengths and weaknesses of these philosophers as undignified, since he would have to report on the counting stones regarding the whole of their work.

108.7–8 truth ... minds: See More’s description of the proper work of the poet as ensuring that “little by little good opinions must be instilled into men’s breasts with honeyed verses” (mellitis numeris opiniones bonae sensim inferendae pectoris, CW 3.2: 644.6–7 or EWTM 468.63–65).

108.25–26 “I thank ... birth”: Terence, Andria 771–72

108.33–34 with arguments: Quaestio normally has a stronger connotation than questions. It involves a challenging enquiry. In the judicial sphere, it may represent interrogation, up to and including torture. In more open-ended discussions, it may represent a statement of a controversy, or a problematic starting point for discussion.

108.36 clever: Scitus is either clever or nice and attractive.
SELECTED EPIGRAMS

Pages 111–114, N.B.: The citations below are to epigram and line numbers.

Poetic Form: unless otherwise noted below, the poems that follow (translated from Latin) are originally elegiac couplets, i.e., a hexameter line followed by a pentameter line. According to Horace (*Ars* P. 75–6), the elegiac couplet was originally the medium for lamentations and votive epigrams. In Latin literature, however, the elegiac couplet was more typically an all-purpose meter without any strong connection between the meter and subject matter. It could be defined negatively as “not epic” insofar as epic poetry was typically heroic, martial, and public, whereas elegy was much more private, subjective, and domestic in its subject matter.¹ By the Augustan period, however, the elegiac couplet becomes the primary vehicle for erotic poetry. “Love Elegy,” as it is called by modern scholars, is characterized by the first-person descriptions of a lover who “figuratively enslaves himself” to a (usually pseudonymous) mistress, and thereby withdraws from the duties associated with public life (*OCD*: “elegiac poetry, Latin”). In the Silver Age, the meter was used primarily for short occasional poems, as, for example, in the epigrams of Martial, who is one of More’s principal models throughout the Epigrams. Indeed, More is somewhat unique in following the form of Martial, rather than Ovid who was the preferred model during the Renaissance and afterwards (*CW* 3.2, 33; *OCD*: “elegiac poetry, Latin”).

25 See *AP* 7.126 for the Greek original, attributed to Diogenes Laërtius.

25.1 Opinion … power (sim … opinio): Latin *vis* has the basic meaning “force” or “power” but it often carries the more negative connotation of “violence” (to which it is related etymologically) and “affront.” In the Greek original, Diogenes Laërtius addresses his reader as if offering a bit of friendly advice. In his version, More completely recasts the first line of the poem by making *opinio* the subject of a *sententia* that explains a general principle of human nature and society.

25.2 To do harm … you appear to wish it, you perish (laedere … videare, peris): More puts the verbs “to harm” (*laedere*) and “you die” (*peris*) in first and last position, where, according to the rules of Latin verse composition, they receive the greatest emphasis. *Laedere* plays on both meanings of *vis* mentioned above, admitting “to offend” and “to wound (physically)” as English translations. “You seem” (*videare*) is in the similarly emphatic next-to-last position and continues More’s meditation on the theme of appearance and reality.

25.3 Philolaus (*Philoleon*): More’s variant *Philoleon* for *Philolaon* appears to be unique, and its presence in all editions of the epigrams including those produced in More’s lifetime seems to be proof that it was intentional rather than a typographical error. The name Philolaus literally means “Lover of the People,” but More’s spelling obscures this. Perhaps More wished to make a pun on *Philoleon*, i.e., “Lover of the Lion,” referencing More’s comparison of tyrants to lions.

32.1 more expedient (*utilius*): The Latin adjective *ātīlis, ātīk*, used here in the comparative degree, primarily means “useful,” “profitable,” or “serviceable” (*OLD*). In Stoic philosophy, *ātitē*, often used as a substantive, denotes what is “expedient,” or “advantageous,” as opposed to *honestum*, “that which is morally honorable” (*OLD* 3; cf., Cicero, *On Laws* 1.41; Livy 23.14.3; Tacitus, *Agricola* 8.1). Cicero’s *On Duties* is the best-known discussion of this subject. Book 1 discusses “what is honorable” (*honestum*), while Book 2 covers “what is expedient” (*ātitē*), and Book 3 deals


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with what to do when the honorable and the expedient conflict. Cicero argues that there is no real conflict between the two, only an apparent one (On Duties 3.34).

32.1 trusted (fidēs): The adjective, fidēs, is etymologically related to the noun, fidēs, “faith,” “good faith,” “loyalty,” or “trustworthiness.” The Romans took “good faith” so seriously as a virtue that they established a cult to the goddess, Fidēs. Her cult is traditionally very old, and said to have been founded by Numa, the legendary second king of Rome (Livy 1. 21. 4; cf., Plutarch Life of Numa 16, Cicero On Duties 3.104), although her temple (on the Capitoline Hill, near that of Jupiter) is no older than 254 BC (OCD: Fides). Cicero defined fidēs as “truth and fidelity to promises and agreements,” and understood it as “the very foundation of justice” and a clear sign that human beings are meant “mutually to help one another . . . , to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness (On Duties 1.22–23).”

32.1 friend (amīcus): Throughout Epigram 32, More plays on the various shades of meaning of the term, amīcus, and its cognates (amicitia, 32.4; amor, 32.8), all of which derive from the verb, amō, “to love, be fond of, like.” Here amīcus means “a personal friend” (OLD, amīcus2, 1), while in line 4, amīcitia refers to the abstract noun, “friendship,” that is “the bond or relationship existing between friends” (OLD 1). Amor in line 8 refers to the “love,” or “affection” one feels for one’s friends.

In Roman society, amīcitia was also a political term describing the relationship between Rome and either another state or an individual, or between individuals. Typically, such “friendships” did not require a treaty (foedus, pl. foederī) or other formal legal obligations, but were often associated with alliance (societas). In Roman political and social life, the “friends” of a prominent man acted as advisors on both public and personal matters, and often formed into groups of political partisans (OLD, amīcus2, 3a). The networks of such “friendships” and the favors (beneficia/ officia) Romans did for one another were the social currency of ancient Rome.

According to Cicero, however, true amīcitia is not based on advantages or favors offered, but on genuine trust (fidēs, see above, fidēsus/ “trusted”) and affection (amor):

For it is love (amor), from which the word “friendship” (amicitia) is derived, that leads to the establishing of goodwill. For while it is true that advantages are frequently obtained even from those who, under a pretense of friendship, are courted and honored to suit the occasion; yet in friendship there is nothing false, nothing pretended; whatever there is is genuine and comes of its own accord. Wherefore it seems to me that friendship springs rather from nature than from need, and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford.

(De Amicitia 8, trans. W.A. Falconer, Harvard UP, 1923)

Cicero is here following on Aristotle’s distinction in books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics between three kinds of friendship: friendships of pleasure, of utility, and of virtue. That is, I may love my friend because he provides me with certain pleasures, or because of the ways in which he is useful to me, or because I observe that he has a virtuous character. For Aristotle, of course, friendships based on virtue are preferable because they are more stable and lasting. Moreover, in friendships of pleasure and utility, friends tend to treat each other as means to an end (either pleasure or some kind of advantage). For Aristotle, however, a genuine friend is someone who loves or likes another person for the sake of that other person. Wanting what is good for the sake of another he calls “good will” (eunoia), and friendship is reciprocal good will, provided that each recognizes the presence of this attitude in the other.

In Epigram 32, More seems to be criticizing these classical and aristocratic conceptions of friendship, all the while employing the language of Roman friendship. The two beggars are drawn together by a real necessity; they need each other and this need, in fact, makes them better and stronger. Their mutual interdependence is founded precisely on the kind of trust that Cicero claims is lacking in friendships based on need. Moreover, their need for one another engenders a mutual and genuine affection for one another. Their community is a real community and far superior to the crowd of arrogant noblemen who congregate around the king.

32.2 service (officium): The noun officium primarily denotes a “helpful or beneficial act done to someone,” a “voluntary service,” or “kindness” (OLD 1), but it also carries a sense of “moral obligation,” or “duty” (OLD 3). In his seminal work, On Duties, Cicero defined “duty” as “what is right” – the nearest Latin equivalent of the Stoic

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technical term, *kathēkon*, or “appropriate action.” As noted above (32.1, *utilis*), Cicero’s *On Duties* is a guide to discovering whether an action is one’s duty, and this, in turn, involves determining whether the action is “honorable” (*honestum*). According to the philosophical principles that Cicero outlines, no action can be considered beneficial or advantageous (*utilis*) if it is dishonorable. Honorable actions, by contrast, may be beneficial because they entail certain advantages such as glory and influence. It is worth noting that our modern culture tends to view virtue as internal to the agent and to divorce it from social status. For Cicero, however, and for the Romans more generally, the distinction between ethics and politics was less defined. The cultivation of virtue was not simply a private concern, but a public one as well. Thus, Cicero interprets virtue in terms of the obligations one owes to other individuals as well as to the republic as a whole: “For no part of life, neither public affairs nor private, neither in the forum nor at home, neither when acting on your own, nor in dealings with another, can be free from duty” (*On Duties* 1.4, trans. E.M. Atkins, Cambridge UP, 1991).

### 32.3-4 agreements ... bonds (*foedera*): In classical Latin, *foedus* (pl. *foedera*) is a legal term denoting either 1) “a formal agreement between states or peoples,” a “treaty,” or 2) “an agreement between private persons,” a “compact” (*OLD, foedus*, 1, 2). It can also refer, as here, to an informal “bond” or “tie” (of friendship, kinship, hospitality, etc., *OLD, foedus*, 4). *Foedus* comes from the same root (FID) as *fides* and *fidus* (see above, 32.1).

### 32.6 will you be guided (*regere*): The verb, *regō*, primarily means “to fix the line of (something),” “to maintain (things) in line,” or “keep (them) straight” (*OLD I ab*). Here it means literally to “direct,” or “guide” a person’s steps (*OLD II*). *Regere*, like *gestābere* in the previous line, are both in the passive voice, which emphasizes the subjects as the recipients of each respective action. *Regō* comes from the same root as the Latin word for “king” (*rex, regō; cf., l. 7, *rēgum*), and thus, also means to “govern,” or “command” (*OLD 10, 11*). The verb *regnat* (< *regnō*, “to rule as a king,” “to reign”) in line 8 is also derived from the same root.

In Epigram 32, it is, of course, the lame man (*claudus*) who possesses the power of sight and therefore the capacity for rule. There is a long tradition in Greek and Roman political thought that connects sight with knowledge, and knowledge, in turn, with the capacity to rule. The *locus classicus* for this is the famous allegory of the cave in Plato’s *Republic* (514a–520a). The verb, *regō*, and its cognates, are contrasted with *gestābere*, the passive voice of the verb, *gestō*, which means “to be carried about,” or “ride” (in a litter or other vehicle, or on horseback, *OLD III*) Thus, whereas the lame man possesses vision and knowledge and with them the claim to rule as monarch, so the blind man has the power of bodily strength. This strength gives the blind man a separate claim to political legitimacy. For as Leo Strauss observed, a state “must not only be wise but strong as well,” and, a state’s “strength by nature resides in the majority,” that is, in the people. Therefore, the lame man represents monarchy, the rule of wisdom, but the blind man represents democracy, the rule of the stronger. The alliance of the blind and the lame, therefore, represent a kind of mixed regime – the union of monarchy and democracy.

In Epigram 112, More also compared a good kingdom to the human body, in which the king represents the head and the people (*populus*) the body, a union that again is held together by natural affection (*amor*). Similarly, in the *Laws*, Plato describes his ideal regime as a citizen-body whose head and eyes are a council of philosophers (964e–965a).

### 32.7-8 from ... king (*altha ... amor*): Although the first six lines of Epigram 32 contain an implicit political message, “the concluding couplet (unlike any other sixteenth-century epigram) turns explicitly to the political” (Wegemer 2011: 113). The “requited love,” or “like-minded affection” (*concors ... amor*), between the king and the people is the necessary condition for a stable and well-governed political regime (Plato *Republic* 432a, *Laws* 684a–686b, 693a; Arist. *Pol. 1313a*). Such affection, *amor*, in turn, requires a kind of self-knowledge: “a clear-sighted and positive response to our flawed and therefore dependent condition” (Wegemer 2011: 113). In a well-ordered political regime, the king “mixes” with the people – to borrow Plato’s phrase (*Laws* 692a; cf. Polybius 6.6–7); the higher is the service of the lower and vice versa. This, of course, requires that the king be humble, not “proud” (*superborum, I.7*). Finally, it is worth noting that in *Utopia*, the character Morus observes that it is the duty of every good man not to shun the courts of ruler (*EWTM* 35.17). What keeps the good man and the dutiful citizen engaged in political life is that mutual affection that he has for his fellow citizens and for his king. *Amor* is, thus, the last word of the poem – the place of greatest rhetorical emphasis.

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33 Title: The Latin alter usually means that More is providing a variant translation of the Greek epigram, but 33 is not a version of the Greek original of 31 and, although it is formally a distich like the basis for 27–30, it is too unlike that poem to be regarded as a translation. Where the social dimension of the men’s cooperation in 27–30 is implied with verbs that may be interpreted as concrete, physical actions as well as abstractions, 33 makes the social and legal implications of the motif explicit. Through compression and reversal, More changes the emphasis of the AP 9.13a and frames the men’s agreement as a contract.

33.1 makes an agreement … that by mutual obligation (lege, pascitur aequa, ut): The verb pascitur followed by ut recasts the beggars’ decision to cooperate in heavy, legal terms. Passo is the usual Latin word for “to make a contract” and is the root of the English “pact.” The ut followed by subjunctive verbs in the next line enumerates the obligations of each of the men who have entered into the contract. Lege … aequa emphasizes the mutually binding nature of the contract, but may also be a reference to Horace’s Odes 3.1.14–15, which discusses the impartiality of necessity in assigning the lots of those of all social classes.4

33.2 The one carry the other … the other lead him (hic ferat illum… hunc regat ille): By maintaining the word order and verb endings while changing the case of the pronouns, More once again uses syntax to confuse the individuality of the two men.

37 Epigram 37 is not a direct translation of any one Greek original, but draws on elements from three poems (see AP 1.33.7, 8 – cf. AP 9.17 and 18 respectively – and 9, for which, see AP 9.371. All three poems describe a hare which survived a land attack by dogs only to be killed by dogfish in the water. There is added conceit in AP 33.8 that there may even be dogs chasing hares in the heavens, alluding to the constellations. In AP 33.9, the hare avoids nets only to be hunted by Molossian dogs, and to be killed by a dogfish when it plunged into the water. In AP 1.40.2 (cf. Pl. 9.14) and 1.40.4 (Pl. 9.94) a lucky old man catches an octopus which, on land, inadvertently snares a hare for him. In the second, the hare had just escaped some hounds only to be caught by the octopus. The old man keeps the hare but throws the octopus back.

The common differences between these and More’s epigram is, first, that More’s epigram is in the first person, spoken by the hare. Second, More’s focus is on the cruelty of man, not on the irony of an escape followed by a capture. He makes the chase and hunt wholly the design of human hunters. In this same vein, man as a whole is represented as cruel, not simply fortunate (see the phrases “harsh race” [durum genus], “Harsh slaughter” [Nec … aequa lege Necessitas / sortitur insignes et imos] and “cruel joke” [crudelem iocum] in 37.7–8 which have no parallel in the corresponding poems from AP).

37.2, 4, 7 oh, oh, O (heu, heu, O): The interjections at these lines 5, together with the reference to the rabbit as “a wretch” (misera) and even its female gender all successfully heighten the pathos of the piece which differs much from any of the parallel texts already cited from Pl.

37.8 a cruel joke (crudelem iocum): See also Utopia 59.1–3 on the conflict between the killing of animals and mercy (clementia) and especially 70.36-71.13 on the conflict between mercy (misericordia) (cf. the reference to rabbit as misera in line 5) and the spectacle of cruel killing (crudeilias, 70.12). There the image is, as here in Epigram 37, a hare killed by a dog.

109 Poetic form: The iambic verse form used here in 109 (iambic dimeter) is used only rarely by Horace, where it is combined with other verse forms. Iambic dimeter is used alone only in comedy (see Plautus’ Epidicus 27-28) and only occasionally in Seneca’s tragedies (see Agamemnon 759-762).

109.1-2 legitimate … most / savage (legitimus … immanissimis): As it does today, “legitimate” properly denotes the offspring of a validly contracted marriage, but it embraces the wider, transferred meaning of “done according to law.” The Tudor dynasty, of which Henry VIII was the second representative, ruled England after a generation of internecine warfare to determine who, in the absence of direct succession, had a legitimate claim to the throne. Being a relatively minor Welsh house, the Tudors did not have a strong claim by blood, and Henry VIII and his father were both anxious to produce legitimate heirs and make strong alliances with families that more closely related to the old royal house. As is implicit in other epigrams and from his writings as a whole, More placed little

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4 … aequa lege Necessitas / sortitur insignes et imos
stock in royal blood and located legitimacy in the consent of the governed as represented by Parliament. Here, More pairs “legitimate” with “savage,” a word that could also be rendered “monstrous” or “unnatural.” He thereby associates legitimacy with nature, order, and law and tyranny with chaos and invites his reader to consider the nature of legitimacy in both its senses.

109.1-2 king … tyrants (rex … tyranni): In the fifteenth century, political discourse had been dominated by conciliarists and republican theorists who sought to weaken the authority of monarchs in the government of both church and state. Italian humanists attempted to resurrect the ancient Roman abhorrence of the Latin rex; and the Italian Wars of the early sixteenth century provided for some a practical solution in favor of tyranny. Northern humanists, such as More, worked to make the best of the situation by acting as advisers to kings, hoping to encourage their sovereigns to rational action and moderation.

109.4 children (liberos): Liberos can mean “children” or “free persons” — suggesting at once their free legal state as well as their status as children, and hence making a nice contrast with slaves (servos). By imagining the king as the father of his people, More reinterprets the notion of legitimacy, arguing that the king must not merely concern himself with fathering heirs but also with directing the affairs of his kingdom towards the welfare of his people.

111 Poetic Form: iambic strophe, i.e., couplets consisting of an iambic trimer followed by an iambic dimer. For Horace’s use of the identical meter, an alternating iambic trimeter and dimer, which Horace introduced to Latin in the Epodes in imitation of Archilochus, see Epodes 5. This is all the more noteworthy in that More uses the rare verse form here and draws attention to it in the title. As a genre, iambic poetry was well known for “its conventions of bawdy narrative and abuse of individuals” (OCD: “Archilochus”). It had much in common with Greek Old Comedy (OCD: “iambic poetry, Greek). The name is derived from the Greek verb, ἰambiquein (iambizgin), which means “to abuse” (Diomedes Grammaticus 1.485.11 ff.). The tradition goes back at least to the Greek poet Archilochus (died c. 652 BC), whose invectives were so savage that one of his victims was said to have hanged himself (OCD: “Archilochus”). Horace, the leading Roman lyric poet during the Augustan period, began his career by writing ten Epodes (or iambi, as he called them) in which, he later claimed, he was imitating “the meters and spirit” of Archilochus (Epistles 1.19.23 ff.). In the Ars Poetica (79), he suggests the poetry of Archilochus and his iambs in particular were produced by rage (rabies). Despite the seemingly restrained tone of this and poem 121, the generic consideration may be significant.

111.1 dutiful ruler (princeps pius): Both Latin terms are closely associated with Augustus, Rome’s first emperor. Augustus eschewed the title king and avoided the appearance of monarchy and encouraged the maintenance of republican forms, at least in Italy. He allowed himself to be called princeps and primus inter pares, the first among equals and extra-constitutional “head” of the Senate. In the Aeneid, which celebrates the mythological origins of Augustus’ family, the founder of the Roman people, Aeneas, is frequently called pius, a term that has no strict English correspondent and combines loyalty, constancy, public service, and devotion to the gods.

111.2 father of the whole realm (tutus … regni pater): This line recalls another of Augustus’ titles, pater patriae” or “Father of the Fatherland.” The old republican title, awarded to those who had saved Rome from disaster or defeat, appeared in abbreviated form on Augustus’ coinage. The conferral of the title never became automatic, and modern historians consider the Senate’s ability to offer or withhold the honor a sign of the continuity of that body’s political authority throughout the imperial period. Republican movements from the eighteenth century to the present from the Americas to Turkey have also made use of variations of the title to honor “Founding Fathers.”

111.3 most fortunate (felicissimus): The Latin felix, which denotes divine favor, has a much stronger theological resonance than the English “lucky.” The dictators Sulla and Julius Caesar both worked to associate the term, which had been linked to republican triumphatores, with themselves. The emperors, both pagan and Christian, continued to use the word to describe themselves and the empire as a whole. Although Christian Latin usage prefers beatus, felix may sometimes be used as a synonym for “blessed.” Both terms have been rendered into English as “happy,” recalling that word’s relation to “perhaps” and “happenstance” and reminding the reader that happiness is the result of an equanimous disposition confronting inscrutable chance and trusting in divine providence.
112.1 one person ( unus homo): The metaphor of “the body politic” to express the relationship between the people and their governors was frequent in medieval political philosophy, from John of Salisbury’s twelfth-century treatise Polycraticus through Henry VIII’s Act of Supremacy.5 John of Salisbury’s concept of the “body” emphasized cooperation and reciprocity among the diverse members of a community in order to achieve harmony. According to G. R. Elton, beginning in the second quarter of the sixteenth century the “Tudor Revolution” had isolated the “Crown” from both the people and the king, laying the foundation for the development of the modern, bureaucratic state.6 The English constitutional historian F. W. Maitland argued that it was precisely in Henry’s reign, specifically in those acts leading to the English Reformation, that the conceptual cleavage between “corporations” and the individuals that formed them became not only possible but actual.7 More’s epigram maintains the traditional, medieval emphasis on the physicality of the metaphor and reinforces the mutual relationship between the head and members of the body.

112.2 head … limbs ( caput … membra): The Pauline account of the Church conceives of Christ as its head and believers as its members. See Col. 1:18, Col. 2:19, Eph. 1:22, Eph. 4:15, and Eph. 5:23. The “Doctrine of the Two Swords,” given classical expression in Boniface VIII’s bull Unam Sanctam, understood the kingship of Christ as being reflected in both the temporal and ecclesiastical hierarchies, especially in the persons of the pope and the king or emperor. In the central middle ages, the idea of papal monarchy prevailed against the earlier practice of lay investiture, but the removal of the papacy to Avignon and resultant schism saw a diminution of papal prestige and authority, inviting the development of conciliarist theories of church governance in the fifteenth century and the assertion of royal supremacy and the divine right of kings in the sixteenth and seventeenth.

112.4 For a contrast to the good king here described (and his respect for citizens and membra, the word used at 112.2), see Utopia, EWTM 160.18-23: “[W]e will overlook the many soldiers who come home crippled [ impendunt membra] from foreign or domestic wars, as they recently did from the battle against the Cornishmen and not long before that from the French wars” (omittamus eos qui suspe vel ab externis bellis, vel civilibus mutili redeunt domum, ut nuper apud vos e Cornubiensi praelio, et non ita pridem e Gallico, qui vel Reipublicae impendunt membra, vel regi).

115.1 dog, a defender: For the image of the ruler as a dog, see Plato, Republic 376e. Socrates had argued (376b–c) that the guardian needed to be mild to fellow citizens and fierce towards enemies, hence with the attributes exemplified by a dog. Custos is the term which Marsilio Ficino uses for the guardians in his translation of the Republic, so he renders the “good guardian” (φǎυξας ἄγριος, 375d) as bonus custos. For the image of the ruler as shepherd, see Homer, Iliad 2.105, 2.244, 2.255, 2.772, 4.413, 11.187, 15.262, 20.110, 22.278; Odyssey 4.24, 4.532, 14.497, 15.151, 17.109, 24.368, 24.456; Plato, Republic 341c and 488d, 345c; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1161a. For More’s comparison of Henry VIII to a shepherd, see pp. 12–13 of Young Thomas More and the Arts of Liberty.

120.5-6 if he ... to them: For a similar expression of this thought, see History of King Richard III, EWTM 100.45–49.

121 Poetic Form: iambic strophe. For more on generic considerations of iambic strophe, see 111 above. The first two lines are scanned thusly:

Qui eumque mulius || vir viri us unus praecest,
Hoc debebit quisquis praecest.

121 Title: It makes a bold claim about legitimate rule, drawing upon classical ideas of elective rulership and the necessary role of consent among free human beings. Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Polybius all distinguish

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between one who rules over free citizens who are “willingly obedient,” and a tyrant who rules by force over slaves (Plato, Laws 713–15, 723; cf., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1160a–b, Pol. 1285a, 1313a; Xenophon, Oeconomicus 21.12; Polybius 6.4–7). For Plato, the legitimate authority of government is grounded on its adherence to natural justice and cannot be transferred to some part of the body politic, whether it be a king, the people, or other state institutions (Laws 715d passim). As Wegemer (2011: 118) notes, More says in Epigram 121 “what he would say at the end of his life: that in England, Parliament has the ultimate authority (potestas) to make or depose kings” (cf. CW”15: 320.22–24). “It is also the view assumed by most of More’s political epigrams, and by Richard III, and Utopia” (Wegemer 2011: 136, n. 112).

121 Title: THE PEOPLE’S CONSENT (POPULUS CONSENTIENS): The idea of consent is not a modern “Enlightenment” notion but is rooted in the tradition of classical republican thought. For the Greeks, any good political order requires the willing acceptance, or consent, of the ruled (Plato, Republic 432a, Politics 291e, Laws 684a–b; Aristotle, Politics 1294b; Polybius 6.4–7). Cicero too argued that “consent is implicit” in “a community of right … with fellow citizens (On the Republic 1.39, On Invention 1.2–3, On Laws 2.14).”

121 Title: THE KING’S AUTHORITY TO RULE (REGNUM): Previous translators and commentators have rendered regnum as “sovereignty” (CW” 3.2, 169). Strictly speaking, however, regnum refers to the “office” or “power” of the monarch (OLD 1, 2, 4), which are, of course, essential to the notion of sovereignty but not sufficient. For modern political philosophers, the concept of sovereignty also entails a corresponding notion of political legitimacy, that is, “some sort of consensually conferred authoritative sanction.” Regnum completely lacks any such notion. The issue here has less to do with sovereignty per se, a concept that was just beginning to be worked out during the sixteenth century, and more to do with legitimacy. More’s claim seems to be that the consent of the people makes the king’s rule legitimate. In classical terms, it makes his monarchy a kingship rather than a tyranny.

121.1 man … many men” (multis … unus): According to Wallerstein, political legitimacy “requires reciprocal recognition, … a hypothetical trade, in which two potentially conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of power, exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy.” More reflects this reciprocal recognition in the interlocking word order of line 1: multis vir viris unus. Here the first word (multis) is an adjective agreeing with the third word (viris), while the second word (vir) agrees with the fourth (unus). This rhetorical figure, called synchysis (Gk. σύγχυσις, “mixture,” or “commingling”), draws our attention to the relationship between the “one man” who rules (praest) and the “many men” who are ruled by him.

121.2 rules (praest): This verb, praeest (<praesum), literally means “to be in front of,” “to be before (in time),” or “to be preeminent in (a certain quality or characteristic)” (OLD, præe). By extension, it comes to mean “to be in charge (of)” (OLD, praesum 1), or “to rule” (L & S, praesum 1). It is this authority to rule that is the central issue of the poem, and so More repeats the verb at the end of line 2, and again at the end of line 4.

121.2-3 owes … owe (dœbet…dœbet): The repetition of this verb, dœbet (<dœbeo), emphasizes both the ruler’s debt to his people and his moral obligation to rule at their will (OLD, dœbeo 6a). Debet is one of the key words in the poem, as "KING'S AUTHORITY TO RULE (REGNUM):

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8 More also makes this theme central to Epigrams 109 and 111.
14 See POPULUS CONSENTIENS above.
because it expresses the middle term of the witty syllogism.\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately the wit is very idiomatic for Latin, because \textit{debet} is used in line two with accusative and dative: \textit{debo aliquid aliqui} (“I owe something (accusative) to someone (dative),” but in line three \textit{debet} is used as the modal auxiliary with the complementary infinitive \textit{praeesse}: \textit{debo aliquid facere} (“I ought to do something”). Since the king “owes” his rule to the people who granted it to him, he “owes” it to them (i.e., he “ought”) to rule no longer than they wish.

\textbf{121.5 powerless (\textit{impotentes}):} Part of the humor of the epigram comes from the surprising conjunction of \textit{impotentes} with \textit{principes}, and the adverb \textit{precario} in line 6 in conjunction with \textit{imperant} (although the latter is not unheard of: cf., Tacitus, \textit{Agricola} 16.6, and Curtius \textit{Historia Alexandri Magni} 10.2.15). More seems to use \textit{impotentes} here to undercut the authority normally implied by \textit{principes} (as well as the expected \textit{praeesse}, which has been used in some form four times in four lines).

\textbf{121.5 princes (\textit{principes}):} In \textit{Utopia} and in other epigrams, \textit{principes} is translated as “ruler.” \textit{Princeps} (pl. \textit{principes}), the Latin word from which the English word, “prince,” is ultimately derived, is the title under which Augustus and his successors exercised supreme authority in the Roman Empire. Augustus chose the title, \textit{principes} (lit., “a leading citizen”), to “emphasize the non-military nature of his rule” (\textit{OLD} 3b, 6). He was always careful to dissociate his rule from a dictatorship and from the suspected monarchical intentions of Julius Caesar. More uses the word, \textit{principes}, “more than sixty times in \textit{Utopia}” (Wegemer 2011: 148), sometimes in a more generic sense of “leader” or “head,” as when he describes the Mayor of Bruges as “the \textit{principes} and head of Prince Charles’ delegation” (\textit{CW} 4: 46.23). Yet More also uses \textit{principes} in \textit{Utopia}, as he seems to be doing here in Epigram 121, as synonymous with \textit{rex}, “king” (cf., \textit{CW} 4: 46.10; \textit{CW} 3.2: 96.5, 28).

\textbf{121.5 proud (\textit{superbiunt}):} The danger of pride is consistent theme throughout More’s writings. See Epigrams 19.128, 32.7, 80.12, 95.9, 108.4, 114.3, 253.7, 265.14.

\textbf{121.6 at the pleasure of the people (\textit{precario}):} This adverb, \textit{precario}, is derived from the adjective, \textit{precarius}, meaning “not properly one’s own,” “borrowed” (\textit{OLD}, \textit{precarius} 1b), as well as “uncertain, transient, precarious; passing quickly by” (\textit{L & S}, 5; II). In legal terms, it means “property held during the pleasure of a superior” (\textit{OLD} 1a). The legal and political implications of \textit{precario} are indicated in this definition from the \textit{Digest} of Justinian:

\textit{Praecarium} is what is granted at the prayers of the seeker, to be used only for as long a time as the grantor permits it; this kind of liberalaity is derived from the law of nations, and differs from donation by this: when someone donates, he gives with the idea of not getting it back; he who grants \textit{precario} gives as if he will get it back whenever he wants to dissolve the \textit{precarium} (43.26.1).

Accordingly, a \textit{precarium} is a grant of the possession and general use of property made gratuitously and revocable at any time; if a person acquires a possession “\textit{in precario},” then that person understands that he himself in not the owner of that possession.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time, \textit{precarium} expresses the ruler’s request for legitimate authority as well as the people’s right to give it and take it back. The two cannot be understood apart from one another.

\underline{157} Translated from \textit{AP} 11.430; attributed to Lucian.

\underline{157.1 an overgrown beard (\textit{promissa ... barba}):} More has added the detail that the beard is long and hangs down, pointing to the ostentatious neglect of personal appearance characteristic of philosophasters. In the examples Erasmus enumerates in \textit{Adagia} 195, both Greek and Latin authors draw attention to the length of the false philosopher’s beard. The emperor Julian (the Apostate), who fancied himself a philosopher, wore a beard to align himself with traditional Hellenism. In his satirical essay \textit{Misopogon}, “The Beard-Hater,” draws attention to his long beard and unkempt appearance.

\underline{169.1 seers (\textit{vatibus}):} The old Roman \textit{ratus} was a pagan oracle rather than a Jewish or Christian prophet. While biblical and Christian accounts of prophecy describe the interaction of human and divine as inspiration, the Greco-Roman understanding is closer to possession. The oracle recited or chanted verses believed to be the \textit{ipissima verba} of a divine being. The trance state during which oracles produced their answers were often chemically induced.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{16} Special thanks to Gerald Malsbary for this and the following observations about \textit{debet}.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{17} Alan Watson (trans. and ed.), \textit{The Digest of Justinian}, Vol. 1. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 214.}
169.2 call forth (cien): The verb cieo has the primary meaning of “to put in motion,” suggesting that the astrologers are merely the authors of horoscopes rather than the interpreters of star signs.

169.4 hope and fear (sperneque metu): Cf. Vergil, Aeneid 1.218.

169.5 good tidings (propers): Propers are literally “those things hoped for.” Along with the future tense verbs, the speaker is stressing the impossibility of knowing the future and the futility of trying to do so.

169.6 as it happens (assole): Unlike soleo, which takes first and second person endings, the verb assulet is impersonal, making the speaker, rather than the astrologers, the medium of gnomic wisdom.

169.7 it will be good (invallity): Cf. Vergil, Aeneid 1.203.

169.10 level head (mens … acqua): The noun aequanimitas, “equanimity,” is rare in Latin, and phrases such as More’s are preferred, in general keeping with Latin’s preference for the concrete rather than the abstract.

198 The poem depicts a dramatic dialogue, although we only hear one side of the debate. The narrator does relate the interlocutor’s objections (ll. 24–25), but it is unclear whether the interlocutor’s words are actually quoted, or simply related obliquely. The poem begins with the narrator’s reply to the interlocutor’s question (quartis) of whether a monarchy or a republic is a better form of government.

As numerous commentators have pointed out, the title of Epigram 198 echoes the title of Utopia: “de optimo rei publicae status deque nova insula Utopia” (CW 3.2, 391; Wegemer 2011: 91). The source of the phrase, optimus rei publicae status is likely Cicero (On Ends 5.11, On Divination. 2.11, Tusculan Disputations 2.27, On Laws 1.15, On the Republic 2.30; cf., optimus status civitatis. Resp. 1.33, 71, 2.40), but the theme of the optimus rei publicae status was a standard subject of debate among Renaissance political theorists.

198 Title CONSTITUTION (REIPUBLICAE): The term “res publica” is notoriously difficult to translate. Literally, res publica means “property of the people,” as Cicero observed in his dialogue titled On the Republic, noting the formal equivalence “res publica res populi” (1.39). There is, however, considerable debate about whether or not its modern English cognate, “republic,” has any links to the type of government found in classical republics (cf., Pocock 1975, Rahe 1994). When Cicero names his dialogue, On the Republic, he almost certainly had in mind the title of Plato’s dialogue Republic (Gk. Πολιτεία, Politics, Laws 1.15). Although the title of Plato’s dialogue is often translated as Republic, politeia translates more literally as “constitution,” “regime,” or “form of government,” and the long tradition of calling Plato’s dialogue The Republic can be attributed to Cicero’s own treatise and treatment in Latin. More generally seems to use the term in the sense of “commonwealth,” or “public property,” i.e., to refer to a particular type of government. In Epigram 198, however, the sense of res publica seems to be much closer to the broader, Platonic sense of “constitution,” or “regime.”

198.1 king … senate (Rex … Senatus): The constitutional debates in classical antiquity usually involved the comparison of the rule of one (monarchy/tyranny), and of few (oligarchy/aristocracy), and of the many (democracy/ochlocracy, cf., Herodotus, 3.81–82, Plato, Republic 544e–569c, Politicus 302a–303b, Laws 683c–702b; 712b–713a; Aristotle, Politics 1288b–1294b; Isocrates, Ad Nicodem 17–21). More’s explicit exclusion of democracy is in line with the terms of debate among Renaissance political theorists, where the discussion focused on the relative merits of

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monarchical and republican forms of government. The fact that More seems to argue in favor of a republic sets him at odds with all other ‘northern humanists,’ who generally prefer “a well-ordered monarch to another kind of government.” Miller (CW 3.2, 391) also points out that in Epigram 198, More specifically rejects three arguments made by Isocrates in Ad Nicoclem (17–21); “(1) a king makes better use of his counselors; (2) a king performs better than those who have only an annual term of office; (3) monarchy avoids the dissention prevalent in governmental assemblies.”

Although More occasionally uses the Latin term, senatus, to refer to parliament (Wegemer 2011: 36, n.3), here it seems to refer to the Senate of republican Rome. That More has in mind the Roman Senate is evidenced by the repeated reference to consuls (17, 19), as well as to the one-year term limits of the consulship (omni anno, 17).

198.2-4 bad ... good (malus... boni): The terms malus (“bad,” “evil,” “wicked”) and bonus (“good,” “virtuous”; pl. boni) are used primarily in the moral sense. It should be noted, however, that in classical Latin, boni (as for example in bonis, l. 5, and honorum, l. 6) is also synonymous with the political term, optimates (sing., optimas) “noblemen,” which is, in turn, etymologically related to the adjective optimus, “best” (cf. Sallust, Hist. 11-12; Cicero, Sest. 16, 38). “The ‘good’ and the ‘best,’ with the implication of good birth, moral excellence, social distinction, and a just claim to rule, was how aristocrats (likewise, ‘the best’ < Gk. ἄριστος, aristos) liked to regard and designate themselves in Greece and Rome” (OCD, “optimates, populares”). If More intended us to interpret the phrase inque bonis multis in precisely this political sense, then Epigram 198 is making an explicit contribution to the debates concerning the role of the vera nobilitas in the optimus rei publicae status.

198.9-10 advisors ... counselors (consilio... consultores): Throughout Ep. 198, More plays on the various shades of meaning of the verb consuló and its cognates: consilium (10, 13), consulitor (11), consul (17, 19), consulatum (24), consuló (30). This is often contrasted with rec/ regó. The problem of counsel could be approached either from “the ruler’s point of view, focusing on the importance of choosing good counselors and learning to distinguish between true and false friends,” or from the point of view of a potential counselor, when the focus was on “the rival merits of otium and negotium – the life of quiet and contemplation versus the life of activity and business.” Consilium is typically translated as “advice” (CW 3.2, 229.10; cf., OLD 2a; TMSB 237.23). I chose instead to translate it here in this line as “advisors” (OLD 3), since it is contrasted with consultores, “counselors,” which invariably refers to persons (Sallust, Jugurtha, 64.5, 85.47, 103.7; Histories 1.48.1, 3.61.15). It seems likely that More wished us to register all the shades of meaning in the term consilium. The conjunction of the intensive pronoun, ipsus, and the reflexive possessive adjective, suos, in line 10 also highlights the fact that the king’s so-called counselors have little to no ability to guide or direct the king’s decision making.

198.11 chosen by the people (eligitur populo): The phrase eligitur populo is usually translated as “elected by the people” (CW 3.2, 229; TMSB 237). In standard Latin syntax, this would be an ablative of agent construction with a passive verb. The ablative of agent is expressed by the preposition ab/ab plus a substantive in the ablative case (e.g., laudātor ab ēōs, culpātor ab ilīs, Horace, Satires 1.2.11). In More’s Latin text, however, the preposition ab/ab is not present; there is simply the noun populo, probably in the dative case. One possible solution is that populo should be understood as a dative of advantage (AG § 376). In other words, the senator “is chosen for the people,” that is, for their benefit or advantage. If, however, we compare this construction with line 13, we find populo in exactly the same metrical position, as well as the dative reflexive pronoun, sibi, both of which are dative of agent constructions with perfect participles (AG § 375). In later classical writers, the dative of agent is used with almost any passive verb (Tacitus, Annals 12.1; Ovid, Fasti 3.1.597). The ambiguity is More’s Latin here may suggest that both meanings should be understood.

In any case, the notion of a popularly elected senate should almost certainly be understood in a more limited

27 Skinner 1978: 216–7. See also, Seneca, De Otio.
sense than it is in modern representative democracies. In Rome, this notion of popular election was more feature of Roman republican ideology than political reality. At no time in history were Roman senators ever elected directly by the people. According to tradition, the first senators were appointed by the king (Liv. 1.8.7). During the republic, consuls (and later censors) appointed new senators (OCD: “Senate: regal and republican period”). A man was eligible to be enrolled in the senate, however, only if he already had held the office of quaestor, a magistracy for which a man was elected by a popular assembly. So popular vote was necessary to confer imperium on magistrates, but even here, popular sovereignty was circumscribed insofar as the Senate still had to ratify the popular election of magistrates. In this limited sense, then, a Roman senator may be said to have been “elected by the people.”

198.13 made for (factum): This verb, factum, can also be used to refer to election (so, “was elected for”). At the end of the verse, it seems only to suggest making (so, “was made for”).

198.16 consul (consul): The title of the chief magistrate in the Roman republican constitution. Two consuls were elected annually by the popular assembly (comitia centuria). Their primary functions were to be the supreme military commanders, to summon the Senate and popular assemblies, and to execute their decrees (Polybius 6.12). Polybius regarded the consulship as the monarchic element in the mixed constitution of the Roman republic. Their power (imperium) was essentially that of a king, limited by the period of office and the presence of a colleague with the same imperium. The title, consul, is probably derived from constilium: both Cicero (On Laws 3.8) and Augustine (City of God 5.12) observe that the title of the consul is derived from his position as “one who consults . . . for the public good” (cf., Wegemer 2011: 36, n.4).

198.19 well-known fable (nota … fabula): Miller (CW 3.2, 391) notes that versions of this Aesopic fable are found in Aristotle (Rhetoric 1393b) and Plutarch (Moralia 790d). Miller does not relate, however, the moral that Plutarch gives for this story: “The regime (politeia) that always throws out the old men (gerontas) must necessarily be filled up with young men who are thirsty for reputation and power, but who do not possess an understanding of politics.” In denying the practical lesson contained in this fable, it is possible that More intends not only to reject the explicit claim that a new king is generally more rapacious than an old one, but also to attack the claims of the hereditary aristocracy.

198.22 This bloodsucker … skin (non … mittet hirudo cutem): This Horatian phrase comes from the Ars Poetica, in which Horace compares a mad poet, who grabs hold of anyone he meets and assaults them with his recitations, to “a leech that will not let go of the skin until full of blood” (non missura cutem, nisi plena cruoris, hirudo, Ars. 476). With these lines, More shows that he has assimilated Horace’s famous injunction that poetry should combine “instruction” with “delight” (Ars 333). The comparison of the king to a blood-sucking leech may be commonplace to us, but the literary allusion would surely have delighted More’s humanist readers.

198.23-26 but you say … this question? (At partum … tibi): The conjunction at introduces an objection, where the objector’s words will be either quoted or introduced obliquely. Here the interlocutor counters that disagreements about important matters impede the senate’s ability to make good decisions. The king, he seems to think, does not have this problem. These lines, then, point to the debate in Book 1 of Utopia concerning the topic of counsel. The narrator, of course, abruptly interrupts his own argument before he tells us why differences of opinion are so important to the deliberative process. As Wegemer (2011: 116) observes: “If the interrupted sentence would have been finished, this decisive reason would have been given: when there are important differences of opinion, these very differences will require consultation, serious discussion, and further study and

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28 Even members of the United States Senate were not popularly elected until 1913, following the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.
32 See also Lintott 1999: 104–109.
debate, all serving to bring out the principles and issues involved, and therefore enhancing the understanding and consensus of all....” Moreover, the narrator may have offered in response a position somewhat closer to Hythloday, viz., that kings more often ignore good counsel, and that it can be dangerous for anyone who attempts to move beyond mere flattery and actually provide good counsel (EWTM 35.62–39.28, 41.34–37). Thus, the narrator might have concluded, a republican form of government is better because debate ultimately leads to greater clarity and greater understanding of the issues, and, in turn, to better policy decisions, whereas in a monarchy, there is no real opportunity for debate, only flattery (cf. Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus 13.4).

More’s use of anacoluthon in line 26 dramatizes the traditional role played by rhetoric in the deliberative process. Deliberative oratory is the branch of classical rhetoric that is used for political debates. Its central topics are “expediency” (Gk. *sumpheron*, Lat. *utilitas*) and “honor/ justice” (Gk. *dikaion*, Lat. *honestas*; cf., Aristotle, Rhetoric 1358b; Cicero, De Inventione 2.52.156–8; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 3.8.1–3, 22–5). Typically, the orator argues that a particular policy or proposed course of action is advisable because it is either honorable or expedient (or inadvisable because it is dishonorable or inexpedient). This, of course, is precisely the topic of the last four lines of Ep. 198 (ll. 27–30). Both Cicero and Tacitus recognized that rhetoric could not function if a commonwealth is “constrained and shackled by the mastery of kings” (Cicero, Brutus 45; cf., Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus 36–41).

198.24 *fathers* (*patrem*): the customary title of the senate of Rome, for which see Livy 1.8, 2.5, 2.10; Sallust Bellum Catilinae 6.6.

198.27 *Is there … anywhere* (*Est ne usquam populus*): The anacloushon in line 26 also highlights another crucial interpretive issue: we do not know the identity of the interlocutor – the you (*tibi*), who presumably asked the question that is the title of this epigram. Depending on who the interlocutor is – that is, whether he is or is not a king – will drastically affect how he answers the narrator’s subsequent questions, beginning with the question of line 27. The narrator asks whether the interlocutor has the power or authority (*arbire*o) to institute a monarchy or a republic for a people anywhere. There are two important aspects of this question: 1) does the interlocutor have the authority to form a government, and 2) is there a people for whom he can form one.

First, as line 29 makes clear, if he has that authority, he is already a king. So, the only question remaining is whether or not he should hand over power to a senate – whether or not it would be expedient, or advantageous, for him to do so. If, however, the interlocutor does not have this power – that is, if he is not a king – as lines 27 and 28 seem to me to suggest, then, the whole discussion turns out to be mere political theorizing. Is there any value in such theorizing? This leads directly to the second aspect.

Regarding the question of a people, there is both a literary and a historical answer. The historical answer is obviously the Romans. Wegemer (2011: 116) rightly points us to Sallust (Catilina 6.6–7), who “reports that not only did the ancient Romans choose to get rid of monarchy, but Rome achieved its greatness only when they did... The condition for this major political change was having a group of leading citizens respected enough and capable enough of effective consultation, of ‘sound deliberation’ about the common welfare.” Thus, within the dramatic frame of Epigram 198, Rome seems to be a kind of model for republican reform; perhaps even revolution. The other possible answer – the literary answer – is, of course, the people of Utopia. As Miller observes: “The phrase ‘Est ne usquam populus,’ particularly because of the elision, suggests *Utopia*, to which More gave the name *Nasquama* in his letters to Erasmus” (CW 3.2: 50). The interlocutor may not have the ability to persuade the king to transfer power to a duly elected senate, and it may be too dangerous to openly advocate for republican reforms à la Rome, but literature may provide a way to suggest, however implicitly, a path to, and the merit of, such reforms.

In this way, then, More may be suggesting a position similar to Maternus’ in Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus. Maternus argues that under the republic, great orators “guided the people and the senate by their advice and prestige” (*et populum et senatum consilio et auctoritate regerent*, 37.5). Under the Principate, however, there is no “need of protracted decisions in the senate” (*longis in senatu sententiosis*) because the emperor – “the one man who is the wisest” – decides what is best for the state (41.4). Those who continue to speak in court, or in the forum, Maternus complains, traffic only in “flattery” (*a dulitiate*): “neither do they seem sufficiently servile to their masters, nor sufficiently free to us” (13.4). Thus, he justifies his own decision to abandon politics and oratory for the life of poetry. Yet, as the opening scenes of Tacitus’ dialogue make clear, Maternus is not writing bucolics; rather, his *Cato* is a political drama, named after the republican martyr, Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis. Instead of risking his “reputation and personal safety” in the forum (11.4), where the standards of eloquence have fallen so low, and there is no “freedom of speech” (27.3), Maternus opts to encourage revolutionary political ideals through the medium of imaginative literature. By the end of Tacitus’ dialogue, however, Maternus’ friends have convinced him
that he needs to more artfully conceal his criticisms of the regime, if he wants to live to see them realized (36–42).

In Epigram 198, More, the poet, quite literally makes his republican speaker fall silent at a crucial point in the debate. The narrator's aposiopesis, then, could be interpreted as his recognition that he has no real ability to give counsel, that it may even be dangerous for him to openly express his true opinions about politics, and that he ought to have a better understanding of who his interlocutor is before he says too much. This is why the narrator shifts his line of questioning in order to better assess the will or capacity of the interlocutor to affect the political landscape. Thus, More may be signaling to us that he sees his role as poet as “the closest approximation to the republican orator.”

198.29-30 If you ... useful? (Si potes hoc ... expediat): If the interlocutor is a king, then he need not deliberate about whom he should give his sovereign authority to rule (imperium) to; the obvious answer would be a Senate. But, would it be expedient for the king to hand over power? To anyone trained in classical rhetoric, the question of expediency would naturally entail the question of whether the proposed action (or policy) is just or honorable (Greek to diakazon/ Latin honestum, cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3; Cicero, On the Orator 2.82, 2.334–336; and esp. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 3.8). If the king were a good Ciceronian, he would, of course, reply that the expedient is honorable and vice versa – that there is no real conflict between the two, only an apparent one (Cicero, On Duties 3.17–19). Thus, the implicit question here is not only “would it work” (Wegemer 2011: 116), but also “would it be right” for the king to hand over his imperium.

It is worth noting, however, that the other option is never considered: i.e., if you are not a king, and so do not have the power to decide for a people whether they should have a king or a republic. The narrator implies that neither he nor the interlocutor have the authority to deliberate about such matters. Therefore, just like Tacitus’ Maternus, they must go outside the traditional venues for deliberative oratory (i.e., the senate) and find other opportunities for debate or deliberation in the imaginary world of literature. There at least they can find an audience before whom they can make a case.

Whereas Niobe was turned to stone, and Capaneus fell from the walls of Thebes, both dying after challenging the gods, Canace, having committed incest with her brother and having conceived, took her own life when her crime was found out. The unnamed performer haplessly happens on a successful imitation of Niobe and Capaneus, but leaves the author disappointed for staying alive and not imitating the myth of Canace. In the context of the Pl and the AP (11.253–255), the two epigrams coming before and after this one make use of a similar conceit: the dancer is described as imitating Niobe (or Daphne) on stage, perfectly imitating the stone which Niobe was turned into (or the wood which Daphne became).

243 Title: The title of Ep. 243 recalls Augustine's City of God, where he praises the faith and piety of the emperor Theodosius, who did not “burn with a desire to extend his rule” (latius regnandi capiti dare . . . flagrare), but was motivated by “a love of doing good” (benefaciendi caritate, 5.26). Augustine goes on to describe how God ultimately bestowed upon Theodosius a “vast empire,” as well as many other “temporal goods” because of Theodosius’ “true piety” (verael a pii, City of God 5.26). Theodosius’ dependence on, and pious devotion to, the will of God is contrasted with the Roman desire for “unbounded glory” (gloriam ingentem, City of God 5.12). Augustine argues that early in their history, the Romans lived their lives “without avarice,” and “each person was satisfied with what he had” (City of God 3.14). However, they, like other tyrannical regimes throughout history, were carried away by a “lust for power” (libido dominandi), and so “began to subdue cities and nations...and to think that the greatest glory belongs to the greatest empire” (City of God 3.14; cf., Sallust, Catilina 2.2). “This wretched lust for power,” Augustine concludes, “brings many evils upon the human race” (City of God 3.14).

243.1 Out of all the many kings ... one (Regius ... unus): Part of the artistry of the epigram comes from More's careful balancing of “many” (multis < multus) and “one” ( unus < unus). There are many who would lay claim to the title, “king,” but a true king – that is, the one who merits the title – is content to rule one kingdom well. For Plato, a true king is one who balances the demands of the many for liberty with the monarchic principle of authority (Laws 693d–694a). If, however, a king becomes “greedy,” and willing to “overturn cities, and overturn and destroy with fire friendly peoples,” the people will hate him and no longer come to his defense (Laws 697d).

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243.1 for whom one kingdom will suffice (regnum cui sufficit unum): The phrase regnum ... unum also recalls Hythloday’s similar criticisms of monarchs who desire the martial conquest of new kingdoms rather than the peaceful administration of their own realms (EWTM 36.27ff, 23.12–13). In his discussion of monarchy in Book 1 of On the Republic, Cicero has his Scipio argue that a good king is characterized by sound judgement (consilio), not by “anger, greed, or a lust for empire” (imperio ... cupiditatem, 1.60, 4–5). Aristotle too warned that hubris, that is, “the wanton violence, arising from the pride of strength or from passion,”(cf. LSJ ὡμής Α1) and “greediness” (Gk. πλεονεξία, pleonexia, lit., “grasping for more”) cause men to “engage in factional conflict (or civil war) both against themselves and against the regimes that give them the license to do so” (Politics 1302b5–10). Moreover, he describes this “grasping for more than one is due” (pleonexia) as one of the chief characteristics of the unjust man (Nicomachean Ethics 1129a32). Plato likewise calls pleonexia an “injustice,” “the source of civil strife,” and a “disease that belongs to kings who live arrogantly” (Laws 906c, 690d, 691a). Thus, he has his Athenian Stranger counsel lawmakers “not to look first and only to external wars,” but rather “to legislate the things of war for the sake of peace rather than the things of peace for the sake of wars” (Laws 628d–e).

243.2–4 there will be hardly one (vix ... erit): As Surtz and Hexter note, Erasmus also complained of “princes, ‘of whom you can scarcely find one… who, content with his own jurisdiction, does not attempt to add some territory to the boundaries of his realm’ – to the ruin of his own country” (CW 4, 311–2; cf. Erasmus, Opera 2.552). The phrase also recalls the Athenian Stranger’s observation in Plato’s Laws regarding the possibility of finding a philosopher-king: “there is hardly anyone anywhere nowadays” who both knows how to rule in the interest of the common good, and has the character to hold power without being corrupted by “greed and self-interest” (pleonexia kai idiopragia, Laws 874c - 875d). Thus, Plato has the Athenian Stranger argue that they must choose the second-best option: a mixed constitution governed by the rule of law (Laws 875d).

244 This epigram celebrates Henry’s successful siege of Tournai, a town in the Francophone part of Flanders, Belgium, on September 21, 1513. As Carlson notes: Henry VIII’s decision to join the “‘Holy League’ against France… and the subsequent English battlefield victories over France and Scotland, in 1513, occasioned an outpouring of bellicose propaganda… both the self-righteous saber-rattling that preceded and the disproportionate triumphal exultation that followed the fighting.” More’s comparison of Henry’s victory at Tournai to Julius Caesar’s complete subjugation of the whole of Gaul should be read as an ironic take on the latter. Julius Caesar, of course, was the prototype for all subsequent European monarchs, and Ep. 244, coming as it does on the heels of Ep. 243, makes clear More’s implied criticism of Henry’s imperialistic ambitions: Henry’s libido dominandi, like Caesar’s, will not be sated by the conquest of one French town.

244 Title OF TOURNAI (NERVIAE): Derived either from Tournai’s Latin place-name, Tornacum (or Turnacum) Nerviorum, or from Nervii, a Belgic people who occupied parts of Flanders, and who were conquered by Julius Caesar in 57 B.C. following a fierce and bloody struggle (Gallic War 2.15-28).

244 Title KING OF ENGLAND (ANGLIAE REGI): As Wegener (2011: 110) observes, the identification of Henry VIII “as king only of England, not of the customary “England and France,”” reinforces “the main point of the preceding epigram.” Henry’s desire to extend his rule ends, at least in this poetic space, in his loss of title. “This abridgment of sovereignty, Wegener (2011: 110, n. 28) continues, “is also present not only in Utopia’s introductory materials but also in all other copies of the coronation ode except for the presentation copy given to Henry in 1509.”

244.1 unconquered (invictam): Recalls the response of Ariovistus, king of the Germans, to Caesar’s demands that he not cross the Rhine again: “[If Caesar attacked], he would learn what unconquered Germans could accomplish through their fortitude” (intellectum quid invicti Germani... virtute possent, Gallic War 1.36). Caesar wrote that the Nervii were of Germanic origins probably in order to distinguish them from their Gallic neighbors (Gallic War 2.4; cf. Strabo, Geography 4.3; Tacitus, Germania 28). He considered the Belgae to be the best warriors in Gaul, and the Nervii to be “the fiercest by far” of all the Belgic tribes (Gallic War 2.4). Caesar’s victory over the Nervii provides an interesting counterpart to Henry’s at Tournai: other Belgic tribes surrendered to Caesar, but the Nervii refused to submit and nearly defeated Caesar’s forces at the Battle of Sabis. The Romans, caught off-guard by the ambush,

were saved only by their superior training and experience, and because Caesar’s daring charge to the front line inspired the Tenth Legion to turn the tide of battle (Gallic War 2.20-21). Caesar reports that their unwillingness to submit “nearly brought the name and tribe of the Nervii to utter destruction” (Gallic War 2.28).

244.3 without bloodshed (sine sanguine): Although Henry’s war was bloodless, it was also, as John Guy points out, essentially “pointless” because “Tournai had little strategic value.” Furthermore, the financial cost of conducting the war, of keeping a resident garrison, and of constructing a citadel in Tournai were extraordinarily high. More would have known all of this, because “his brother-in-law, John Rastell, had been in Tournai and would give [him] the inside story.”

244.3-6 captured … be captured (capit … capi): The repetition of different forms of the verb capio highlights the central theme of the poem: the capture of Tournai. In line 3, capit is repeated in order to highlight Henry as the active agent who captures Tournai “without bloodshed,” a fact which apparently makes him greater and better than Julius Caesar. Of course, it is not entirely clear how Henry is better or greater. Presumably we are to infer that Henry a better general because he took the town without bloodshed, and that he is a more restrained, or merciful conqueror. Caesar was of course famous for his mercy and restraint in battle. After the surrender of the Nervii, Caesar showed himself “merciful” (misericordia, Gallic War 2.28) toward the vanquished, allowing them to keep their towns and territories, and commanding the neighboring tribes not to attack them. It is, furthermore, patently absurd to compare Henry’s abilities as a strategic commander to Julius Caesar’s, who is widely considered to be one the greatest military geniuses in western history. The praise of Henry here is not simply empty; it is laughable.

The doubling of capit in line 3 is balanced by the repetition of different forms of the verb sentio (sensit, 5; sensisti, 6) each paired with an infinitive of capio – the perfect active infinitive, cēpisse, in line 5, and the present passive infinitive, capī, in line 6. This seems to emphasize the false opinions that each sides draws from the experience of the capture (OLD, sentio 6 & 8). Henry “believed” that the capture (cēpisse) of Tournai “conferred honor” (honorisīcum) on himself. As Wegemer (2011: 110), however, notes: “To write that Henry VIII ‘felt [sensit] that he had gained honor’ is much different from saying that he actually gained honor.” On the other hand, Tournai “believed” it was “useful,” or “advantageous,” (utile) for them “to be captured” (capi). Tournai’s perceived advantage here is possibly related to the debate over whether or not Tournai was given representation in Parliament. Yet, as Bradner and Lynch (CW 3.2, 404) remark: “the inhabitants of Tournai did not find the English occupation advantageous, since large numbers of them abandoned the city from the time of the conquest until the city was returned to the French in October 1518.” The contrast between the honorable (honorisīcum, 5) and the advantageous (utile, 6) again highlights the problems of providing good counsel to autocrats. Henry was ill-advised to undertake this war; neither he nor his advisors were able to distinguish what was truly honorable or truly advantageous, or to properly judge when the two seem to conflict (cf., Cicero, On Duties 3.19ff).

37 Guy, 48.
39 See Davies 1998 for a summary of the debate.